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FUNDAMENTALS IN SEXUAL ETHICS

AN ENQUIRY INTO MODERN TENDENCIES

BY

S. HERBERT

M.D., M.R.C.S. Eng., L.R.C.P. Lond.

AUTHOR OF

"AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHYSIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX,"

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PREFACE

THOUGH conceived earlier, and though quite an independent work, the *Fundamentals in Sexual Ethics* forms a natural sequel to my previous book, *The Introduction to the Physiology and Psychology of Sex*. The ideas formulated in the *Ethics* are built, as it were, upon a substructure of biological and physio-psychological facts, the interpretation of which is unavoidably coloured by the ubiquitous element of the 'personal equation.' This statement is necessary in order to enable the reader, and especially the ever ready critic, to form a just estimate of the opinions here offered.

I am under a deep obligation to Mr. Havelock Ellis. Not only have his works on *Sex Psychology* been a source of inspiration to me, but his generous assistance by the gift of some of his latest essays and the loan of books, including a MS. work of the late Mrs. Havelock Ellis, has been invaluable.

I also owe a great debt of gratitude to my wife, without whose unwearying and discriminating advice this book would not be what it is.

Mr. David Isaacs has given his kind assistance in seeing this book through the press, for which my thanks are due to him.

S. H.

MANCHESTER,
January, 1920.

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FUNDAMENTALS IN SEXUAL ETHICS

INTRODUCTION

"And she took of the fruit thereof; and she gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat. And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked. . . . And the man and his wife hid themselves amongst the trees of the garden." This Biblical narrative of Adam and Eve, relating how they partook of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, may be taken as typical of the general attitude towards the knowledge of sex. Indeed, according to modern Bible exegesis, the plucking of the fruit is to be interpreted as an allegorical description of the sex act itself,[1] and may thus well stand as a symbolical representation of the subject to be discussed. We are still to a large extent in this primitive state of fearing the tree of knowledge, and yet would fain eat of it. We make sex a sin, but do not take courage to deal with it. And yet, as H. G. Wells has shrewdly pointed out, "The future of sex is the centre of the whole problem of the human future."[2]

Great changes have come over us, and there are still greater in store. Ever since the days of the French

[1] See H. Northcote, *Christianity and Sex Problems*, second edition. Philadelphia, 1916. Note B.
[2] H. G. Wells, *The Passionate Friends.*

Revolution, Man * has become conscious of himself as an individuality, and this movement has affected woman as well as the workers. The awakening of woman's soul, which at first manifested itself as purely a cry for human rights in the spirit of Rousseau,[1] soon followed the growing political wave that swept over Europe in the middle of the last century, and shaped itself into the effort for woman's political emancipation.[2] This is the stage that fills with its contests the arenas of nearly every civilized country, and in which we still live at the present time. Though the issue has been decided successfully in many countries, it still remains the ideal and the battle-cry for most women of the present generation. It implies not only equal rights for women, but also equal duties, equal education, and, alas! also equal competition with man. Now it will become evident in the course of the following pages that this strain put upon woman's energy is not all to her advantage; in addition to the bright side there exists a reverse side also. And the wiser among the future mothers are finding out that a change in the economic relationship between man and woman, though of vital importance, does not necessarily involve an alteration in the real position of the sexes. In fact, they are coming to see that the essential cause of woman is the cause of sex. It is here that we find rooted the central phenomena of Man's life; it is here that we shall discover the true fundament of the family and society. In order to solve

* Throughout this book, wherever the context makes it necessary, we use the word "Man" with a capital M when man *and* woman is meant in contra-distinction to man = the male. Unfortunately, the English language possesses no equivalent to express the La in *homo* = human being.

[1] The great English representative is Mary Wollstonecraft with her *Vindication of the Rights of Women.* London, 1792.

[2] Here belongs John Stuart Mill's *Subjection of Woman.* London, 1869.

the question as between man and woman we must tackle the sex problem, carefully, earnestly, tenderly, but—fearlessly.

All life is change. Since Darwin this has become almost a commonplace; for it is now an acknowledged fact that there occurs in nature a progressive change in all species, including man. Evolution has become the master-key to the whole range of cosmic phenomena, and is the recognized method for the interpretation of all human manifestations, be they those of biology, psychology, sociology, art, or religion. But whilst admiring the wonderful spectacle of an ever-changing world, and enjoying the patient elucidation that scientists have given us of the deeper relationship and bearing of earlier civilizations to our own; whilst congratulating ourselves upon the hard-won progress attained in economic, political, and social institutions, we fain would have the world stand still in one respect—namely, that of sex. Even those who read with approval of the progress made in marriage-relationship since primitive times, or those who give their consent to a Married Woman's Property Act, or, may be—as a last concession—to woman's vote, even they view with horror a possible change in the sex relationship of man and woman. Nay, to them it would seem well-nigh inconceivable; yet all the time, according to the inexorable law of nature, it is going on in their very midst.

So far this process has been, as it were, an unconscious one, silent and underground, but the movement has now entered upon a new phase. Progress, instead of being left to run its course blindly, must henceforth become methodical and deliberate—in sex matters no less than in other affairs. For it is the very consciousness of this idea that enlarges our horizon and directs our powers for our own upward destiny. The whole modern feminist

movement is an expression of this new impetus towards progress. The old problem of Adam and Eve has to be reviewed in the light of modern knowledge; fresh bearings have to be found for changed social conditions. To readjust old sexual standards to new ethical needs is an urgent requirement of our time. Only a frank and fearless discussion of the whole issue between man and woman in all its aspects will enable us to throw some light on this otherwise dark and perplexing problem of the sexes.

PART I

THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SEX

Herbert Spencer, in his *Data of Ethics*, laid it down as a guiding rule that for the proper elucidation of a theory of ethical conduct it was essential to proceed from the much wider principle of conduct in general. For only by tracing ethical conduct back to its natural physiological source could its real meaning and purport be fully understood and rightly valued. Similarly, we may assert, if the subject of sexual ethics is to be grasped in its true perspective, if it is to be more than a mere hazard of prejudiced beliefs and sentimental ideals, we must build it, as it were, upon the solid foundation of scientific facts.

It is true that ethics does not deal with what is, but with what ought to be. But what ought to be must, or should, be regulated by what is—*i.e.*, by what is natural. It is too generally taken for granted that sexual ethical conduct can be determined by moral and social considerations alone. What a person ought to do in sex life, according to a preconceived ethical standard, is confused with the much more pertinent problem of what the average person can do according to the physiological rule. Yet these two notions must be kept clearly distinct. For while we cannot gainsay the ethical postulate that the sex life must be in agreement with the general moral law of society, there is no doubt that only mischief can result if such ethical demands are not in conformity with the physiological laws of sex.

Before we c n discuss satisfactorily ethical rules of sexual behaviour, we must, therefore, first of all get a clear idea of the nature of sex. This, we shall find, has a threefold content: first, there are the biological fundamentals giving us the root factors of sexual differentiation; then there are the physio-psychological facts of sex, which furnish us with the data for an estimate of the distinctive peculiarities of the two sexes; and, finally, there is the most important element of the sex norm—*i.e.*, the phenomena of the normal sex impulse, as exhibited by each sex respectively. Only a careful elucidation of these basic characteristics of sex will enable us to formulate with any degree of success some general principles of sexual ethics.

CHAPTER I

BIOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALS

Coming to the biological fundamentals of sex, we shall find that they resolve themselves into two distinct sets of facts, which, though closely connected, will with advantage be studied separately.

The two most elemental questions to be answered in the domain of sex are: firstly, what, at bottom, is sex?—*i.e.*, what is the peculiar something which makes a given being specifically male or female? And, secondly, given male and female individuals, with their distinctive traits, is the differentiation of these two sex types complete? The very formulation of these questions would seem to the average sex reformer not only futile, but stupid. For what would seem more obvious to common sense than that a man is a man, and a woman a woman? There would appear to be no doubt at all about their respective natures. On the other hand, the question where man ends and woman begins, or vice versa, would seem to be merely an empty speculation. Nothing is more certain to the average lay person than that man and woman were created separately, and have remained thus—individually distinct—ever since.

And yet these questions are by no means useless. The answers we give affect vitally the very problem of sexual ethics. Indeed, they have, and have of necessity, been answered—*ambulando*, as it were—crudely and categorically without much biological study or psychological insight. This is dangerous. Whether woman is equal

to man or not cannot be determined by political and social, or even ethical, predilections, but can only be decided, if at all, by the serious application of scientific principles. Now, considerable light has been thrown of late into hitherto dark regions of the sexual problem. Modern investigations have been so startlingly novel in their results, they have modified or controverted so many long-standing "facts" of sex, that they well-nigh tend to revolutionize our very ideas of sex and sex relationship.

It has been accepted as a commonplace up to lately, even by scientists, that the difference between the male and female lies in the possession of distinctive sex glands, the male possessing testicles (which produce sperm cells), and the female, ovaries (which produce egg cells, or ova). In addition, each sex possesses accessory, so-called secondary, sex characters, which are subsidiary in the process of reproduction. These are in both sexes the copulating organs, and, further, in the female the organs for bearing and feeding the young. These fundamental physical distinctions between the sexes are, of course, well known. But the secondary modifications of the body extend much further than this, and we find that most external and internal structures of the individual are adapted in accordance with the male or female function of the organism. This is simply a special case of Darwin's law of evolution, according to which altered function always brings about altered form in agreement with the mode of life. Indeed, as regards man and woman, it has been shown by Havelock Ellis and others that their organization is different in nearly every respect.[1] It would appear, then, that the idea of maleness or femaleness cannot be restricted to the possession of male or

[1] See Havelock Ellis, *Man and Woman*, fifth edition. London, 1914.

female sex organs only, but must be applied to the whole body. As J. A. Thomson puts it: "It seems, in fact, as though the body was 'sexed' through and through."[1] So far we are still on familiar ground that has been worked out since Darwin's days and is fairly well known.

But the problem does not end here. In trying to elucidate further the cause of sex, modern science has found that the appearance of the secondary sex characters is dependent upon the presence and proper functioning of the sex glands (testis or ovary). For experiments on castration in early puberty show that in the absence of the specific sex glands the characteristic male or female features of the individual do not develop, or develop only very feebly; and that, if castration is undertaken later in life, the castrated individual tends more or less to assume the characteristics of the opposite sex. It becomes evident, therefore, that the specific sex glands (in addition to their function of producing sperm cells or egg cells respectively) have a further function—namely, that of supplying the body with certain internal secretions, which are essential for initiating and maintaining the proper male or female formation of the organism, and for directing and controlling the reproductive functions during life.[2] The case tends to be still more startling, however, when we hear that, according to the latest researches, it is not the testes or ovaries alone that determine the sex of a given organism. There exist in the body various other glands, such as the thyroid, the thymus, the suprarenal, pituitary glands, etc., which by means of their internal secretions throw substances into the body that play a vital part in the determination of the sexual features, physical as well as mental. By the

[1] J. A. Thomson, "Sex-Characters," *Scientia*, Vol. XV., N. XXXV., 3, p. 392.

[2] See F. H. A. Marshall, *The Physiology of Reproduction*, chap. ix. London, 1910.

excess or defect of any of these glands the sex ensemble of a given individual may be modified in the direction of that of the opposite sex. There exists, in fact, according to W. Blair Bell, a correlation of all the internal secretions in regard to sex function, which has been called by him the "sex complex," and which determines the sexual character of the organism at any given time.[1] Now it has been shown that, though in a given individual the sex organs may be those of one sex, yet the general sex complex may be so altered as to present in the main the general features of the opposite sex; so that it may be doubtful whether the sex of a given individual should be determined by the sex glands or by the predominant sex ensemble. The features involved appertain not only to physical traits, such as voice, beard, rotundity of body, etc., but also to psychic characteristics. Blair Bell himself does not hesitate to declare that sex in all cases should be defined according to the predominant sex ensemble rather than according to the sex glands. Instead of distinguishing two sexes, we should rather speak of a male and female sex ensemble; or, as J. A. Thomson has done, of a male and female sex diathesis[2]—*i.e.*, a disposition towards a given sex, in the same way as we speak of a rheumatic diathesis, which means a disposition towards rheumatism.

We have arrived, then, at the conclusion that sex pervades the whole organism; and incidentally, that a combination of male and female characters may appear under certain conditions in a given individual when the sex complex is disturbed. This leads us to our second problem, the discussion of the question whether we have a right to assume even in normal cases a complete differentiation of the sexes into male and female. In

[1] W. Blair Bell, *The Sex Complex*, Preface. London, 1916.
[2] J. A. Thomson, "Sex Characters," p. 402.

order to answer this question we must go back to the root phenomena of biology, and enquire into the origination of sex.

It is well known that all higher animals, including Man, are ultimately derived from single-celled organisms that propagate asexually by fission. Gradually, as the individual cells combine into cell-colonies to form the higher multicellular organisms, sex cells are separated off from the whole cell-complex, which as germs serve the specific purpose of propagation. These germs are of both kinds, male and female, and are at first conjoined in the same organism; such organisms are therefore called hermaphroditic.[1] Now most authorities assume that this was the primary sexual state, extending fairly high up in the animal series (worms, snails, etc.). It was only gradually superseded by the separation of the sexes into two distinct types of individuals, the one male with sperm cells, and the other female with egg cells. A transition stage is still indicated in those cases where, in hermaphroditic individuals, the male and female germs ripen at different times, so that copulation has to take place for the purpose of propagation, just as in unisexual organisms. Furthermore, it has been shown that all higher animals, including Man, pass through a hermaphroditic stage where both sexual systems are still existent. But during embryonic growth one of the sexual systems (the male or the female) dwindles, while the other develops fully, indicating the ultimate sex of the individual. Remnants of the atrophied sex system are still traceable in the adult organism, even in Man. When part of the second sex system persists into adult life, in a more or less functional state, together with the predominant system, we get the pathological condition

[1] See the author's *First Principles of Heredity*, second edition, chap. ii. 1917.

of adult hermaphroditism.[1] But apart from these pathological cases, it has generally been taken for granted that with the development of one of the physical sex systems and the reduction of that of the opposite sex, the latter component was completely eliminated from the individual, so that in normal cases we get only pure males or females.

The last decade, however, has seen a considerable change in our views on sex. There has always been a certain amount of speculation, half religious, half philosophical, which took the existence of bi-sexual beings for granted. But it is only of late that the problem has received from the biologists the close attention that it deserves. Of course, the crude notion of a double monster—a man-woman—has to be abandoned as a myth. What is true is, that the double sexual elements, with which the individual starts in its development, persist to a certain degree right through life, though the actual sex organs are exclusively of one sex or the other. Most authorities now incline to the view that, whatever the actual cause of the determination of sex may be, each fertilized germ contains within itself both sexual components, male and female.[2] With the gradual embryonic development, one of the components becomes dominant, and expresses the actual sex of the individual, while the other component is not wholly abolished, but remains latent (recessive). It can, however, under certain conditions become active and add its share to the total sex ensemble of the individual, thus disturbing the balance of the original sex complex. This view gives us

[1] See Geddes and Thomson, *The Evolution of Sex*, revised edition, chap. vi. London, 1901.

[2] See F. H. A. Marshall, *Physiology of Reproduction*, p. 650 *et seq.*; and especially P. Kammerer, *Geschlechtsunterschiede*, Abderhalden's *Fortschritte der naturwissenschaftlichen Forschung*. Vienna, 1912.

the best interpretation of the phenomena of castration, and also explains most satisfactorily certain facts of heredity—*e.g.*, that the characteristics of a grandfather can be transmitted through the daughter to the grandson.

Some scientists, however, have gone further than this. They maintain that there is in reality no such being as an absolute male or an absolute female. For them, the admixture of the opposite sex ingredient in a given individual is not only a question of potentiality, but is an actuality. Every individual, according to them, is a compound being of male and female characteristics. This view has been put forward with great emphasis by W. Fliess,[1] who maintains that all living beings, plants as well as animals, possess a double active principle, the male (which has a rhythm of twenty-three vital units) and the female (with a rhythm of twenty-eight vital units). This idea has been still more elaborated by O. Weininger,[2] who posits in every organism two kinds of plasma, a male and a female. According to him, each cell possesses male and female sexuality in different degrees, quite apart from the sex of the whole body; though, as a rule, there is a tendency to the same specific sexuality in all cells. All kinds of combinations of the male and female plasma are possible in different individuals, to which Weininger has tried to give arithmetical expression. But such calculations are purely speculative. The fact, which has found more and more favour with modern scientists, remains, however, that sex differentiation even in normal individuals is never, or at least rarely, complete.

Two important results flow from this biological enquiry. The first is, that there exists a male and a female diathesis differentiating the sexes from each other; and that maleness and femaleness are not confined to the reproductive

[1] W. Fliess, *Der Ablauf des Lebens.* Vienna, 1906.
[2] O. Weininger, *Sex and Character,* part i. London, 1912.

organs only, but pervade the whole body. Secondly, this differentiation of the sexes is not complete; every individual represents a sex ensemble which, though predominantly male or female, always contains the sex elements of the opposite sex. These additional elements are generally latent, but, under certain abnormal conditions of altered internal secretion, they may break through the actual sexuality of the individual. In addition, a varying admixture of the opposite sex is most probably normally active in all sex beings, thus leading to "the possibility of an infinite gradation of sex" (Heape). These conclusions will be found of vital importance when we come to the consideration of certain sex problems. It will then appear how absolutely essential a sound biological foundation is for a proper judgment in matters of sexual ethics.

CHAPTER II

PHYSIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA

We have seen that the two sexes differ from each other in their sex ensemble. Our next task is to find out how far this principle is applicable in special to human kind, the immediate object of our study. In other words, we have to investigate the natural distribution of male and female characters in man, in order to find out whether there are any fundamental criteria distinguishing man and woman.

In no other field of the sex problem has there been such an accumulation of contradictory evidence as in that of woman's peculiar traits. The battle has surged hither and thither without apparently any decisive result. Old prejudices have encountered new prepossessions, and there appears to be no way out of this deadlock of opinions pro and contra. Proofs and demonstrations have been enlisted—often quite unconsciously—on preconceived political or social grounds, so that it would seem impossible to decide the question in an unbiased scientific manner. If an attempt is to be made to gain any clear light on this problem, it is first and foremost essential to rid ourselves of the 'idols of the mind,' and try to get some prime data to build our opinion upon. This can only be achieved by viewing man and woman in the first instance as biological entities—*i.e.*, by going back to the zoological sex differentiation of organisms in order to find the root principle of sex distinction in Man. That which is common to all living beings is most likely to afford us some clue to the real

meaning of sex in Man, and may thus enable us to distinguish between what is fundamental and what accidental in the make-up of man and woman.

We have already seen that the essential distinction between the male and the female diathesis is due to a difference in the sex complex that controls the bodily metabolism of each sex—*i.e.*, there exists a specific male and female metabolism. How can this difference be expressed? It has been shown that the most primitive distinction between male and female organisms is that of their relative rate of metabolism. While the male tends towards activity, is relatively more disruptive, and breaks down protoplasm, the female rather builds up, is constructive, and tends towards stability. As Geddes and Thomson have expressed it, the male is relatively more katabolic, the female more anabolic.[1] The male is active and mobile, the female relatively more passive and stationary. We see this behaviour exemplified not only in the lowest single-celled organisms, where the male seeks the female, but also in the germ cells of the higher animals, where, as a rule, the small active sperm has to find its way to the much more bulky stationary egg cell. So far as the higher animals are concerned the same rule holds good to a great extent, the principle being applicable, with few exceptions, to the modes of life of male and female respectively. It may be said that, on the whole, a division of labour exists as regards the sex functions in such wise that the male is generally more energetic and aggressive; while the female, on the contrary, tends to store and conserve energy, and has more persevering resistance and stability. This fundamental distinction has reference to their respective shares in the process of reproduction. The

[1] Geddes and Thomson, *The Evolution of Sex*. Revised Edition. London, 1901.

female, upon whom in the higher animals falls the main burden of bearing and rearing the young, necessarily needs to conserve her energy for this supreme purpose; while the male, who comes off rather lightly in this respect, is endowed with a store of surplus energy that can be spent in activity and display. Hence results the different development of the types of fatherhood and motherhood in most of the higher animal species. It is this biological difference in the reproductive process that forms the basis, as it were, of all later sex differentiations between male and female.

We shall now have to see how far this principle is applicable to the human species, taking into consideration all the available physio-psychological data as regards man and woman. The first thing that strikes us here is the more massive development of the bony framework in the male, which, combined with the large expansion of his chest and his greater strength, gives man his characteristic aspect. The female, on the other hand, is more delicately built, has a relatively more extensive development of the abdominal organs, and, chief of all, a wide and broad pelvis. In other words, while in man the motor functions are preponderant, in woman the vegetative functions predominate. The large pelvis, in conjunction with the female breast, is, of course, a direct adaptation to the function of child-bearing. But other secondary female characteristics, though not quite so prominent, indicate the same purpose in the division of labour between the sexes. Thus the motor energy of the male is apt to show itself in strong efforts, which, though violent and powerful, are inclined to be intermittent and spasmodic; while the motor energy of the female, though generally at a lower level, is more regular and continuous. The actions of man are more aggressive, those of woman more defensive. All this is

in accordance with other differences in the general metabolic function of man and woman. The blood of man is thicker, redder, and denser, which all makes for an increased metabolism; woman, on the contrary, has a natural tendency towards anæmia, which indicates a lowered vitality. Now it has been shown by Bunge that a storage of iron takes place in the maternal organs even before the first conception, ready for the use of the fœtus. Similarly, woman tends to accumulate fatty tissue (which causes the softness and charm of her figure). As Lloyd Jones has expressed it, there is a general storing up of tissue food in the female, partly as fat, partly as proteids, and a general reduction of katabolic energy. Woman's anabolic surplus also shows itself in her greater tenacity of life, her greater endurance and disvulnerability (power to overcome disease), and a more general adaptability to adverse conditions. In short, while the male exhibits all those characteristics which make for the expression of explosive energy, useful for the hunt, for war, and the defence and the provisioning of the home, the female is more conservative in her metabolism, she uses her power moderately, storing it up in her body in order to expend it ultimately in the bearing and rearing of the progeny.[1]

So far we are on fairly safe ground, there being practically unanimous agreement among all competent students of this subject. It is not so when we come to the higher sensory and psychic phenomena of man and woman. Indeed, we find here the most extraordinary divergence of opinions. For it is just in this field that it happens to be so difficult to discover a rationale that would enable us to bring down the bewildering mass of contra-

[1] For detailed facts see Havelock Ellis, *Man and Woman*, early chapters; also W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, first essay. Chicago, 1907.

dictory evidence to ultimate fundamentals. Yet even here some progress has been made of late.[1] Thus it is now generally admitted that the distinguishing feature of woman in contradistinction to man is her greater affectability and emotionality. Her nervous organization is one of greater tension, and hence more readily discharges than that of man on the impulse of new stimuli and impressions. Her sense organs, though perhaps on the whole somewhat duller in discrimination, are quicker in perception. This nervous irritability (in the physiological sense) is also known in the tendency of the female sex towards emotional affects, such as blushing, laughing, weeping, etc.; while the greater prevalence of hysteria and other lesser nervous disturbances among women, and their tendency towards hypnotic and allied states, point in the same direction. Anæmia increases affectability; in anæmic persons a very slight stimulus or exertion will produce too strong a reaction. We arrive thus at Havelock Ellis's conclusion: "The comparatively large extent of the sexual sphere in woman and of the visceral regions generally—for in woman at puberty, as Dr. Campbell puts it, a new keyboard and a fresh series of pipes are added to the instrument—the physiological tendency to anæmia and the existence of the inevitable periodicity of function in woman, conspire to furnish a broader basis for the play of emotion, which no change in environment or habit could remove."[2] But this very affectability also has its bright side and its advantages. If woman is more easily exhausted through lack of nervous staying power, the quick nervous response enables her at the same time to adjust herself

[1] See H. Ellis, *Man and Woman*, later chapters; W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, second and subsequent essays; also J. A. Thomson and others in *The Position of Woman*. London, 1911, first essay.

[2] H. Ellis, *Man and Woman*, p. 424.

more readily to new conditions. She is more adaptable than man, and succumbs less to shocks.

Coming now to the higher mental faculties, we have already pointed out that emotionality is the one distinctive trait which by common consent is pre-eminently an attribute of woman's psyche. Indeed, the Dutch psychologist, Professor G. Heymans, has tried to show in a most erudite and elaborate study on the psychology of women[1] how the difference in the male and female mental make-up can be worked out on the assumption of this one fundamental fact. The time has gone by when woman's cerebral capacity was measured by cubic volume of brain substance or by the complexity of the brain convolutions; nor can her comparative failure in the higher intellectual vocations simply be disposed of with the cheap allegation of her general inborn mental inferiority. The opening of the High Schools and Universities to women, so tardily conceded, has proved beyond cavil that women do as well in their studies as men, if not better. But while woman cannot be said to be intellectually inferior to man, this does not imply that in psychic capacity she is the same as man. As has been well remarked, equivalence does not necessarily denote equalness.

Now on this point once more, concurrent opinion tends to affirm that whilst man inclines towards principles and abstracts, woman has a predilection for facts and concretes. If he has, on the whole, a more reflective, inventive mind, ever stretching towards the shaping of new ideas, woman, on the contrary, shows more mnemonic, steady application in the use of her intelligence, taking vivid interest in the details of work, but rarely rising above the immediate tasks before her. Man is apt to consider remote contingencies; woman lives more in the immediate present. She is, as G. Heymans puts

[1] G. Heymans, *Die Psychologie der Frauen.* Heidelberg, 1910.

it, too emotionally bound up with what is before her to be able to give herself up to dispassionate, cool, and what would appear to her arid, speculations.

But once more, this must not be taken as a mere deficiency in woman. The disadvantage relative to man is counterbalanced by corresponding advantages. While man's mind is more massive and deliberate, woman is much more nimble and quick in her ratiocination, so far as it goes. Her intuitive, rapid apprehension of a situation is proverbial—woman has already acted with the sure insight of a seer, when man is still weighing lumberingly the arguments pro and contra. It thus comes about that feminine thought, though less knit together in its structure, is richer in its diversity. To quote Heymans once more: "Female thought follows the infinitely complex curve of life intimately in all its deviations, while male thought tries to include life's curve by many straight lines, joining at all sorts of angles."[1] In this respect woman shows much more of the artist's temperament, which, instead of surveying life from a lofty point by the cold light of reason, rather dips into the midst of it, living it in the fulness of her heart. The female genius is not bent like the philosopher upon trying to discover the world's secret in a formula, but rather, reckless of all formulas, aspires to reach the essence of this existence by her very personality. Truly, it is hard to choose between the son of heaven and the daughter of earth.

Still less can we do so when we come to consider other results flowing from the same quickening source. That woman is pre-eminently a creature of love will be admitted even by her staunchest enemies. Not only in her sexual love, with which we shall deal later, but also in her parental love is she greater. It is these qualities that make her the natural helpmate of all beings feeble,

[1] G. Heymans, *Psychologie der Frauen*, p. 182.

distressed, or otherwise in need of sympathy. She has an innate impulse to tenderness and compassion just because she is so easily moved by her emotions, not distracted by considerations of theoretical right and justice. Her heart feels, and this is enough for her. It is not to be denied, however, that this good quality has its drawbacks too. Emotionality uncontrolled may lead to pettiness, quarrelsomeness, and even cruelty, and women cannot be said to be free from these traits. The same clinging tendency of woman enlarges her need and craving for sympathy, thus making her less independent than man.

As a matter of fact, there is something in woman which, whilst keeping her nearer to the child,* also makes her more kin to nature. Woman is arrested earlier in her bodily growth than man; the result is that in her physical build—her relatively larger head and abdomen, smaller face, chest, and limbs—she tends to present a juvenile appearance. Not only does man's growth continue longer, but he is also more apt to vary than woman; he more often reaches extremes, be it of genius or of idiocy. While women keep more to a common natural level, man's tendency towards variation makes him strike out into ever new and unwonted directions, giving him a constant incentive towards change and experimentation with body and mind. It is "this originally primitive nature of woman, in form, function, and instinct, which," as Havelock Ellis has remarked, "is always restful to men tortured by their vagrant energies." Who after this would venture to better man's and woman's intrinsic natures according to a new pattern? What

* It is now established that the child, though ontogenetically (in individual development) immature relatively to the adult, is phylogenetically (in race development) more advanced. The young ape is more man-like than the adult ape. See H. Ellis, *Man and Woman*, chap. ii.

seems more true than that man and woman are fit *pendants* to each other, fitted for their lives' tasks in their relation alike to each other and to their progeny?

But after asserting so much, we stand before another much more difficult, though not less important problem. Having analyzed the sexual differences between man and woman, we now have to decide, firstly, how far these sexual characteristics are biologically fixed and limited to each sex, and, secondly, whether this limit is at all movable as between the sexes. There are some writers who maintain that there is no such thing as a definite male or female entity; that, on the contrary, sex affects only certain bodily characteristics appertaining to the process of reproduction, and that all other sex differences are merely superimposed by social needs. Thus Charlotte Perkins Gilman says: "Masculine and feminine are only to be predicated of reproductive functions;" and "the brain is not an organ of sex."[1] Rosa Mayreder has tried to give this theory a scientific backing by pointing out that the "teleological differentiation of sex" does not affect the higher cerebral centres.[2] Because the original separation of the organic world into male and female organisms is generally assumed to have come about for the purpose of greater variability of offspring through the mixing of a double set of parental qualities (paternal and maternal), she assumes that sexuality is not a fundamental kind of being, but only a form, a phenomenon of adaptation. This is proving too much by proving too little.

In the first instance, it is not absolutely sure yet that sexuality has only this one purpose of increased varia-

[1] Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Women and Economics*, sixth edition, p. 159. London, 1908.

[2] Rosa Mayreder, *A Survey of the Woman Problem*, first essay. London, 1913. Also, "Das Urphänomenon der Geschlechtlichkeit," *Neue Generation*, September, 1910.

tion; but even if this were so, the original separation of the sexes would still have had far-reaching consequences, and may have led ultimately to a fundamental differentiation in the respective metabolisms of the sexes in accordance with their differences of function. Sexuality has not decreased, but, on the contrary, has become intensified during the course of evolution, and even during the relatively short span of social evolution. And the advance has been especially on the mental side of man. Compared with the original sexual splitting of the protoplasm, this psychic differentiation may be looked upon as a secondary adaptation. But if it was originally an acquired modification, it must have become through ages of selection an inherited variation. For the female individuals with the most effective maternal functions (physical and psychic) would be the best and most successful progenitors of the race. Professor Thomas seems to be inclined towards a similar opinion. He would explain the mental differences between man and woman as the result of primitive difference of occupation. The male roams about for food, the female stays at home tending the young. And, furthermore, according to him, "the primitive division of labour among the sexes was not in any sense an arrangement dictated by the men, but a habit into which both men and women fell, to begin with, through their difference of organization."[1]

Similarly, Professor Heymans[2] would explain the greater emotionality of women by a steady sexual selection. If men always preferred emotional wives, this type would soon preponderate and become the norm. Now it is true we cannot find as yet any definite causal connection between somatic (bodily) sexual characters

[1] W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, essay on "Sex and Primitive Industry."

[2] G. Heymans, *Psychologie der Frauen*, p. 268.

and corresponding psychic traits, but even so, such a connection may have established itself by now through long persistent sexual selection. Indeed, the opinion has been propounded, as we shall see in a later chapter, that it is sexuality which dominates, if it does not determine, the nature of the human psyche. And another point: why is it that emotional traits in woman became an attractive element for man? If it was not advantageous to the race, such types, being, according to the law of natural selection, unfavourable for survival, would soon have failed and died out; and furthermore, as Darwin already pointed out, selection can only select what is already given by Nature. If emotionality had not been a fairly common trait of the female, serving a racial purpose, it is not likely to have been picked out for selection, unconsciously though it be, by savage man. It is known that the type most admired by both man and woman is the prevailing racial type. As Havelock Ellis has said: "So long as women are unlike [men] in the primary sexual characters and in reproductive function they can never be absolutely alike even in the highest psychic processes.[1]

This leads us to our second point of the discussion. While the eager protagonists of feminism are trying to minimize the importance of sex traits in order to show that in certain respects woman is equal to man, the opponents of the woman's movement go to the other extreme. They have a certain type of womanhood in view which is their ideal, and they maintain this to be the true and only type, the unalterable Eve as created from Adam's rib and fashioned for his requirements for all eternity. Against such ultra-conservative views we would urge two considerations. In the first place, it is difficult to decide what constitutes a typical man or

[1] H. Ellis, *Man and Woman*, p. 18.

woman. As Rosa Mayreder[1] rightly observes, it may either be an ideal type, which, after all, is only a mental abstraction, or it may denote the average type. In neither case can "all" existing individuals conform to this type. As a matter of fact, all we can do is to define woman (or man) by as many characteristics as possible, and then construct different curves representing the frequency with which each character appears. This can, of course, be done with some accuracy only in the case of physical, measurable traits. Thus we find, for instance,



FIG. 1. (*Modified after Heymans.*)

taking Heymans' frequency curve for height (Fig. 1), that the average height of women is 63 inches; their actual height, however, varies from 44 inches to 80 inches. Looking at the frequency curve, we see that, while the heights on both extremes contain only a few individuals, the frequency increases as we approach the mean or average height. Now we must assume similar variations in other feminine qualities, as far as they can be ascertained. If we now compare in our figure the frequency

[1] Rosa Mayreder, *Survey of the Woman Problem*, first essay, "Outlines."

curve of women's heights with that of men, we find a difference in the distribution of actual heights. The average height of man is greater than that of woman —68 inches instead of 63 inches. There are no women as tall as the tallest men, but no men as small as the smallest women. But, as a comparison of the two frequency curves shows, there are many women above the average height of man, and some considerably so; while, on the other hand, a good many men are below the average of woman. In other words, femininity and masculinity are relative terms, and can only apply to averages. We can never expect any given individual to show all the traits peculiar to man or woman. Because most women are emotional, it does not follow that all women must be emotional; because most men think in abstracts, it does not follow that all men are capable of doing so.

But we can go a step further still. We have drawn attention previously to the fact that male and female characteristics are not distributed so definitely between the sexes as to allow for an absolute distinction to be made between man and woman. Indeed, the mere somatic (bodily) differentiation of the sex glands cannot, as we have seen, be regarded as an invariable criterion of sex. All gradations of sex characters are possible, and do in fact exist. That a person with certain visible male or female traits must of necessity have all the other corresponding psychic qualities is, according to the latest scientific knowledge, a fallacious assumption. For instance, it is now well authenticated that the artistic temperament contains a strong feminine note; also, that genius is generally distinguished by a happy mixture of masculine and feminine qualities. Indeed, the very excellence of genius has been attributed to this cause. Magnus Hirschfeld has elaborated a series of such inter-

mediate sex types.[1] Thus there are the physical hermaphrodites who possess the sex glands of one sex, but (more or less) the external sex organs of the other.* Then there are complete males possessing some female bodily features, such as breasts; and females possessing male features—*e.g.*, beards, etc. A third mixed form is that of a male with a predominantly female disposition, and vice versa; and, finally, the homosexual persons who, though normal in every other respect, yet are only capable of the erotic emotion characteristic of the opposite sex, and are thus drawn by their sexual feeling towards their own sex. Though it must be admitted that the aforesaid types are perhaps on the whole rare and atypical, emphasis must be laid on the fact that lesser variations are most probably extremely common. Men with a certain amount of feminine sensitiveness are by no means uncommon, nor are women with a certain manly sturdiness. Indeed, it is these types of personality that are so often the most charming and delightful creatures, a pleasure to their friends and an asset to society.

And as a final argument in favour of this view we must draw attention to the fact that, though the fundamental type of sexuality appears to be relatively fixed, this does not exclude the possibility of variation within certain limits. It is well known that physical sex differences are much smaller among primitive races; thus, for example, the width of the pelvis has increased considerably with the advance of civilization.[2] On the other hand, Rosa

[1] Magnus Hirschfeld, *Die Homosexualität*, chap. xi. Berlin, 1914.

* Real hermaphroditism involves the possession of both kinds of sex glands (male and female) by one individual; but such cases are extremely rare and do not come within the purview of our subject. The physical hermaphroditism mentioned in the text is therefore technically known as pseudo-hermaphroditism.

[2] Compare Ploss, *Das Weib in Natur und Völkerkunde*, tenth edition, chap. vi. Leipzig, 1913. Also H. Ellis, *Man and Woman*, chaps. i. and ii.

Mayreder[1] has urged, with a good show of reason, that the primitive masculine trait of pugnacity has lost much of its survival value with the advent of industrialization, and is therefore likely to disappear gradually. Modern man is certainly more gentle and delicate than savage man. Civilization has brought man physically nearer to woman. Similarly modern woman shows a tendency to approach more towards the male norm. As she is gradually emancipating herself from her bondage, lasting throughout the ages, she is deviating rapidly from the tearful, over-emotional type of her grandmother's time.* Modern work, too, exerts here a modifying influence in the same way as it has affected man. The sexes tend to approach each other once more, due to a change in the mode of living. Besides this, as we shall see in a later chapter, sexual selection comes into play here as a determining factor in changing the sexual character of man and woman. It is quite possible that after the " oversexed " condition of previous periods—to use an excellent term of Charlotte Perkins Gilman—we are once more entering upon a more natural and harmonious development of sex individuality.

[1] Rosa Mayreder, *Survey of the Woman Problem*, essay, " On Masculinity," etc.

* Compare Sophia in Fielding's *Tom Jones*, or Amelia in Thackeray's *Vanity Fair*, with George Meredith's heroines, especially Diana of the Crossways, and Clara Middleton in *The Egoist*.

CHAPTER III

THE SEX IMPULSE AND ITS NORM

THE same extremes of partisanship evinced on the subject of woman's mental endowment reappear when we come to the consideration of the sex impulse in man. We find once more those who, believing in a double sex standard, take for granted an absolute difference in the erotic natures of the two sexes. Others, again, holding the opposite view, affirm that there is no such difference between man and woman; or, at most, if it exists at all, that it is not appreciable enough to allow for any distinction to be made as regards the exercise of their sex functions. Here we can only reiterate the warning that no proper conclusion is possible on merely moral predilections. High ideals do not necessarily make for sound thinking. Though the sex question is closely bound up with social conduct, ethical considerations alone are not sufficient to solve sex problems. We must ascertain first what, according to physiological laws, is possible, before we can prescribe what on moral grounds should be permissible.

The sex instinct is an inheritance from our animal ancestors, and serves, as with them, in the first instance, the same purpose—the propagation of the race. In order to bring the male and female sex elements together for the process of fertilization, it is necessary that the two sexes be drawn to each other for the consummation of the ultimate act of sexual union. Now it is generally

the male that is the more active agent, seeking the female for the purpose of mating; the female, on the contrary, plays a more passive rôle, waiting to be wooed. This aggressive attitude of the male is in full accordance with his katabolic tendency, which shows itself in a general display of energy and combativeness. Indeed, the primitive nature of the act of coition as a conquest of the female by the male has remained as an integral element of human courtship in the masculine delight for sex domination; while, with few exceptions, the female accepts and feels pleasure in sexual submission. The psychological factor has its root in the physiological law of sex.

Man, unlike the animals, has no sexual season. Mating is possible right through the year, and sexual desire has become perennial. There is no 'close time' for woman, as there is for the subhuman female. But even among animals there exists a fundamental distinction between male and female as regards their share in the mating process. The female only experiences desire at the season of 'heat,' which ceases as soon as impregnation is accomplished; this rule, with few exceptions, does not apply to the male. The biological reason is obvious. The female, once impregnated, has fulfilled Nature's purpose for the time being; while the male, by his sexual readiness, increases the chances of fertile mating with other females.[1] It cannot but be admitted that something of this primitive function still adheres, and perhaps always will adhere, to man as a sex being, however much otherwise his sex behaviour may become modified under the spiritualizing process of love. It is this avid "mate-hunger" of the male which explains the roaming tendency of man and "his mysterious craving for variety." This primitive instinct has remained a potent factor of male

[1] See H. Ellis, "The Objects of Marriage," *Medical Review of Reviews*. New York, 1917.

sex behaviour even among civilized people,[1] and is as such recognized, in their very terms of disapproval, even by those who would fain try to deny it.*

That man's physiological function has undergone little, if any, change since primeval times there can be little doubt. Thus Colin A. Scott has pointed out that "the periodic tension of semen in man is to be regarded as the expression of seasonal stimuli."[2] And of this accumulation of semen man has to rid himself—this is nature's law, which no reformer's zeal, however well intentioned, can abrogate.† In proportion as civilization

[1] *Cf.* W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, pp. 57 and 193.—H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, six vols., new edition, Philadelphia, 1913, Vol. VI.: *Sex in Relation to Society*, p. 495.**—W. Heape, *Sex Antagonism*, passim. London, 1913.—R. Michels, *Sexual Ethics*, pp. 137 and 222. London, 1914.—I. Bloch, *Die Prostitution*, vol. i., p. 52. Berlin, 1912.—A. Forel, *Die Sexuelle Frage*, eleventh edition, p. 88. München, 1917; in English, edited as *The Sexual Question*. London, 1906.—M. Hirschfeld, *Vom Wesen der Liebe*, p. 138. Leipzig, 1906.

* It is perhaps this same factor which accounts for the strange phenomenon of middle-aged men (in the full prime of their lives) feeling such a strong attraction to young girls, experiencing a sort of second summer of love, which often leads widowers to choose young and comely maidens as their second wives. The tendency of older male animals (as rams, bucks, and male seals) for fertilizing the young and robust females, driving away the younger males, is well known. This has a distinct biological advantage.

[2] Colin A. Scott, "Sex and Art," *Journal of Psychology*, vol. vii., No. 2.

† The idea that the semen is reabsorbed into the system finds no favour now with medical scientists.

** As we shall have to refer to these Studies very frequently, we give here the complete list of volumes:

I. *The Evolution of Modesty; The Phenomenon of Sexual Periodicity; Auto-erotism.*
II. *Sexual Inversion.*
III. *Analysis of the Sex Impulse.*
IV. *Sexual Selection in Man.*
V. *Erotic Symbolism; The Mechanism of Detumescence; The Psychic State in Pregnancy.*
VI. *Sex in Relation to Society.*

The volumes will be quoted henceforth according to their number.

lessens the legitimate opportunities for this natural periodic discharge, other forces come into play which, whilst achieving this end more indirectly, must be accounted for this very reason, if within the limits of Nature, still certainly less normal. We refer to the involuntary nocturnal and sometimes diurnal emissions, often coupled with voluptuous reverie, which take place when the natural exercise of the sex impulse becomes, for social reasons, impracticable. Very frequently these acts take on the form of voluntary masturbatory practices. Nay, more, as Metchnikoff[1] has pointed out, there exists a disharmony between the precocious development of the sexual sensation and the development of sex maturity in man, leading to physical self-abuse during puberty which, though abnormal, can only be looked upon as a passing phase during the growth of youth. There are some good people who look upon all masturbation as unnatural. It appears to them as a heinous sin, a blot upon man's nature, which, according to their panacea, can only be wiped out by a more drastic spiritualizing away of the body. A clearer notion of the physiological laws of sex might teach them to have a little more forbearance with and somewhat less disgust of Nature. As Havelock Ellis has said: "We can neither attain a sane view of life nor a sane social legislation unless we possess a just and accurate knowledge of the fundamental instincts upon which life is built."

The exposition of the male sex impulse given so far would exhaust all that has to be said on the subject for those adherents of the double sex standard who believe that man has a specially powerful overmastering sex need, and who tacitly assume a sort of sexless state of the human female. According to them, the sex problem does not arise for woman, simply because in her un-

[1] E. Metchnikoff, *The Nature of Man*, p. 97. London, 1916.

sullied purity she is not subject to any physical desires like man, but passively and patiently awaits her appointed time of legitimate love, somewhat like the Sleeping Beauty awaiting her prince. The same idea is held by those who, preaching complete abstinence for both sexes, believe that with a little perseverance woman's standard could be enforced upon man. Now there is some truth in this contention, in so far that woman's sexual desire certainly is less apparent than that of man; it is of a more modest and reticent form. But this relative passivity of woman must not be construed into a complete negation of her sex impulse. While, as Havelock Ellis[1] has pointed out, the sex impulse of the male is intensive, and focused, as it were, in a single point, driving him towards the ejaculatory act, the female sex desire, on the contrary, is more extensive and diffuse, assuming at the same time a much more psychic aspect. Woman's innate coyness keeps her from giving way to her natural impulses, which often need the active stimulation of a lover before they are brought into conscious evidence. Furthermore, this very factor of greater psychic irradiation in woman inclines her towards exclusiveness in her love. She is less ready than man to sacrifice the higher erotic emotions to physical ardour. But it would be a mistake to conclude from this, as many would have it, that pristine virginity is a special blissful mental state for every woman. Prolonged abstinence, though not producing such physical distress in her as in man, certainly has in time a disturbing influence upon her in so far that it produces an unrelieved psychic tension which, even if not recognized by herself as sexual, still works its consequences. "There is little doubt," says Dr. Marie C. Stopes, "that the complete lack of a normal sex relation is one of the several factors which render many middle-

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. III., p. 249.

aged unmarried women nervous and sleepless."[1] It certainly is curious to see how much trouble is taken in protecting woman from the evil influences of sex, while the main question of "the moral struggle of woman's soul" is completely left out of sight as non-existent.

We come, then, to the conclusion that woman's sex impulse, though not the same as that of man, still is active, though in a different way. The contention that a virginal mode of life is natural for women cannot any longer be maintained in the extreme form propounded by those who, wishing to remodel the world according to their own standard, would advocate the same negative law of sex for man and woman alike. It is true that sexual frigidity is a much more frequent occurrence in women than in men, but that does not justify us in proclaiming it the norm. Indeed, the reaction against this levelling-down process has already set in. A considerable volume of opinion is gathering, especially on the side of the new women's movement, in opposition to this man-made view of woman's lack of sexuality.* Thus F. W. Stella Browne declares: "I believe the conventional estimate of women's apathy and instinctive monandry is not

[1] Dr. Marie C. Stopes, *Married Love*, p. 58. London, 1918.

* It is perhaps interesting to note that this newest view has been prophetically anticipated by George Egerton, a most thoughtful and sensitive woman writer, near the end of the last century. It is worth while quoting a passage, though somewhat lengthy, from her book, published in 1894 (*Keynotes*, p. 22): . . . "the eternal wildness, the untamed primitive savage temperament that lurks in the wildest, best woman. Deep in through ages of convention this primeval trait burns, an untameable quantity that may be concealed but is never eradicated by culture—the keynote of woman's witchcraft and woman's strength. But it is there, sure enough, and each woman is conscious of it in her truth-telling hours of quiet self-scrutiny; and each woman in God's wide world will deny it, and each woman will help another to conceal it—for the woman who tells the truth and is not a liar about these things is untrue to her sex and abhorrent to man, for he has fashioned a model on imaginary lines, and he

true."[1] Rosa Mayreder quotes with approval Bourget's words, "Among the lies women inflict upon men that of being sexually awakened through love is by far the most common,"[2] and declares that "the feminine type of erotic subordination is neither the most common, nor the 'normal,' nor the essential type of woman."[3] Dr. Marie C. Stopes, in her book on *Married Love*, clearly shows that woman has natural periods of sexual desire. Havelock Ellis, who is perhaps the greatest living authority on the psychology of sex, points out that the sex impulse is subject to much greater variation in woman than in man. Though he lays great stress on the difference between the male and the female sex impulse, he nevertheless recognizes that there are energetic women who possess strong sexual emotions.[4] Professor C. J. Bucura[5] would go still further in maintaining that woman is more sexual than man, though he admits that the influence of civilization has tended to render the original disposition nugatory.

It is certainly a great mistake to assume, as is often done, that woman finds full satisfaction in motherhood alone. This would surely be a denial of Nature's primal intention, who, in order to achieve motherhood, has implanted in woman not only the physical possibility,

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has said, 'So I would have you,' and every woman is an unconscious liar, for so man loves her. And when a Strindberg or a Nietzsche arises and peers into the recesses of her nature and dissects her ruthlessly, the men shriek out louder than the women, because the truth is at all times unpalatable, and the gods they have set up are dear to them."

[1] F. W. Stella Browne, *Sexual Variety and Variability among Women*, British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology, Publication No. 3, p. 4.

[2] Rosa Mayreder, *Survey of the Woman Problem*, p. 156.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 160.

[4] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. III., *passim*.

[5] C. J. Bucura, *Geschlechtsunterschiede beim Menschen*. Wien, 1913.

but also the corresponding psychic desire for mating. Though the bond between mother and child is more intimate than that between father and child, the relationship of the male and female progenitors has been lifted out of its primitive animal stage, and has become that wonderful flower of mutual physical and spiritual interpenetration which we call love.

PART II

SEX RELATIONSHIPS

Sufficient scientific criteria have been found by us to formulate—at least, in broad outlines—some fundamental laws of sex. Though subject to further analysis and correction in the future, they furnish us for the present with a sound enough basis for enunciating some valid rules of social sexual conduct. In trying to construct such an ethical code we are at once struck by a great distinction prevailing in the sex life of organized human society, according as it is pretermarital,* not directly concerned with the idea of race propagation, or marital, and part and parcel of a common family life. Not that this distinction is at all fundamental; for pretermarital sex relationship may be very much on the lines of a marriage union, while the marital bond does not necessarily exclude other sex relationships at the side of it. Physiological laws take no cognizance of social differentiation when this runs counter to the dictates of Nature. Still, seeing that society is organized around the vital unit of the family, and has evolved a sex morality in accordance, a proper recognition of this fact is indispensable in order to arrive at a correct evaluation of social sex behaviour. In attempting to solve the modern sex problem we must never lose sight of the importance of ethical considerations. For while

* We use the word "pretermarital" to cover both premarital and extramarital relationship.

biology and physiology tell us what within natural bounds is healthy, social ethics prescribes what within these limits is conducive to the moral well-being of the individual and the race.

Now, though Nature is relatively stable at all times and all the world over, it is otherwise with social institutions. The social superstructure of tradition and custom overlying the primary biological factors, has with the growth of civilization become so complex that it is very difficult, nay, sometimes impossible, to arrive at a proper valuation of the two component elements. Yet, if we are to formulate any valid judgments of sexual ethics, it is imperative to disentangle what is essential in this social factor and a permanent gain to society, and what is after all ephemeral, the outcome of a passing mood of humanity. We shall, therefore, before attacking our subject proper, that of sex relationship in all its aspects, first deal with the evolution of sex morality.

CHAPTER I

SEX MORALITY IN EVOLUTION

Primitive man, though hedged in by tribal custom and superstitious fear, is in matters of sex a child of Nature. For him there exists as yet no separativeness with regard to the various bodily spheres. Since he is wont to go about in a state of more or less complete nakedness, he has no special secretiveness as regards any part of the body. Indeed, it is now generally admitted that such scanty covering as is given to the pubic region serves rather as a decoration and attraction than as a means of concealment. Though savages are by no means devoid of modesty, they attach no feeling of shame to nakedness itself. This finds corroboration in the notable fact that when clothing is first assumed it is the man who dons the dress, while the woman, especially the unmarried girls, goes naked.[1]

The primitive mind is not unduly concerned about ideas of sex purity. In fact, even in more advanced civilizations it is by no means uncommon to find the two sexes mingling freely in the nude state. Thus in Sparta boys and girls practised nude side by side in the gymnasium. The custom related by Homer of female slaves attending the heroes in their baths found imitation right through classic antiquity,[2] and even in Christian

[1] See H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. I., *Evolution of Modesty.*

[2] J. Donaldson, *Woman in Ancient Greece and Rome*, pp. 199–202. London, 1907.

Europe, with the rôles reversed; while mixed bathing (in complete nudity) was considered a matter of course in antiquity, and persisted unabated almost into the Middle Ages.[1] Indeed, nudity by no means shocked the conscience of the people of that age. Beggars sat practically naked at the church doors asking for alms; nor was it considered extraordinary to have on special festive occasions damsels in Eve's costume preceding the royal procession.

Primitive sex morality is quite in accordance with these notions. Though it is perhaps too much to assert nowadays that promiscuity formed the beginnings of primitive sex life,* yet there is very little doubt that sexual relationship is extremely free between the sexes, especially before marriage. As a rule, no special value is attached to virginity in this stage of society, any resulting offspring being rather considered an asset to the tribe. At special seasons this freedom is extended to the whole adult population during certain festivals, when licentiousness runs riot without check or hindrance. Such Saturnalia are to be found also in classic times, and continued in a mitigated form right through the Middle Ages, the present-day carnivals being the last faint echoes of these old religious orgies.[2]

There is no doubt, as Westermarck[3] has shown, that this premarital sexual liberty is by no means universal.

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. I., *Evolution of Modesty*.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, p. 669.

* This was the accepted theory of the older anthropologists (L. H. Morgan, J. F. McLennan, Lubbock, and others), who held that regulated sex life evolved from a stage of primitive sexual promiscuity ("communal marriage," as Lubbock called it). This idea has now largely been given up, especially owing to the researches of E. Westermarck and his criticism of this theory in his *History of Human Marriage*.

[2] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. III., Appendix A; Vol. VI., chap. vi.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, chap. ii.

[3] E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, third edition, chap. vi. London, 1903.

There are a great many primitive tribes among which strict chastity is enjoined; but in most cases this applies only to the woman and not to the man. It would be taking an altogether false view of savage ideas were we to consider this insistence upon female virginity from our modern point of view as a sign of moral continence. It is nothing of the sort. The demand for chastity in woman is merely a property right enforced by man upon his womenfolk for his own pleasure. A man who seduces a girl under such circumstances does not commit a moral wrong, but only damages her marketable value, for which he has to pay compensation; in the case of a married woman it is the husband that is considered the injured party; and he can exact punishment accordingly.[1] This notion finds further illustration when we find that women may in many tribes be lent by their husbands to honoured guests, and also that the initial act of defloration is often entrusted to the chief or priest of the tribe as a special religious rite.[2] This makes it evident that the idea of purity, as conceived to-day, is entirely foreign to this stage of culture, chastity in woman being merely a prerogative of man.

Now, whilst recognizing this first real step in the advance of continence, we must not forget, as Westermarck himself has pointed out, two qualifications. In the first place, celibacy is practically unknown among primitive people, and is regarded with great disfavour even among more advanced civilizations; the unmarried state is looked upon as something unholy, if not unnatural. Secondly, uncultured races marry early with the advent

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. I., *Evolution of Modesty*.—L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, third edition, pp. 172–174. London, 1915.—E. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, vol. ii., chap. xvii. London, 1906.

[2] E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, p. 347, etc. London, 1902.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, chap. ii.—Ploss, *Das Weib*, vol. i., chap. xviii.

of puberty. There are no bachelors and old maids. It is considered the duty of every man and woman to marry young in order to propagate the race. The biblical injunction, "Be fruitful and multiply," represents the aspiration of all primitive races.[1] In later times, during the classical age, when with the opulence of the aristocratic class bachelors became more numerous, stringent laws were enacted against it.[2] It thus comes about that for primitive society no sex problem arises, both man and woman performing their sexual function as soon as they are fitted for it by Nature. We must class in the same category the old Teuton tribes. Though unmarried girls had a large measure of sexual freedom, and polygamy was not forbidden, unfaithfulness on the side of married women was severely punished.[3]

The case stands somewhat differently with the ancient classical nations. Here, too, we find chastity obligatory upon the female sex, but only for those of the ruling class; slaves and freedwomen were beyond the pale of the law, and could do as they list. It was the main desire of the Greek as well as the Roman citizen to ensure the pure descent of his family, and towards this end means were taken to ensure purity in those who were to become the mothers of legitimate offspring. But besides this, there reigned supreme the classical ideal of bodily perfection, which went far to counteract any tendency towards asceticism. The body was held to be endowed with divine beauty. All impulses were recognized as natural, so that "a systematic repression

[1] E. Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, chap. vii.

[2] J. Donaldson, *Woman in Ancient Greece and Rome*, pp. 138 144. London, 1907.—Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité antique*, twenty-first edition, pp. 51, 106, 256 (Paris, 1910); in English as *The Ancient City*. Boston, 1874.

[3] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 431.—E. Westermarck, *Origin of Moral Ideas*, vol. ii., p. 453.

of a natural appetite was totally foreign to their mode of thought." The result was that paganism accepted sexual indulgence as a matter of fact (excluding from it only the legitimate bearers of the race), and arranged sex life accordingly. Though wives were restricted to child-bearing, there was yet an abundance of women in the ancient city state, offering ample opportunities for irregular sex relations. These were accepted with complete frankness and without much censure.[1] In Greece there arose a type of women who, though disqualified from marrying a citizen, attained to the highest eminence of intellectual and political activity as friends and companions (*hetairæ*) of the most famous statesmen, philosophers, and poets. In Rome they were of a rather lower type; but in both countries female slaves were readily resorted to by the men. As marriage was forbidden between a citizen and a slave, such unions were not legitimate, but were legally considered to be concubinage. Demosthenes tersely expressed the sentiment of his time about sex matters when he said: "We have *hetairæ* for the sake of pleasure, concubines for the daily care of the body, and wives that genuine children may be born to us and that we may have a trustworthy guardian of our household property."[2]

We see, then, that there existed in classic antiquity a large number of women who were outside the legitimate pale of marriage, and could follow their instinctive desires unhindered without risk of losing their social status. Slaves were not hampered in any way in their sex relations, as they only served their masters, by whom a large slave progeny was considered an asset.

[1] See W. E. H. Lecky, *History of European Morals*, last edition, 1911, chapter on the Position of Women. London, 1869.

[2] Quoted by J. Donaldson, *Woman in Ancient Greece and Rome*, p. 213.

But sexual indulgence went still further. Prostitution was legalized and systematized for the first time in classic antiquity. It is true, there occurs what Havelock Ellis has called a sort of "amateur prostitution" among primitive peoples, but it is there considered merely a legitimate means of acquiring a dowry. Certainly, no stigma of any kind is attached to those who follow this profession.[1] The same trend of thought shows itself also in the once prevalent custom of temple prostitution, according to which it was a religious, sacred act for women to give themselves to any stranger.[2] Prostitution, as arranged in Greece and Rome, was considered a legitimate means of gratification for virile men, being instituted, as Solon prescribed, "as a protection of marriage." We find, then, that while in classical antiquity the citizen woman was held to chastity, but married early, free rein was given to man's vagrant nature, no one thinking any the worse of it. In the later times of the Roman Empire married women gained a great deal of liberty, often emulating the men in matters of sex indulgence.

But all this was changed with the advent of Christianity. The first result of the Christian view of life was an unequivocal emphasis upon chastity as an equal obligation for both sexes alike, leading thus to a general encouragement of purity; but with time, the valuation given by the Fathers to the spirit in contradistinction to the body led to a disparagement of the latter and to the debasement of sex. The idea of sex impurity is by no means unknown to primitive people. Side by side with a free and open recognition of the sexual impulse,

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., chap. vii.—Ploss, *Das Weib*, vol. i., chap. xviii.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, chap. ii.

[2] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., chap. vii.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, chap. ii.

there often exists "a functional sensitiveness," caused, partly by fear, partly by disgust or shame, which results in a religious taboo between the two sexes. This means that, except for certain ritual precautions to be taken in order to guard against peril, the two sexes are strictly segregated into separate huts, though this does not exclude free relations between the unmarried. A similar notion of the nocuous influence of the sex function is the cause of ascetic ideals among all kinds of barbarous people, who therefore keep away rigidly from contact with woman in order to remain strong in battle or lucky in the chase, etc. Finally, we find a lifelong voluntary chastity as a religious vow for special holy and priestly functions. Asceticism is considered "the necessary antechamber to spiritual perfection."[1]

Christianity, adopting such ascetic ideals with full vigour, erected them into an absolute standard for the world, and laboured hard to impose them upon all who came under its sway. Not only did it advocate, and ultimately make compulsory, celibacy for its clergy, but it maintained an unmitigated hostility to all manifestations of sex. St. Paul, and after him St. Augustine, declared all that was "of the flesh" as sin. The unmarried state was lauded as preferable to wedlock; in the words of St. Jerome, "Marriage peoples earth, but virginity heaven." Even marriage, though permitted for the sake of children, was a carnal indulgence. Not only was virginity extolled as the crowning glory, but separation from wives was praised as a deed of grace; while as a variation, a sort of spiritual marriage became the vogue, in which husband and wife lived together

[1] E. Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, chap. viii.—H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. III., Appendix A; Vol. VI., chap. v.—E. Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, vol. ii., chaps. xxxviii. and xli.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, chap. ii.

chastely as brother and sister.[1] Thus there came about a reversal of the normal valuation of the sex function in life. The Virgin Mother became the symbol of purity, the monk and the nun the ideal representatives of human kind. Woman, as she existed outside the religious orders, was Eve, the eternal temptress, a snare of perdition, the incarnation of lust. She was, as J. Donaldson expressed it, "a fire-ship continually striving to get alongside the male man-of-war and to blow him up into pieces."

This constant preoccupation with the carnal side of sex had ultimately the very opposite effect to that originally intended. It accentuated the sexual consciousness of those battling the battles of virtue. To use an apt expression of Havelock Ellis: "In attempting to desexualize the idea of man, it only succeeded in oversexualizing woman." Or, as J. Donaldson put it: "If man is a male human being and woman a female human being . . . What the early Christians did was to strike the male out of the definition of man and the human being out of the definition of woman."[2] As a matter of fact, it is now admitted on all sides that, as regards the purity campaign, the Christian Church utterly failed in its endeavours. Far from eradicating the sexual impulse from life, it only imparted to it an unwholesome flavour, which corrupted like a blight the heart of medieval society. Not only did prostitution flourish more openly and aggressively than ever, but the clergy itself, especially the high office bearers, formed a very focus of vice, spreading their evil example to the laity around. The

[1] E. Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, chap. vii.—J. Donaldson, *Woman in Greece*, etc., book iii.—W. E. H. Lecky, *European Morals* (Position of Women).—H. C. Lea, *Sacerdotal Celibacy*, chap. i. London, 1867.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, chap. ii.

[2] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 399.—J. Donaldson, *Woman in Greece*, etc., p. 182.

advocates of celibacy, in trying to suppress lust, "only heightened immorality by hypocrisy."[1]

This state of affairs changed but slowly. The new ardour given to learning and individual liberty during the Renaissance soon began to militate against the old monkish régime, while the rise of Protestantism in many countries tended to abate the worst consequences of enforced celibacy on the one side and libertinism on the other. Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a new expansion of the range of modesty took place, which refined not only manners and customs, but also language, and ultimately feeling itself. An age of reason began to invoke Nature herself against a chastity which had "the only merit of being external and conventional." By the beginning of the nineteenth century a high state of feeling had been reached against the previous excesses, and a movement rather of timidity and prudery set in, which in its fervour against naturalness and nakedness has still not spent its power.[2] All the time the evil of prostitution has gone on practically unabated, in spite of many drastic attempts to uproot it. Through all the changes of the times the classical double standard of sex morality—chastity for woman and licence for man—has remained as a signal evidence of male and female sex antagonism. It remains for the new school of sexual ethics to try and solve this problem —if solvable it is.

[1] E. Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, Vol. II., p. 432.—W. E. H. Lecky, *European Morals* (Position of Women).—H. C. Lea, *Sacerdotal Celibacy*, p. 64. London, 1867.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, chap. vii.—K. Bücher, *Die Frauenfrage im Mittelalter*, second edition. Tübingen, 1910.

[2] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. I. (*Evolution of Modesty*); Vol. VI., chaps. iii., v., and vii.

CHAPTER II

SEX MORALITY

1. The Problem of Continence

At last we come to our subject proper, that of sex morality. But even now our preliminary clearing-up work is not yet done. Two tendencies have come down to us from the past: one, the natural assertion of the sex impulse, ever craving for expression; the other, the ascetic tendency, checking and spiritualizing these innate physical desires. The latter has found, as we have seen, its extreme champions in those who would deny the right to all sex manifestations unless under the formal sanction of law and religion. We are still cumbered with this medieval heritage, which haunts the whole field of sex discussion, making it well-nigh impossible to approach sexual questions with anything like impartial judgment. Yet we have to divest ourselves of such prejudices, and must try to look at the problem from every point of view sincerely and honestly.

In dealing with the problem of continence it is essential at the outset to define what is meant by that term. The general looseness in the use of the word is such that it rather tends to confuse than to clear the issue. To begin with, we find that continence, as preached by its most insistent advocates, has a double implication. On the one hand, it is intended to apply to the proper control and use of the sex functions, having reference to all conditions of sexual life; on the other, it is limited to continence merely before marriage in quite a special

way. Now continence in the first sense is opposed to licence, and has as such an indisputable legitimate claim in all that appertains to the exercise of the sex functions. If there is one point on which there is unanimous agreement in the whole field of sexual ethics, it is that of continence. All authorities, of whatever shade of opinion, emphasize the fact that, from both a physiological and a moral point of view, self-restraint is an essential desideratum of sex life. Continence is and ever will be the only true means towards a sound and healthy development of body and soul. From a hygienic point of view nothing is surer than that a life of sexual over-indulgence brings with it sooner or later bodily ills and "fruits of chagrin"; misuse of sexual power will ever tend to thwart the proper enjoyment of true love. "It should never be forgotten," says Dr. Marie C. Stopes, "that without the discipline of control there is no lasting delight in erotic feeling. The fullest delight, even in a purely physical sense, can only be attained by those who curb and direct their natural impulses."[1] To quote James Hinton, who pleaded for pleasure as a service and use and not as a misuse and indulgence: "Man is so made that he can rise above sexual passion and subordinate it to use."[2] The pleasures of sex, like those of life, need to be tempered by service to good ends. What is needed is love, not lust; temperance, not gluttony: only thus can true liberty take the place of licence.

But the problem assumes another aspect as soon as continence is taken in a more restricted sense as meaning sex restraint before marriage. Here we have to keep strictly asunder two aspects of the question—the purely medical and the spiritual. It is quite futile to try to determine the value of continence (in the restricted

[1] Marie C. Stopes, *Married Love*, p. 53. London, 1918.
[2] Mrs. H. Ellis, *Three Modern Seers*, p. 85. London, 1910.

sense), if we mix up the hygienic factors with ethical considerations, as is generally done. Even medical men cannot be said to be quite free from this bias, when they utter authoritative opinions upon sex questions to which they have given no special study.* Thus, when we come to discuss continence from the purely physiological point of view, we are at once met by the equivocalness of authoritative guidance. While a good many writers strongly maintain the possibility of continence, others, perhaps on the whole the more progressive school, would look upon it—if it be possible at all—as in any case not natural; while a third section, taking an intermediate position, consider it possible only in certain cases and under certain reservations.[1] Disregarding those authors who by their very tone of moral reproval show their ethico-theological bias (which we discount for the present) —Nyström aptly calls them medico-theologians—the clash of opinions is more apparent than real. The main difficulty lies in the fact that the problem is generally not stated in the proper form. To ask, as is mostly done, whether continence is possible, is, to put it mildly, shirking the issue. For who can deny that continence is possible—at least, to some people ? It has been achieved by many. Such an answer proves nothing. What we want to know is much more: firstly, whether continence is possible to the average man and woman; secondly, for how long; and, chief of all, what is meant by the term

* Though attention is now being given to the study of venereal diseases, it may perhaps be pointed out that the education of the general practitioner in sex matters (apart from the study of anatomy and physiology) is extremely defective. The importance of this subject is not sufficiently realized as yet by the authorities for them to make proper provision for the instruction of medical students in the psychology and pathology of sex and kindred subjects (heredity, eugenics, etc.). Such a step is an urgent need of the times.

[1] See for discussion of opinions, pro and contra, H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., chap. vi.

"continence" when applied indiscriminately to all ages and all conditions of premarital life ?

In the first instance, it is imperative to make a clear distinction between continence and abstinence. Of continence in the more general sense of temperance we have already spoken. There can be no doubt of its importance and the necessity of it for a true and chaste love-life. But if what is meant by continence is really abstinence, then we must be careful to discriminate between temporary abstention during the years of adolescence, and asceticism to be practised for a more or less prolonged period after manhood is attained. As to the former, restraint, complete sexual restraint, is not only possible but imperative for every youth and maiden as the true means towards a fine and healthy erotism in after-years. It is a consummation devoutly to be hoped for. Self-control here is synonymous with complete abstention from those sexual acts which, viewed in their biological importance, can only be a prerogative of adult manhood and womanhood. It is not only ethically right, but physiologically attainable. We must exclude here the lighter forms of sex indulgence, the innocent forms of flirtation, etc., which are to a large extent unavoidable, as they constitute, so to speak, a sort of apprenticeship for the most difficult art of love.[1] As regards the more insistent demands of sexual impetuosity, Freud has shown that a great part of such needs can be directed into other channels, being transformed in this process of "sublimation" into the finer spiritual feelings of an æsthetic, religious, and generally emotional nature. The grosser desires may thus be transmuted into more psychic manifestations, which, though not losing entirely their

[1] For further discussion of these points see the author's *Introduction to the Physiology and Psychology of Sex*, second edition, chap. vii. 1918.

primary imprint of sexuality, still soar up into the purer regions of true human love. And from a hygienic point of view, too, a good deal can be done to tone down into less volcanic expressions physical desires which as yet can find no full psychic and ethical equivalent.

But after emphasizing so much—which is practically a commonplace and would need no discussion except for fear of misunderstandings—we still are face to face with the problem of asceticism proper. For, admitting that the question of sex indulgence does not properly arise before fully attained manhood (and womanhood), as soon as this limit is passed the problem becomes truly perplexing. We cannot any longer brush aside Nature's call when continence has to be prolonged and continued for years, or may be tens of years, or even for life in the case of non-marriage. Continence here comes very near to abstinence, more or less total. No mere grandiose moral attitudinizing or appeal to heroic self-repression will suffice here. It is the lack of discrimination in this respect which vitiates so much the problem of continence as presented by most writers. Indeed, the whole issue has been obscured through the want of definiteness. We have seen that continence, in the usual accepted sense, is a *sine quâ non* of a healthy and moral sex life; that, furthermore, abstinence during adolescence can be taken to imply true abstention without raising any serious question as to its appropriateness. It is only when full sex maturity is reached that we come up against the proper antithesis between continence and abstinence.

Now, taking abstinence, even in this sense, in its full rigour, we could still assert with complete confidence that abstinence is possible. Historically it has been shown to be so by many sects who practised it as a religious rite; and it is verified every day by earnest people who know how to subjugate their sex instinct to moral exigencies.

But the really vital question is: How many people are there made of such stuff as fully and continuously to match their will-power and moral fervour against the promptings of Nature? In other words, is the average individual capable of abstinence? History has given us the answer. There has perhaps never been a more ardent and sincere attempt at cultivating a moral sex consciousness than during the first centuries of Christian propaganda; yet we have seen how utterly it failed. As Lecky has put it: "Asceticism, proclaiming war upon human nature, produced a revulsion towards its extreme opposite, and even when it was observed it was frequently detrimental to purity of mind."[1] Nor is this an isolated case. We need only to remind the reader of the reaction in manners during the English Restoration under Charles II. after the Puritan rule, and many other such instances. As a matter of fact, man—male man in the mass—never has been abstinent, rarely continent. Even those who advocate abstinence admit the hard task it sets to the moral strength and perseverance of the celibatarian votary.[2] Failures there are many, successes relatively few. It does not behove us who have been fortunate to throw stones at those who, through an innate want of will-power, or, may be, an inborn excessive sexual ardour, may have lost their virtue,* to their own regret and mortification.

But assuming physical purity has been achieved, what of that? What A. Maude Royden has said of women may well be applied generally: "Chastity has become to an extraordinary degree merely a physical condition."[3]

[1] W. E. H. Lecky, *European Morals*, vol. ii., p. 336.

[2] See, for instance, H. Northcote, *Christianity and Sex Problems*, pp. 58, 60.—F. W. Förster, *Marriage and the Sex Problem*, p. 148. London, 1912.—A. Forel, *Die Sexuelle Frage*, p. 456.

* The original meaning of virtue is the quality of virility, manliness.

[3] A. Maude Royden, *Women and the Sovereign State*, p. 104. London, 1917.

If a man should abstain from sexual gratification with the other sex, does that necessarily imply purity? By no means. As a matter of fact, even disregarding the tendency to masturbatory practices, what guarantee is there of spiritual chastity in a man who is constantly occupied in battling with his uprising bodily sensations? Have we not seen from historical evidence that this very preoccupation produces the opposite result to that desired? One needs only to read the lives of the anchorites to see how they were scourged by lust, which they, in conformity with the beliefs of their time, ascribed to the machinations of the devil.[1]* Thus, if we insist upon purity, let us pray for purity of spirit rather than that of the flesh.

Coming to the hygienic aspect of asceticism, we meet once more the same confusion of thought as pointed out before. To affirm with the stentorian voice of conviction that "continence is not incompatible with health" is no more impressive than to proclaim that fasting is compatible with health. Indeed, fasting would do many people good, and so would abstinence, if practised in moderation. The whole point is to determine, when to fast; for how long; and perhaps, also, who should fast. Now there seems to be no doubt that, on the whole, women bear prolonged abstinence much better than men;[2] at least, the need for sex gratification awakens with them much later in life, when self-control is much stronger than during the storm and stress of the teens.[3] On the other hand, however, it has been shown by Freud that neuroses of anxiety, so frequent in women, are mostly, if not

[1] I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, p. 628.

* Anatole France has given vivid literary pictures of this mental state of the anchorites, especially in his novel entitled *Thais*.

[2] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. III., p. 230, etc.; Vol. VI., p. 185. York, 1912.—E. Metchnikoff, *Nature of Man*, p. 96.

[3] H. Ellis, *loc. cit.*, Vol. III., p. 243.

entirely, due to suppressed sex emotions, and that they may supervene even if there exists no clear consciousness of the repression.[1]

For man the physical problem is certainly much more difficult; and it may remain a moot point whether a system can be called sound which, in man after maturity, relies upon involuntary emissions, continued for years, or may be for life, as a proper mode of relieving Nature. If such emissions are not exactly detrimental to health, they certainly are, when at all prolonged, very depressing, and hardly in accordance with a full enjoyment of life.[2] It is certainly characteristic that even those who visit with such unqualified condemnation all premarital sex gratification unhesitatingly advocate early marriage as a remedy, thereby confessing that they too consider the fulfilment of sexual desires a natural requisite of the individual. If we leave out moral considerations for the present—and we are bound to do so in purely medical matters—it is hard to see what difference Nature has made between the married and the unmarried. Surely there is no evidence that the sex instinct varies in accordance with the moral sanction of society.

In fact, instead of asking whether abstinence is possible or harmful, it would be much more pertinent to ask whether, if attainable, it is good. We are still too much possessed with the medieval idea of chastity to realize fully that the sex impulse, besides having a negative importance, also has a positive value. The mistake is too often made of looking upon the sex impulse as merely a physical phenomenon, and this is done especially by those " who, dividing the body from the soul, have made the natural desires of the body into stains on the soul,

[1] S. Freud, *Selected Papers on Hysteria and other Psychoneuroses*, second edition. New York, 1912.

[2] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 184.—A. Forel, *Sexuelle Frage*, p. 86.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, p. 286.

have by savage legality created sins and multiplied sins."[1] Now, the sex functions do not spring into being all at once. The physical manifestations develop slowly, and *pari passu* with them their psychic accompaniments. We cannot suppress the former without retarding at the same time the natural stream of the higher emotions. As we have pointed out elsewhere, it is a great error to assume, as is generally done, that "we can dam up the current of sex life without detriment, personal and social. Holding up too long love's vitalizing power may lay barren the whole personality."[2] Nyström has summed up the condition of those condemned to a loveless, sexless life very neatly in saying that one could speak in their case of "a veritable atrophy of personality."[3] And the proof of this lies in the fact that while bachelors, usually not celibates, rarely show any ill effects of unmarried life, women, doomed to a lifelong solitary existence, generally bear the impress of soured spinsterhood.* Furthermore, it is well known how frail and delicate-looking maidens, treated perhaps for anæmia and all sorts of neurotic ailments, suddenly brighten up when love comes their way to give meaning and fulness to their existence.

No! As Hinton has so well said, "The problem for man and woman is so to use and possess the sexual passion as to make it minister to higher things, with no restraint on it but that."[4] Or, to put it in the words of Colin

[1] See Stopford A. Brooke on William Blake in his *Studies on Poetry*, p. 51. London, 1910.

[2] S. Herbert, *Physiology and Psychology of Sex*, p. 120.

[3] A. Nyström, *La Vie Sexuelle*, p. 156. Paris, 1910.

* Of modern writers it is especially May Sinclair who has taken up her pen on behalf of these unfortunate "old maids," and shown that unmarried women also may be more than spiritless, sexless creatures. See especially her novel, *The Three Sisters*. The theme is also courageously dealt with by Morley Roberts in *Hearts of Women*.

[4] Quoted by H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 169.

A. Scott: "The Puritan repression is too self-centred. The purity that does nothing more than keep to itself from the world is unsuited to our growing wants and large social consciousness. What we need at present is a religious and artistic spirit that goes out to meet the sexual instinct, and is able to find in it the centre of evolution, the heart and soul of the world."[1] Even Northcote, an Anglican clergyman, who speaks of "offering the sacrifice of the sex life upon the altar of humanity,"[2] admits in the end that "while asceticism has indeed proved a factor of power and value in the world-process, it is none the less immeasurably inferior in spiritual effectiveness to love."[3] If sex is the central fact of life—and few will deny this, seeing that it is the source and propagator of life—then love is the central phenomenon of our psyche. As Professor McDougall points out, the action of the sex impulse is that of a social energizer.[4] The student of life cannot do better, to quote once more Colin A. Scott, than "to come into real and intimate contact with the life that fills our modern art, to appreciate and enjoy, and to feel with his very heart the ecstasy of love that art for ever offers at Nature's shrine."[5]

The discussion on abstinence has so far been a one-sided one. We have weighed the arguments purely from the physio-psychological point of view and found that asceticism, far from being a condition devoutly to be desired, is at best a *pis aller*. But this admission, reasonable as it seems, does not offer us, in the bare form given to it so far, much help towards a solution of the sex problem.

[1] Colin A. Scott, "Sex and Art," *Journal of Psychology*, vol. vii., No. 2, p. 198.
[2] H. Northcote, *Christianity and Sex Problems*, p. 87.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 458.
[4] W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, eleventh edition, p. 399. London, 1916.
[5] Colin A. Scott, *Sex and Art*, p. 225.

For what we have to aim at in our ethical sex standard is not only to recognize biological facts, but also to adjust them to the moral conscience of the times. It is here that the difficulty lies; for it is in the ethical field that the clash of opinions is so violent and irreconcilable. The ideal theoretical solution, of course, would seem to cut off the current of sex activity until such times as full sway can be allowed to it under the ægis of the established secular and religious authority. This is something the extreme purists aim at. In advocating equal sex morality for both sexes they have in view the female sex standard, wishing and attempting to enforce it upon man. To endeavour to abolish the unjust and immoral double sex morality sanctioned by immemorial custom is a very laudable undertaking indeed, and one cannot but heartily agree in the severest condemnation of a system that has been a bane to humanity. But whether any permanent result will accrue from the attempt of women "to force the pace of man's morality," to use a phrase of Professor J. A. Thomson, is another matter. We have repeatedly pointed out that man's organization is different from that of woman, that his erotic needs are not the same as hers; nay, there are even voices being raised among women themselves protesting against the passive rôle assigned by male dominance to the female. It is hard, indeed, to see how, in view of such facts, the female ascetic standard in its turn could ever be imposed upon the male. As W. P. Pycraft in the course of his book on *The Courtship of Animals* takes occasion to remark: "That the desire for sexual congress is inherently more avid, more intense in the male than in the female, is often called in question, and more especially by those who imagine that they have a mission to carry on 'social reforms,' and to regulate the relations between the sexes of the human race. Such aims and ambitions are

commonly those of the arrogantly ignorant. . . . However much we may choose to seek refuge in sophistry, the fact remains that man is still an animal, and if the human race is to continue, he must always remain so."[1] Walter Heape, an eminent authority on all matters connected with sex physiology, repeatedly insists upon the fact that "the male sex instinct and requirements are quite different to those of the female." "Sex laws arise in the female mind and are modified by the male to suit his own requirements."[2] Indeed, his whole book is built upon the thesis of this sex antagonism between man and woman. No; the panacea offered by the aforesaid school of sex moralists is at once too simple—and too ancient. It has failed before, under more favourable conditions, and it is not likely to succeed better now.

If this sounds shocking to those not conversant with the biological facts of the case, and carries unsavoury suggestions, it is not the fault of the facts. We should like to remind such people of the saying of St. Jerome: "If an offence come out of the truth, it is better that the offence come out than that the truth be concealed." Now the truth is, as Lecky pointed out nearly half a century ago, that "however much moralists may enforce the obligation of extramatrimonial purity, this obligation has never been even approximately regarded"[3]—and we must add, is not so regarded to-day. There is unanimous agreement among the writers of all shades of opinion that unchastity is quite common among the rural and urban population in all countries. The evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible.[4] As a matter

[1] W. P. Pycraft, *The Courtship of Animals*, second edition, p. 149. London, 1914.
[2] W. Heape, *Sex Antagonism*, pp. 16 and 17.
[3] W. E. H. Lecky, *European Morals*, vol. ii., p. 282.
[4] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. III., p. 200; Vol. VI., pp. 38, 387.—C. Booth, *Life and Labour*, third series,

of fact, apart from the more irregular forms of sex relations there exists, especially among a certain section of the working-class in town and country, a sort of free courtship which carries with it no opprobrium whatsoever, and is simply regarded as the natural preliminary to marriage. Indeed, there are even indications that a loveless, sexless life before marriage, far from being appreciated, is looked upon rather as a sign of inferior sexual attraction.[1] Against such realities no cavilling will help us.

It would seem, then, that we have landed in an utter impasse. Between the natural physiological functions of man on the one hand, and his ethical development on the other, there yawns a gulf which no empty theorizing will help to span. "The superposition of man's higher moral and intellectual capacities upon a basis of animal instincts—it is this problem which Nature has left unsolved." "Nature cannot solve the problem for us by altering the innate constitution of the human race."[2] This does not mean that free rein should be given to the sexual impulse. Even on physiological grounds it is certain that uncontrolled impulse is just as mischievous as unnatural restraint, and in the end more dangerous to health, apart from any moral considerations. But whilst recognizing that licence and asceticism are both enemies to the strength and purity of life, we are still face to face with the problem of reconciling the natural call of sex with the moral law of society. For if we grant that ethical considerations are paramount—and who will gainsay this?—we see that man's physical nature has

vol. i., pp. 55, 56 (London, 1901); last vol., pp. 41–46 (London, 1902).—Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Prevention of Destitution*, p. 306. London, 1912.—R. Michels, *Sexual Ethics*, part ii. London.—A. Flexner, *Prostitution*, chap. i. New York, 1914.

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 380.—C. Booth, *Life and Labour*, final vol., pp. 41–46.

[2] W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, eleventh edition, p. 405. London, 1916.

been outstripped by morality and is at war with it, both remaining irreconcilable—unless, indeed, we have the courage to clear our mind of some of the old prejudices still clinging to the very idea of sex. So long as we insist upon calling everything connected with sex by nasty names—unless it is dealt with in a veiled and fanciful manner—we cannot expect to see even an approach to a moral solution of the sex problem. To stamp everything as "beastly" that is "of the flesh" only means the abandonment of all efforts towards an elevation of sex. What we need is a new vision that will embody in a uniform sex standard not only the physical desires of man, but also his spiritual aspirations. In other words, what we need is a true ideal of chastity.

It will have become clear from the foregoing that chastity is not identical with abstinence—indeed, the ascetic may be, as we have seen, a spiritual *débauché*; nor is it equivalent with continence, for "low" living does not necessarily go together with high thinking; it is certainly not the same as virginity (either for woman or man), for this merely implies "anatomical intactitude," which has no intrinsic relationship with sex purity;[1] nor, finally, is it synonymous with social sanction, for this can only ensure proper form, but not proper function. Chastity—true chastity—has reference not so much to actions as to feelings and motives; it is the quality of the emotions in relation to sexual acts that constitutes a state of purity or impurity. In short, we may define chastity with Ellen Key as a "harmony between body and soul in relation to love."[2] Such an ideal is applicable to all sexual relationships alike. It is the supreme and only test of all sex behaviour in and outside marriage.

[1] R. Michels, *Sexual Ethics*, pp. 101, 144.
[2] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 23. London, 1911.

The true solution for a code of sexual ethics lies in the recognition of the harmonious interplay of all organic impulses of the body and the soul. To neglect the former is unnatural, to overlook the latter is immoral. To despise the sexual activities as brutal shows want of knowledge and insight; for it is upon them that the whole fabric of human life and love is built. "Love craves the flesh," but the soul redeemeth it. As May Sinclair so beautifully puts it: "Love is a provision for the soul's redemption of the body—or for the body's redemption of the soul."[1] "The great danger for the evolution of love lies in the fact that women still reckon not fully enough with the senses, men not fully enough with the soul" (Ellen Key). It is here, then, that we find the key to the whole problem of sexual ethics: a proper balance between the physical and psychic forces of man as a sexual being. But before we can apply this test to the various modes of sex relationship, we must first give an analysis of love itself as a physio-psychological phenomenon.

2. Analysis of Love.

Though some animals, such as birds, apes, etc., have been credited with the feelings of love, the mental processes of ideation are generally not sufficiently developed in subhuman species to allow for such high sentiments among them. On the whole, the sex instinct among animals remains on the lower level of mere impulse, which, according to Professor McDougall, is a psycho-physical disposition, consisting of the cognition of a given sense impression (sensory stimulus) and an appropriate movement (motor reaction); both being accompanied by a pleasant emotional feeling, here properly called "lust,"

[1] May Sinclair, *The Helpmate.*

which is localized in the nervous centres.[1] The perception of an individual of the opposite sex arouses under given circumstances a desire for approach (called by Moll contrectation), at the same time bringing about a general heightened excitement of the body, leading to a state of physical turgescence or tumescence in both partners, especially of the sexual organs. This state in its turn brings about a still stronger sexual impulsion, until the final stage is reached in the process of mating, where the accumulated energy spends itself in the accomplishment of the supreme act of union. The sudden release of the state of tension in the sex organs and body alike after the act is called the stage of detumescence.[2] We can thus distinguish three successive stages of sexual excitation; firstly, that of the sensory impression of the mate; secondly, that of actual approach and contact; and, finally, that of the copulatory embrace—each with its corresponding emotional equivalent. Each preceding stage is a necessary preliminary step towards the next, the whole series forming what is technically known as a chain instinct. This constitutes the sex impulse considered merely as an animal instinct, or what is generally called its physical side.

Now, coming to the sex impulse in Man, we find a greater elaboration of the emotional content, and with it goes a more conscious recognition of the higher elements of the sex process. Love has been defined by Ellen Key as "a synthesis of desire and friendship," and similarly by Havelock Ellis as a "synthesis of lust and friendship."[3] Such definitions do not lead us very far towards

[1] W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 387–393.

[2] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. III., *Analysis of the Sex Impulse*. A general account of the sex process is given by the author in his *Introduction to the Physiology and Psychology of Sex*, second edition. 1918.

[3] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 73.—H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 133.

a deeper understanding of love as a psychic phenomenon. The content of love is hardly exhausted by the two terms of sexuality and friendship, even if we try to picture it, as Hirschfeld has done, not so much as a superaddition of the two components, but rather, as it were, as a sort of chemical combination.[1]

Love, which is practically unknown to the primitive mind,[2] and only arose as a poetic form in Greece about the fourth century B.C.,[3] has extended its sphere with the progress of civilization, until it now involves the whole organism in its activity. By its spiritual irradiation it affects in equal measure all the higher manifestations of art and religion, and infuses into life a spirituality undreamt of before.[4] Indeed, there are voices becoming loud in claiming love—*i.e.*, sexual love—as the basis of all fellow feeling,[5] and others who would make it the constituent original element of the æsthetic sense;[6] while Freud and his school give the term a much wider meaning, and would regard it as the type of all love, embracing equally the sentiment of parent for child and of child for parent.[7] For our purposes we need not burden ourselves with this wide extension of the term sex, but shall limit our analysis of love to what is generally known as sexual love in the restricted sense. We have seen that the physical side of love can be divided into three stages, according to the intensity of the excitation, each being accompanied by its appropriate feeling-tone.

[1] M. Hirschfeld, *Vom Wesen der Liebe*, p. 53. Leipzig, 1906.
[2] K. Groos, *The Play of Man*, p. 271. London, 1901.—H. Ellis, *loc. cit.*, Vol. IV., p. 134.
[3] J. Donaldson, *Woman*, p. 201.
[4] C. A. Scott, *Sex and Art*, pp. 153, 162.
[5] L. Housman, *The Relation of Fellow-Feeling to Sex*, British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology, Publication No. 4.
[6] G. Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty*, pp. 59–62. London, 1896.—H. Ellis, *loc. cit.*, Vol. IV., p. 138.
[7] S. Freud, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*. New York, 1916.

It is this latter emotional psychic element of the sex impulse which with the rise of a more refined and soulful human love assumes ever greater importance and value; indeed, what is generally called the spiritual side of love may be looked upon as merely the expression of these higher emotional and ideational processes in man, without at all necessitating the assumption of a mysterious supernatural agency. Now, these manifestations of love, being from the first conditioned by physiological processes, naturally tend to run *pari passu* with the physical facts. We find therefore that the psychic or spiritual content of love is analyzable into three states corresponding to the three physical stages of the sex impulse, both series by their interaction rendering the whole gamut of sexual experience in Man at once more extended and more complex.

If we start once more with the primary condition of sex feeling, we find it to be some undefinable attraction that draws two persons of opposite sexes towards each other. It has been shown that the sexual reaction takes place in response to certain definite sensory stimuli, affecting any one of the senses—sight, hearing, smell, touch—generally a variable combination of such stimuli acting together.[1] What causes this reaction to be a specifically sexual one is still a moot point. It is well known that even in cases of mutual friendship between persons of the same sex a certain physical sympathy often obtains which is not wholly explainable by intellectual companionship alone. It has even been claimed by some writers on sex, especially by the psycho-analytical school of Freud. that all friendships have something of a physical sexual basis.[2] But leaving this point

[1] See the author's *Physiology and Psychology of Sex* (Chapter on Erotic Symbolism); or in detail, H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. IV.

[2] Dr. Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psycho-analysis*. London, 1918, p. 357; Dr. S. Ferenczi, *Contributions to Psycho-analysis*. Boston, 1916, pp. 55, 177.

aside, there still remains the mystery of the specific physical attraction which we call sexual. Some authors have tried to explain it by a sort of chemical attraction, and speak of erotic chemotropism, just as the approach of the male and female germ cells has been accounted for by chemotaxis.[1] In analogy with this action Hirschfeld speaks of the mutual sexual attraction as due to genotropism.[2] He assumes for this purpose the existence of special sexual sensorial end cells, which are distributed over the body at appropriate places to take up sensory sexual stimuli, similar to the action of other sensorial end organules, those of touch, temperature, sight, etc.[3] Wherever these sensorial sexual end organules are accumulated we have sexually excitable regions of the body. These are called erogenous zones. Now, while we feel inclined to accept the idea of sexual sensory elements as the ultimate specific cause of sexual stimulation, it is perhaps wise to refrain from the use of the word genotropism; for the theory of tropisms implies a purely mechanical explanation of life, which at the present time, if not entirely rejected, is certainly still *sub judice*.[4] But in any case we can admit the notion of a specific sexual attraction, whatever its ultimate character may be.

We shall denote the mildest form of sexual attraction, which represents the initial physical stage of the sex impulse mentioned above, as sub-erotic, in order to distinguish it from the term "sexual," which is used in a more general way as a generic term denoting all kinds of differences of sex, whether sensual or otherwise. This

[1] Gustav Jäger, *Die Entdeckung der Seele*. Leipzig, 1884.—R. Müller, *Sexualbiologie*, p. 13. Berlin, 1907.
[2] M. Hirschfeld, *Naturgesetze der Liebe*, p. 64. Leipzig, 1914.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 88.
[4] See the author's *First Principles of Evolution*, second edition, chap. x. London, 1915.

sub-erotic attraction has its corresponding psychic side in purely intellectual fellowship, such as we find, for instance, in platonic friendship. The characteristic features of such a friendship are well recognized as intellectual harmony with a minimum of physical attraction. It is a feeling of intellectual unity between two persons, which implies a mutual harmony without any actual contact. It is in the second stage that a fuller content is given to sexual feeling by the introduction of tactual sensations, which, as has been truly said, are "the alpha and omega of affection."[1] As Crawley points out, "The desire or willingness for physical contact is an animal emotion, more or less subconscious, which is characteristic of similarity, harmony, friendship, or love." And further: "These ideas of contact are primitive in each sense of the word, at whatever stage of culture they appear. They seem to go back in origin and in character to that highly developed sensibility of all animals and even organized life which forms at once a biological monitor and a safeguard for the whole organism in relation to its environment."[2] This desire for touch, typical of the second phase of physical love, pervades all normal sex behaviour; and we may therefore call this stage that of erotic attraction. The relevant psychic state implies a corresponding inward affective feeling; the intellectual harmony is now suffused with an emotional ardour which gives warmth and tenderness to the relationship involved. We have, in other words, a psychical emotional feeling of unity superadded to the erotic physical attraction. Coming to the third and last element of love, we have seen that on its physical side it consists of the completest physical

[1] A. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, p. 126. London, 1859.
[2] E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, pp. 77 and 79, also p. 126.—H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. IV.; *Sexual Inversion*, p. 8.

contact, involving the ultimate act of sexual union. It is the end stage having as its aim the act of propagation, thus realizing Nature's purpose, towards which all previous steps have merely been the means. This state may be recognized as the stage of erethic attraction, sexual erethism denoting the sensation of the sexual orgasm. It is very important to introduce separate words for the various stages of physical sensations; for, as we have seen, sexual excitation involves various degrees of sensual feelings, starting with the merest trace of sensuousness and rising up to the highest point of orgastic feeling. The term "sexuality" covers all these stages. It is the



FIG. 2.

loose use of this term "sexuality" that has made such havoc in all discussions on sex matters. We shall best avoid misunderstandings by adhering strictly to the more detailed terminology outlined above. The final step to be taken in our analysis of love is to find the psychic equivalent corresponding to erethic attraction. This can only be a state of feeling signifying the complete physical union of two beings in the mutual abandonment of body and soul. In its fullest meaning it is the psychic expression of two personalities uniting to create a third.

As such it is the final realization of that "will of twain" which is at once the aim and acme of all life.

In dividing the content of love into a double tri-partite series (see Fig. 2) we must not imagine that the divisions are absolute. In fact, it would be much more correct to picture each of the preceding factors as continuing into the next division, thus constituting in a sense what Hirschfeld called, as mentioned above, a chemical mixture. Our diagram would then assume in reality an aspect as in Fig. 3.



Fig. 3.

It will have become clear from the foregoing analysis of love how much more complicated and at the same time more spiritualized is the sex instinct of man compared to that of the animals. While in the latter the sex impulse runs in a rapid succession of reflexes to the ultimate act of coition, in man the preliminaries assume more and more importance, and tend to become detached from the main process of mating. It is these refinements, the efflorescence of the human mind, which lifts out the sexual play of man from the mere instinctive behaviour of animals. As Havelock Ellis aptly points out: "The sexual activities of man and woman belong not to that lower part of our nature which degrades us to the level of the 'brute,' but to the higher part, which raises us towards all the finest activities and ideals we are

capable of."[1] It is this psychic content of love, restricted in the animal world to a mere sensuous feeling, which, becoming conscious in man, attains such vast proportions, radiating out into all spheres of life. It is the hall-mark, not only of all human sex activity, but of true sex morality.

We thus once more come back after a prolonged and, we are afraid, somewhat wearisome interlude on the analysis of love to our main theme of chastity. We have seen that it consists in a proper balance between the physical and psychic factors of love. We are now in a position to go a step farther and determine more precisely in what this balance lies. For the bare statement of the fact, as it stands, does not get us very far towards a solution of the ethical problem. The minute analysis of love into its component parts enables us to apply the idea of the balance in a more exact way, and will incidentally give us the cue to many of the complexities of sex relationship found in real life. As repeatedly enunciated, the only test of the morality of any sex relationship is its spirituality—*i.e.*, its psychic meaning must tally with its physical expression. As long, therefore, as there is a proportional balance between the physical and psychic side of love, we have a sex relationship which is intrinsically ethical. As two of the most eminent women writers on the sex problem have declared: "The ethical value of sex relationship lies only in its psychic contents,"[2] says Rosa Mayreder; and Ellen Key: "There can be no other standard of morality for him who loves more than once than for him who loves once only: that of the enhancement of life;" and further: "Love must give life; if not new living beings, then new

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 130.
[2] Rosa Mayreder, "Zur Psychologie der freien Liebe," *Neue Generation*, January, 1912.

values; it must enrich the lovers themselves and through them mankind."[1]

This will sound to most people a commonplace statement, and it would hardly need reiterating, were it not for the fact that, while in theory it is taken as an axiom, in practice it is more or less discountenanced. "In matters of sex we are all somewhat medieval," says Havelock Ellis. We are afraid of drawing conclusions from our own admissions, because the medieval code of sexuality is that of the hero of Ibsen's *Brand:* all or nothing. Sex being tabooed, it was only recognized in the form of sacramental marriage; and with regard to sex matters we have largely remained in this intolerant frame of mind. As Bloch points out: "The sexual instinct has at least as much importance for the individual as for the race; and the exclusive attention to the latter aspect of it was the fundamental mistake of the traditional sex ethics."[2] *Natura non facit saltum* (Nature never makes clear cuts), and there is no reason why this should happen in love any more than in any other social relationship. It is one of the most grievous errors of the orthodox moralist not to recognize this evident truth and to condemn all sex relationships that are not according to his preconceived pattern. Not only ought we to allow for natural transitions, but for personal idiosyncrasies also. For the higher man's organization, the finer and more complex his soul, the stronger his need for individuality and choice in his sexual relationships. Nor must we forget that the erotic emotions are based in the last analysis on physical impulses. As May Sinclair so finely says: "There is no spirituality worthy of the name that has not been proven in the house of flesh."[3] We may perhaps even go farther

[1] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, pp. 39 and 47.
[2] I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, p. 589. [3] May Sinclair, *The Helpmate*.

and maintain with Edward Carpenter: "Intimacies founded on intellectual and moral affinities alone are seldom very deep and lasting; if the physical basis in any form is quite absent, the acquaintanceship is liable to die away again like an ill-rooted plant."[1] In short, lesser forms of love exist, and should be valued as administering not only to the physical and mental well-being of the individual, but also to the æsthetic and moral development of the race. Their final ethical criterion is an adequate spiritual content raising the relationship above purely physical enjoyment. As a matter of fact, such relations always have existed and always will exist; only they have been on sufferance, they have not been allowed to come out into the free air of social approbation. By rebuking and reviling as improper all sex relations outside legitimate marriage, however innocent, the would-be moralists have created not only vice but—viciousness. There is no reason, as A. Maude Royden has pithily remarked, why "*before marriage* understanding and knowledge should be made so hard. . . . There is a constant expectation that boys and girls, if much together, will do each other harm. What wonder if they do, surrounded by this murky atmosphere with which all things connected with sex have been surrounded? The modern lovers, who begin with a much more decent regard for each other before they are lovers, turn it into reverence when love comes. With such a reverence freedom is safe and noble."[2]

3. Love Relationships.

When we now try to define our various degrees of love relationships from an ethical point of view, we shall see

[1] E. Carpenter, *Love's Coming of Age*, second edition, p. 12. London, 1915.

[2] A. Maude Royden and others, *The Making of Women*, p. 46. London. (The italics are in the original text.)

that we can construct three fundamental moral types graded according to our previous three main divisions of love. If we construct a square *adAD*, making the physical and psychic sides of our previous diagram two perpendicular sides of the square, and draw horizontal lines connecting the three divisions previously made (see Fig. 4), we can express the totality of love, physical and spiritual, by the area of the square *adAD*. This implies that such a love contains all the three physical and



Fig. 4.

psychic elements given in our previous analysis of love. This is ideal love—a state of feeling not vouchsafed to everybody. For, as we shall see later, even in love—true love—there rules the law of the average or mean. All sorts of limitations are set to ordinary mortals, and the highest reaches are only attained by the favoured few; for there is such a thing as genius—in love also !

Coming to the lesser divisions of love, we have first that relationship which combines the intellectual feeling of harmony with a modicum of physical attraction, a relationship well recognized as that of platonic friendship. We can express the content of platonic friendship in symbolizing it by the area *abAB*. It is true, the possibility of such a relationship has been doubted as often as admitted.

All we contend for is its theoretical possibility and its practical morality. If it does not flourish independently for a long time, it certainly often forms one of the finest portals of a true and lasting love relationship.

A second relationship of balanced harmony is represented by the area *acAC*. Here we have an increase alike on the physical and on the psychic side of love. As long as this balances on both sides, we are still in the realm of chaste relationship according to our canon of chastity. For purity depends not on the form of any given relationship, but on the harmony of its physical and psychic content. Such a friendship heightened by erotic emotion we call erotic friendship. It can easily be seen that it forms the natural transition stage to the highest and fullest form of love. But apart from this, it has been claimed by many modern spirits as an independent sex relationship on its own merits.[1] As we have seen, it remains a moral relationship so long as the psychic content warrants the physical expression. It may be, and has been, objected that such a friendship runs too close on love. But this can be an objection merely for those who only feel able to sanction either the ideal of legitimately wedded love or the utter emptiness of a lonely loveless life. Apart from the question of the immoral consequences of such a doctrine—we shall deal with this point later, when treating of sexual vice—we can only say that such people try to emulate in the mental sphere the barbarous proceeding of Procrustes, who, instead of fitting the bed to the man, succeeded in fitting the man to the bed by mutilating him. As a matter of fact, as Carpenter has truly pointed out: "Love and

[1] F. W. Stella Browne, *Sexual Variety and Variability among Women*, p. 7.—Grete Meisel-Hess, "Von Liebe und Liebesfreundschaft," *Neue Generation*, May, 1914; also, *Die Sexuelle Krise*, Jena, 1909. English translation: *The Sexual Crisis*. New York, 1918.

friendship—which have been so often set apart from each other as things distinct—are in reality closely related, and shade imperceptibly into each other."[1] H. G. Wells, who has done so much to bring air and sunshine to these neglected children of Eros, expresses a similar sentiment when he says: "For most of us half the friendships and intimacies from which we derive the daily interest and sustaining force in our lives draw mysterious elements from sexual attraction, and depend and hesitate upon our conception of the liberties and limits we must give that force."[2] The fact of the interaction of the erotic impulse and other social forces is now too well established to need any further evidence than that given previously in this chapter. We shall only quote in conclusion Havelock Ellis, the greatest of all students of human love, who says: "The frontier between erotic love and friendship is vague, and an intimate psychic intercourse that is sternly debarred from ever manifesting itself in a caress, or other physical manifestation of tender intimacy, tends to be constrained, and arouses unspoken and unspeakable thoughts and desires which are fatal to any complete friendship."[3]

There is another consideration that may be urged here. It has been asserted that love exists only for the purpose of procreation, and that any other expression of it is *eo ipso* immoral. All we can say to this is that such an idea cannot any longer be held to be wholly true, in view of what we have been able to show with regard to the finer developments of the human sexual impulse. Not only have the erotic needs increased with the progress of modern civilization, but they have become spiritualized and, in this process, been rendered

[1] E. Carpenter, *The Intermediate Sex*, fourth edition, p. 18. London, 1916.

[2] H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*, second edition, p. 200. London, 1917.

[3] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 571.

partly independent of the merely physical final act of mating, which after all is typical only of the animal world. The sexual expression of human love is not restricted any longer to a strictly localized region of the body, but irradiates the whole of the organism. Besides, it is a characteristic of human instinct as against animal impulse that it is plastic and not fixed. The inherited disposition in man is only given in the rough, as it were, allowing for individual variation and adaptation.[1] The sex instinct is no exception to this rule.[2] In the beautiful words of Olive Schreiner: "Noble as is the function of the physical reproduction of humanity by the union of man and woman, rightly viewed, that union has in it latent other, and even higher, forms of creative energy and life-dispensing power, and its history on earth has only just begun; as the first wild rose when it hung from its stem, with its centre of stamens and pistils and its single whorl of pale petals, had only begun its course, and was destined, as the ages passed, to develop stamen upon stamen and petal upon petal, till it assumed a hundred forms of joy and beauty."[3]

But even more; if some people would urge against such valuation of love that it may lead 'anywhere,' let us point out that there is such a thing as sublimation of physical love. Not only is there, as Hirschfeld aptly points out, sublimation into purely extraneous, æsthetic and intellectual channels, but also a process of keeping the sexual feelings upon a higher psychic level; in other words, mere animal passion may be refined into spiritual, though still erotic, enjoyment.[4] Besides, each step towards the

[1] C. Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Behaviour*, second edition, pp. 175, etc. London, 1908.
[2] W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 394, etc.
[3] Olive Schreiner, *Woman and Labour*, p. 27. London, 1914.
[4] M. Hirschfeld, *Naturgesetze, der Liebe*, p. 227.—Colin A. Scott, *Sex and Art*, p. 168.

ultimate act of congress can serve in its turn as an independent partial satisfaction of the sex impulse. It is well known that dancing often serves this purpose, and so do other emotional expressions of affection. "Psychic satisfaction of love often makes complete physical expression less urgent." Man has woven a beautiful pattern of love relationships where there was at first a mere rough outline; he has invented many finer shades of colour, where there was previously one strong glaring red of lust; in short, Man, when truly guided by his natural impulses—and these include the spiritual impulses as well as the physical—and not by empty form-



FIG. 5.

alism, is creating living works of art besides which all other arts fade into a mere shadow.

So much for the moral sex relationships. The same principle of the balance of chastity gives us the means for a proper interpretation of those sex relations which we class as unchaste and therefore as immoral. While chastity implies a harmony between the physical and psychic content of love, unchastity exists in every case where the physical expression of the sex relationship outweighs the psychic meaning. A glance at the diagram (Fig. 5) shows us all the theoretical possibilities of un-

chaste relationship; and, in fact, all these theoretical cases do exist in reality. If we divide the square *adAD* diagonally from *d* to *A* into two triangles, we separate the physical side from the spiritual side. The triangle *adA* will then represent a sex relationship which embraces the whole of the physical sex manifestations, including the final sexual act, without there being any ingredient of spirituality, and which will therefore easily be recognized as that of prostitution. Prostitution may hence be defined as a sex relationship which implies a total lack of reciprocal sexual harmony. It is the grossest expression of the purely animal side of the sex impulse in Man. As we shall deal with prostitution later in a special chapter, we mention it here only for the sake of completeness. Similarly, we leave over for later consideration another sex relationship, that represented by the area *adAC*. It is the relationship which is commonly called a *liaison:* it runs very closely on concubinage and marriage, and we shall therefore treat all the three together.

There are two possible ways in which full, unmitigated prostitution may become attenuated: there may be either a glimmering of spirituality, a raising of the psychic feeling and a more or less variable admixture of mutual understanding between the sexual partners, or the physical expression of sexuality may be toned down to a less complete animalism. In the first case we get a relationship (represented by *adAB*) which still aims at complete sex gratification; indeed, this is directly or indirectly the object of such a liaison, but it assumes a somewhat higher aspect by not being so openly bent on mere sensuality. Wherever there is a genuine approach towards a relationship of spiritual communion, prolonged for some time, on however limited a scale, there is a ray of hope. Such a relationship has at least a modicum of

friendship, though sexuality with all its physical appurtenances is still the main, if not always its avowed, result. We therefore call such a relationship sexual friendship. In relation to prostitution proper it constitutes a step upwards; but, be it pointed out, a very small step upwards.* It will not do to cover up the intrinsic impropriety of such a relationship by passing it off as a 'friendship' pure and simple, as many of its votaries so fondly try to do, in order to carry off a nasty deed by a nice name. It is much more correctly viewed as an attenuated form of prostitution, a sort of semi-prostitution; and thus it should be classed. There is, it is true, a still milder form of sexual friendship which stops short of the ultimate act of congress on principle, and only involves the lesser forms of physical intimacy. As the intellectual basis of friendship persists, the disproportion between the physical and spiritual side becomes much lessened, and therewith its immorality. It forms a transition stage, as it were, between sexual friendship of the highest degree and platonic friendship, as can be seen from its representation in the diagram (*acAB*). It is a relationship very frequent among young people, who would seem to make out quite a fair claim for it, were it not for the fact that it is generally accompanied by a conscious spirit of covert licentiousness. The sexual practice is felt to be an infringement of the moral law of chastity, and is thus stamped as unethical. Indeed, if sexual friendship must be characterized as semi-prostitution, this minor form of it may not inaptly be described as a sort of semi-demi-prostitution; but prostitution it remains.

* Of course, this statement implies the reciprocity of the feeling between the two partners. Where sexual friendship is merely used as a cloak by the man to trap and seduce a girl, it is worse than prostitution. For prostitution implies at least open cognizance of the fact of sexual relationship between the two partners; a feigned sexual friendship only adds deceit to the immoral sexual act.

In fact, it borders dangerously upon the sex relationship *acA*, and is easily converted into it simply by shedding more or less of its intellectual garb and becoming frankly physical. The latter relationship, which contains the two physical phases of love but none of the spiritual, belongs to that category of loveless lovemaking which in its vulgarity is encountered only too often as part of our modern sex life. It is merely a milder form of prostitution, the one which, as has been indicated above, is derived from prostitution by a drop from the extreme sexual embrace. It represents the attitude of the *demi-vierges*,* who, by no means always of the lower class, haunt certain boulevards, cafés, and playhouses—virgins only in virtue of their "anatomical intactitude," not by their moral rectitude. It can in justice only be described as demi-prostitution. It belongs to prostitution, and can only be properly treated along with it. We can see from the diagram that the minor form of sexual friendship (*acAB*) falls naturally between the two other forms of half-prostitution.

Reducing the physical side of sexualism still more, we arrive finally at a sex relationship indicated by the area *abA*. It is the mildest form of illegitimate sex indulgence. It implies that activity between persons which is intended, as Forel puts it, "to betray one's own erotic feelings and to excite that of the partner,"[1] without there being any warrant for such an action by the assumption of a psychic equivalent. It is denoted as flirtage, and must be carefully distinguished from flirtation, which is legitimate. Flirtation in the moral sense is an elemental fact of court-

* The word *demi-vierge* was coined very significantly by Marcel Prevost, a French writer, in analogy with the well-known type of the *demi-monde*, an expression invented by another French writer, the younger Dumas, which denotes the better class prostitute or *maîtresse*.

[1] A. Forel, *Die Sexuelle Frage*, p. 104.

ship. It has in the form of coquetry a deep biological and psychological significance. The female, in order to be appropriately aroused and stimulated by the wooer, plays, as it were, at a sort of mock-modesty, which at the same time accentuates the passion of her mate. This instinctive behaviour, to be observed in the animal world, becomes a more or less conscious act in the human female, and is the natural preliminary to normal courtship. Flirtation of this reputable kind is merely the playful expression of love in any of its stages.[1] But when it becomes an end in itself, it is a perversion of true love and becomes as flirtage a phenomenon of degeneration.

Flirtage can take many forms, from the slightest allusion in talk up to a point where it is not distinguishable from actual prostitution, at least in its lesser forms. Now, it is a curious fact that most of the forms of flirtage, especially those of the milder kind, are visited with very little, if any, social disapprobation. It is strange, indeed, to see such a perversion of moral truth. One would think that the essence of every chaste sex relationship lay in its psychic content and would be judged by this spiritual standard, and by this standard alone. But no! Whilst lip-service is being paid to a morality of spiritual values, it is the physical aspect of love that lies most heavily on the troubled conscience of modern society. Clement of Alexandria enunciated the sane dictum: "Love is not tested by a kiss, but by kindly feelings." But his successors gradually turned this sentence round, and by overlooking the kindly feeling ultimately ended in condoning the kiss. How else could it come about that even now the most flagrant offences against true inward chastity are suffered openly and with

[1] See the author's *Physiology and Psychology of Sex*, p. 98; also H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 518; Vol. I., p. 41.

little or no protest so long as they do not involve a patent physical breach of decorum? How is it that a man may be considered honourable and pure, simply because he abstains from the grosser physical sex acts, although he outrages the good sense of all moral decency by merely 'looking' at a woman? And this in complete forgetfulness of the teaching of the Gospel, which declares: "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her already in his heart."[1] No wonder that H. G. Wells, championing the cause of honest daylight love, pours out his vials of wrath upon those "men and women who are not clean and scandalous, but immoral and respectable."[2] It may be asked, What is in a kiss? In physiological parlance it has been defined by a cynic as "the friction of two mucous surfaces"; in ethical practice it stands as the embodiment of a whole world of love. We cannot do better than repeat the good old saying of Clement of Alexandria: "Love is not tested by a kiss, but by kindly feeling." We should cherish this axiom as the fundamental touchstone of all sincere sex morality.

It would be a great mistake to look upon all the sex relations, chaste and unchaste, given in the above scheme as fixed categories. Nature, we have already had occasion to remark, does not deal in absolute distinctions, and our diagram is intended only to illustrate symbolically the ideal conceptual limits of such relationships. In reality they flow imperceptibly into each other, so that all shades and variations have to be allowed for. Thus, if we take for the sake of clearness once more the diagram of chaste relationships (Fig. 4), we must not rigidly limit their correctness by absolutely straight lines. That would run counter to all human experience. There

[1] St. Matthew v. 28.
[2] H. G. Wells, *The Passionate Friends.*

must be give and take, and a certain amount of latitude should be granted on either side. The lines, instead of running strictly horizontally in the diagram, may be conceived to deviate either way a little, thus including more or less of either the physical or the spiritual side of love.

As a matter of fact, it will be seen that by increasing the physical or by decreasing the spiritual element of love a chaste relationship is converted by natural transition steps into one of unchastity. Thus platonic friendship may merge into flirtage, erotic friendship into a liaison. This is the rule in all human affairs. The border line between good and evil is narrow; the good merges into the bad by insensible steps. It is only in a rough sort of way that we can determine where the good ends and the bad begins; though, let it be understood, there is one absolute ethical test of every kind of sex behaviour, which can be put down as axiomatic: "As immoral must be condemned every sexual act in which harm is wittingly done to the physical or moral personality of the sexual partner."[1] If it be urged against such a scheme that it renders the work of ethical teaching difficult, if not impossible, we can only reply with William James: "Since when, in this mixed world, was any good thing given us in the purest outline and isolation? . . . Without too much you cannot have enough of anything."[2] It is for us to adapt ourselves to Nature, and not to try to force her into our petty schemes, which can only result in failure. *Exemplum docet!* It is so easy to truncate humanity by recognizing only two degrees of love. Nature laughs at such easygoing logic, and defies us in our moral plans laid out with such narrow measure.

How little the ordinary double-barrelled system of sex

[1] R. Michels, *Sexual Ethics*, p. 35.
[2] William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 315. London, 1912.

morality, with its twofold standard for man and woman, is adapted to the complex human reality becomes still more apparent when we go a step farther in the working-out of our diagram. So far our diagram has represented a standardized individuality—*i.e.*, a given individual psyche. We have divided in our analysis of love the physical and the psychic content into three pairs of unequal sections, giving each part a certain proportionate amount. We have allowed one unit to sub-erotic attraction, four units to erotic, and two to erethic attraction according to a quite arbitrary standard of the relative importance each plays in the process of love. But this standard will differ from person to person. There exist natural variations in the sexual make-up of individuals just as much as in their physical or mental constitution. It is the non-recognition of this individual element in love that has led to so much vituperation on the one side and so much undeserved misery on the other. We are only at the very beginning of our researches on sex psychology, and it is as yet premature to try to fix any definite erotic types. But one thing has become clear from what we have learnt through the pioneer work of Havelock Ellis, Moll, and others: that there are of sex more things in heaven and earth than were dreamt of in our philosophy.

There is one final point to be dealt with in connection with our analysis of love. Not only do individual variations exist with regard to the relative extension of the different component parts of love, but each particular person has what can aptly be called a psychic intensity which is especially his own. No one can live above his own level of personality; it colours not only all family and business relations, but also the ethical, intellectual, and all other social activities. And sexual life is no exception to this rule. In other words, men and women

differ in their physical and spiritual capacity for love. As regards the former it is well known that there is a frigid and an ardent type; and frigidity itself either may refer to sexual desire, indicating an absence of *libido*, or may imply only the absence of sensuous sexual pleasure (*voluptas*) in the act. Similar variations may also obtain in the psychic field of the sexual personality. The capacity for emotional and ideational ardour is an inborn gift; there is, as has been said once before, scope for talent and genius in the realm of love also. It is this psychic intensity that determines the quality of love,



FIG. 6.

apart from its intrinsic mixture of physical and psychic elements. With a shallow mind all love will tend to run dry and exhaust itself in physicalities; while a deep, flaming soul will ever vivify the slackening stream of love with an abundance of sparkling, refreshing ideational energy. As Nietzsche so well said: "The degree and nature of man's sexuality reaches up to the highest summit of his mentality."[1] If we ascribe a certain "thickness" to the physical and spiritual side of love (to use a convenient term employed in a similar way by William James), our diagram, instead of being a flat square, now becomes a solid figure (Fig. 6, I.). The two possible variations are represented by Figs. 6, II., and 6, III.; II. representing

[1] Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil.*

the physical, sensual type, and III. the spiritual, ideational. Here, again, the thickness may vary in the different sections; for a great intellectual friend may prove to be a poor sort of a lover, and vice versa. All sorts of combinations are possible in this respect.

We have at last come to the end of our survey of sex morality. It has been a long and intricate piece of work, carrying us far beyond the simple rule of continence, generally considered sufficient to settle matters of sexual ethics. While the authoritative rule proclaims only one form of legitimate love, holding out no salvation for any love outside the official pale, and adapting itself to human exigencies by the cheap and nasty subterfuge of a double-standard morality, we have seen that in real life sex relationships are as complex as the human mind itself. It is true, there exists an ideal in love also, as in other realms of social endeavour. Who would not look up to such an ideal of spiritual love as the one true beacon light of human sexuality? But it is a fundamental mistake to think that by simply positing and preaching such an ideal we are likely to attain purity. To set mankind an impossible task as the only task from the first, merely means to discourage frail humanity, which would otherwise climb cheerfully the smaller hillocks towards the goal of progress. Though the ideal stands as the aim and end of all human love, we cannot but realize that it will only be attained by gradual steps. Whilst upholding, then, the ideal, we must not forget that ideal morality cannot be, and never yet has been, practical morality. Between them yawns a gulf which can only be bridged by degrees, and in this very process the ideal moves forward ever farther and farther—perhaps never to be reached by everyday practice. As Westermarck clearly points out: "We must not confound the moral law with the moral ideal. . . . If the realiza-

tion of the highest moral ideal is commanded by a moral law, such a law will always remain a dead letter, and morality will gain nothing."[1] And, furthermore, we must find and trace the right path towards our ideal. It certainly does not run through the dreary waste of asceticism, a mere negative "empty virtue," but rather through the living, striving, blossoming underwood of erotism, a healthy and chaste exercise of love in all its manifold individual forms, a love which would "signify a new start in our existence, a finer shoot of the tree stoutly planted in good gross earth; the senses running their live sap, and the minds companioned, and the spirits made one by the whole-natured conjunction."[2]

[1] E. Westermarck, *Origin of Moral Ideas*, Vol. I., p. 153.
[2] George Meredith, *Diana of the Crossways*.

CHAPTER III

SEX VICE AND DISEASE

1. Prostitution.

In animals, and, as we have seen, to a large extent in primitive man, sex life is one and undivided. As soon as puberty is reached there exists for all individuals (with few exceptions) the possibility of sexual satisfaction, and mating takes place in the ordinary routine of events. There can here be no thought of legitimacy of sex gratification, for all sex intercourse is merely the natural expression of an organic function. It is only when woman is set apart for man as his personal possession, and chastity is enforced upon her as the price of legitimate wifehood, that for the first time the simple unity of sex life is rent in twain; on the one side there is the marriage tie for the purpose of propagation; on the other there is all that is left of human passion and love detached from legitimate courtship and wedlock. The natural sequence of sexual desire is broken, the separate elements finding their own appropriate expression in different social uses and practice.

Now, man retains the full prerogative of his sex functions in both these respects, while a delimiting restriction is laid upon woman. Thence results a division of womanhood into those women who serve the end of producing legitimate progeny, and those who merely administer to the sexual lust of man. In ancient society there existed a type of female below the status of free womanhood.

The female slave and freedwoman, unable to marry within the prescribed order of the law, became the coveted object of passion of the respectable citizen, either as highly intellectual companions of love (the *hetairæ* in Greece), or much more frequently as vessels of sexual concupiscence in all manner of forms and degrees. As was shown in a previous chapter, irregular traffic with woman outside marriage was considered in classic antiquity nothing more than a natural right of man, a thing which, if not exactly to be flaunted in broad daylight, yet was not held dishonourable, much less immoral. "This sexual ethics with its system of double morality was," as Bloch well remarks, "the necessary product of the typical slave state with its contempt of woman, its contempt of individual love, and its contempt of work."[1]

And this attitude, though in theory modified to a certain extent by Christian sex morality, has prevailed in practice up to the present day. It is true that, while marriage in Greece and Rome was a loveless affair, a mere physical propagation of the race, Christianity laid special emphasis upon the sacrament of marriage; but by disregarding the physical aspect of love altogether, and decrying it as impure, it erred not less in this matter of true sex relationship than did the ancients. By undercutting the lawful stream of human passion they only succeeded in driving it into illegitimate, irregular channels. Hard as the saying may seem, Bloch is quite right in declaring that "our modern sexual ethics is merely that of the ancient slave state."[2]

Prostitution, according to this view, is merely the relic of that part of the primitive sexual impulse in man which escaped being forced under the legal constraint of marriage. And it is in accordance with this view that

[1] I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, vol. i., p. xix.
[2] *Ibid.*

we find it prevalent "in every society in which early marriage is difficult, and intercourse outside marriage is socially disapproved."[1] Westermarck also gives point to this statement in saying that "irregular connections have on the whole exhibited a tendency to increase along with the progress of civilization;[2]" and he attributes this fact "to the increasing tendency towards celibacy in modern civilized countries."[3] Additional proof is furnished by statistics showing that urban life, which delays marriage, favours not only prostitution but also the lesser forms of unchaste relationship.[4] Bloch, the greatest authority on the subject of prostitution, does not hesitate to declare that "prostitution is the necessary correlate of monogamic marriage;"[5] while, according to Havelock Ellis, "it is not so much the indispensable concomitant of marriage as an essential part of the whole system."[6] As such it becomes the central problem of the whole sexual question. For the reconciliation of the conflicting tendencies of sexual desire on the one hand, and of moral order on the other, holds within itself the final solution of all sexual ethics.

In our last chapter we have defined prostitution, according to our diagram of chastity, as that sex relationship which combines with a maximum of physical lust a minimum of spiritual feeling, while in its lesser forms the disproportion, though less excessive, is still large. We disregarded altogether the distinction between legitimate marriage relationship and irregular extramarital sex relations. While historically prostitution may be looked

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 227.
[2] E. Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, p. 69.
[3] E. Westermarck, *Origin of Moral Ideas*, vol. ii., p. 441.
[4] A. Flexner, *Prostitution in Europe*, chap. iii.
[5] I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, vol. i., p. 219.
[6] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 255.

upon as a sort of countermove on man's side against marital restriction, marriage itself by no means escaped altogether the same deteriorative tendency. Christianity, by insisting too exclusively upon the spirituality of marriage, relegated all natural impulses to the limbo of sinfulness. By its emphasis upon the sacramental rite, the form of marriage ultimately became of more importance than its contents: so much so, that nowadays the marriage bond is often consecrated under the shadow of the Church, and of course, by the secular authority, in cases where not love but mere worldly consideration is the sole motive. Such marriages *de convenance*, though sanctified by law, are devoid of all spirituality, and ought to be classed in their proper category of unchaste relationships. The official seal of correct form cannot alter anything as regards its real essence. From the moral point of view such a union is nothing but prostitution in one form or another.

It may be objected that certain considerations enter into a marriage union which distinguish it from the temporary relationship of prostitution. No doubt this is so. But these ulterior ends, such as the establishment of a common household and the rearing of a family, do not intrinsically alter the ethical status of sex relationship itself, which is one of carnal union without love. And every such union, whether temporary or permanent, is an act of prostitution from the standpoint of pure sexual ethics. As Marro pithily remarks: "Between those who sell themselves to prostitution and those who sell themselves to marriage, the only difference is in price and duration of contract."[1] Social factors can alter the form, but do not change the ethical content of a sex union. And it

[1] Marro, *La Pubertà*, p. 462, quoted by H. Ellis; *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 290. See also R. Michels, *Sexual Ethics*, p. 38.

is this alone that constitutes the moral order of any given relationship. If society is still loth to speak of a married couple as living in a state of prostitution—it is quite ready, however, to stigmatize every free union as such, irrespective of its content of love—there are signs that the public conscience, especially that of woman, is at last revolting against a loveless state of marriage as degrading, and as worse than a loveless celibate life. Such a view can only be hailed as a welcome step forward in the proper appreciation of love-life as the one essential test of true sex morality—even in marriage. If loveless marriage is not yet considered as prostitution, well—it ought to be.

But this is anticipating an ideal state of sex morality. At present such a standpoint is somewhat premature. How far we are from it is shown by the difficulty there is of finding a true and clear definition of prostitution according to current ideas of sexual ethics. A definition of prostitution that is not based upon the true inward meaning of the sex relationship, but tries to circumscribe it by merely external, adventitious characteristics, must naturally be indefinite and vague. As we have seen, sex relations cannot simply be classed according to their legitimate sanction; prostitution is no exception to this rule.

But leaving aside now the truly fundamental distinction made before, and adhering to the conventional style of looking for prostitution among the illegitimate order of sex relationships only, we are at once confronted with the difficulty of determining in what way prostitution differs from other kinds of irregular sex behaviour. For it is admitted by everybody, even on the most conservative view, that there are extramarital relationships which cannot be classed with prostitution proper. As Bloch has shown in his masterly and exhaustive book on "Pros-

titution,"[1] we cannot define prostitution by any one single characteristic. (This follows naturally from what we have said before.) Neither want of choice, nor publicity, nor payment, nor professionalism—not one of these single factors justifies us in speaking of a sexual act as one of prostitution. It is assumed that prostitution is characterized by indiscriminate intercourse with any chance comer; true, but often, and perhaps even generally, except with the lowest prostitutes, there is a certain choice of customers. Notorious publicity is not essential either; for at the side of the public prostitute there exists clandestine prostitution with its vastly more numerous votaries. Payment for services rendered does not necessarily constitute an act of prostitution; for, on the one hand, remuneration in some shape or other is frequently made in the more permanent extramarital sex relationships which border on regular sex unions, though they remain without social sanction; while, on the other hand, prostitution is possible without fee altogether, if the other conditions of mere carnal intercourse are fulfilled. And, lastly, even routine professionalism does not implicitly constitute prostitution; for there is a floating and ever-changing section of women who follow this vocation in their leisure hours, temporarily and for pleasure—a sexual underworld which practises prostitution and yet is not of it. It includes the large and ever-increasing mass of young people who practise the grosser kinds of sex friendship and flirtage described in the last chapter. It is only a varying combination of any of these factors that constitutes prostitution. Perhaps the shortest definition is that of A. Maude Royden, who speaks of prostitution as "commercialized vice,"[2] if we understand

[1] I. Bloch, *Die Prostitution* (Berlin, 1912). Unfortunately, only the first volume of this indispensable work has so far appeared in print.

[2] A. Maude Royden, *Women and the Sovereign State*, p. 49, note.

by vice unchaste sex relationship between the two sexes; though, be it understood, homosexual prostitution is possible as sex vice between two persons of the same sex.

This last definition of prostitution distinguishes it from the other extramarital sex relations, which, though irregular in form, are characterized by a certain fixity of relationship. For, as Havelock Ellis points out: "It is not the abundance of lovers which makes a woman a prostitute, but the nature of her relationship with them."[1] Here once more our own definition comes in very appropriately; for it defines the nature of prostitute relationship as that carnal union (not necessarily always complete) which is devoid of spiritual content. It excludes thus the liaison and all lesser irregular sex relationships from the category of prostitution, however else we may be inclined to class them in the moral scale. We can now from this new point of view perhaps best define prostitution with Bloch as "a promiscuous sex relationship characterized by the absence of all individual relationship between man and woman."[2] Under this definition we should have to rule out all prostitute relationship in marriage, which, as was said before, is the only possible way at present, if we wish to avoid confusion. While our own definition is an ethical one, denoting every sex relationship as prostitution where there is an absence of individual love, the current definition, as just given, might be described as a social definition of prostitution; it reckons other personal relationships between husband and wife a bar against prostitution. The distinction between these two ideas, and their relation, is of great importance, and should be clearly kept in view.

Ethically, prostitution is a vice; socially considered, it is illicit sex traffic. We can deal with it from either

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 247.
[2] I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, p. 197.

of these points of view. Those who are fond of looking upon prostitution from a merely external aspect as a public nuisance, will try to devise methods for doing away with it by repressive means, without troubling their heads much whither the social evil takes flight, so long as the streets are cleared and obvious scandal avoided. This is the police view of prostitution, which has found its most pronounced expression in the continental system of reglementation. It is quite unnecessary to waste time in discussing its merits or demerits. It fails in what it sets out to do—to bring prostitution under law and order; nor does it succeed better in what is considered its greatest claim to recognition, the sanitation of illicit sex intercourse—*i.e.*, the prevention of disease.[1] Most authorities are now agreed that this system has utterly failed in both these respects, and that from every other point of view it is worse than useless.[2] It makes it more difficult for the fallen woman to extricate herself from the pit into which police registration has pushed her; it forces prostitution into secret channels, and thus encourages clandestine prostitution, which it is powerless to stop; it gives a false feeling of security against disease, a security which in reality does not exist; and, finally, which is its worst indictment, it countenances by this public supervision an act of immorality, so that society becomes in a sense privy to the act; it is, as Flexner put it, "society's tacit assent to laxity."[3] Whatever else can be said for or against the public regulation of prostitution, the problem decides itself on purely moral grounds. Our

[1] See for complete statement of the case pro and contra, A. Flexner, *Prostitution in Europe.* New York, 1914.

[2] A. Flexner, *Prostitution.*—H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., pp. 250 and 332.—I. Bloch, *The Sexual Life of our Time*, chap. xv. London, 1908.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, p. 564.—A. Forel, *Die Sexuelle Frage*, p. 361

[3] Flexner, *Prostitution*, p. 219.

new ethical sex conscience cannot suffer the condonation of certain facts which in the same breath it proclaims as vice. As a matter of fact, regulation as a system would seem to be in England as dead as a door-nail, were it not that it raises its obnoxious feelers here and there under all sorts of subterfuges.* Security is the prize of constant vigilance.

There have not been wanting attempts in the past at exterminating prostitution root and branch by ruthless severity.[1] They were all unsuccessful; nay, it was found that "the remedy was worse than the disease."[2] Heidingsfels, an American authority, admits that "a suppression of prostitutes is impossible, and control is impracticable."[3] And Grete Meisel-Hess puts it in her direct way: "There exists a need for prostitution; it therefore will not disappear, neither by moral tracts nor by police measures; for an institution which answers a need has never yet disappeared."[4]

Does this mean, then, the toleration of prostitution? Even this attitude has found advocates so far back as St. Augustine. Though he declared prostitution a sordid business, comparing it to the plague, he nevertheless realized its necessity in the well-known saying: "Remove the whores from human affairs and you would pollute the world with lust."[5] And we have accordingly, as men-

* See the Criminal Amendment Bill (February, 1917) and its discussion in Parliament. Under this Bill a heavy sentence for loitering, with forced medicalexamination, could be imposed upon women without any evidence other than police evidence. The Bill was not passed; but a similar order referring to offences of women (save the mark!) against soldiers has since been promulgated under the Defence of the Realm Act, and has actually been put into action, protests notwithstanding.

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 241, etc.
[2] Quoted by H. Ellis, *loc. cit.*, p. 251.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 248.
[4] Grete Meisel-Hess, *Die Sexuelle Krise*, p. 209.
[5] St. Augustine, *De Ordine*, II., iv.

tioned before, the spectacle of medieval society morally condemning prostitution and yet at the same time condoning it—nay, reckoning with it as a routine part of life. In other words, it was considered necessary as a social safeguard. This attitude towards the prostitute and her social mission has found forcible expression in the famous passage of Lecky: "Herself the supreme type of vice, she is ultimately the most efficient guardian of virtue. But for her the unchallenged purity of countless happy homes would be polluted, and not a few who, in the pride of their untempted chastity, think of her with an indignant shudder, would have known the agony of remorse and of despair. On that one degraded and ignoble form are concentrated the passions that might have filled the world with shame. She remains, while creeds and civilizations rise and fall, the eternal priestess of humanity, blasted for the sins of the people."[1]

Nor is this view of prostitution as "a safety-valve for the constitution of marriage" yet extinct. Apart from those who would plead for it as the relatively most harmless method of "man's sowing of wild oats," it finds a partial recognition by those who would claim justice for the prostitute as a social saviour—if this be her profession. "Either," says Professor Pearson, "there is a means of abolishing prostitution—and all participation must be treated alike as antisocial—or the prostitute is to be treated as an honourable woman."[2] This is a laudable proposition in so far as it advocates equal treatment for both sexes alike; but we have advanced too far in our ethical sex feeling to be able to go back to the ancient view of life in the toleration of sexual immorality. We cannot any longer treat prostitution as a

[1] W. E. H. Lecky, *European Morals*, vol. ii., p. 283.
[2] Karl Pearson, *The Ethic of Freethought*, second edition, p. 382. London, 1901.

social fact only; it is fundamentally an ethical question, and we cannot but treat it as such. This is the reason why all the previous methods of finding a solution for prostitution have failed—they did not touch the core of the problem.

When we now come to ask what is the real cause of prostitution, we find there is a twofold source feeding the river of social pollution. There is, on the one hand, the demand from the side of the man, and, on the other, the supply kept up by woman to meet this demand. Of these two factors the first is, as we shall see, by far the most important and decisive. It is true, there is a certain mutual interdependence between supply and demand, as in other economic spheres; but in prostitution, it will be found, it is the demand which in the first instance creates the supply, and not vice versa. As a matter of fact, reformers, being constantly preoccupied with the social view of prostitution, have ever been tempted to regulate and, if possible, to cut off the female supply, forgetting that at bottom prostitution is mainly a sex problem of the male and not of the female. This becomes evident when we analyze the woman's part in prostitution, and try to elucidate the reasons why certain women give themselves to sexual vice as a profession.

It is generally taken for granted that the main factor that drives girls into this career is economic—*i.e.*, poverty. The fact is that prostitutes are, on the whole, recruited from the working-class, being represented chiefly by factory workers, shop girls, waitresses, and domestic servants, the last-named forming by far the greatest proportion of all.[1] It may also be conceded that fluctuating trade and low wages play a great rôle in swelling the number of prostitutes at certain times,

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 260.—Flexner, *Prostitution*, p. 63.

creating what may be called the part-time prostitute, who, in addition to her normal vocation, occupies herself in her leisure hours or slack time with the pleasures of *Venus pandemos*.[1]

But, as Flexner rightly points out, while "prostitution is of economic origin and significance in so far as the region of economic pressure is mainly the region from which the prostitute comes . . . the mere fact of living within the area, whether in its darkest tract or elsewhere, is not of itself conclusive. For the prostitute is, in the last resort, 'individually selected'"[2] Or to put it another way, if the economic factor is a predisposing moment, there must be another element which picks out of the host of female workers those who are inclined to a loose life; for these form, after all, compared to the whole number of working girls, only a small minority.

What is this additional factor? It is difficult to trace; for the motives that drive women into the arms of prostitution are manifold. Some authorities, especially Lombroso and his followers, have tried to make out a case for the prostitute as a special atavistic type, an inborn pathological variation of womanhood corresponding to the male type of the born criminal. This extreme view is now generally given up, though it has found less erudite followers of late in some of the over-enthusiastic and less careful eugenists. It is true that a good many prostitutes show minor degrees of moral imbecility; and, on the other hand, most feeble-minded girls, if not especially taken care of, fall easy victims to prostitution; but to generalize this statement and regard the addiction to prostitution in itself as a degenerative, dysgenic sign—nay, to go so far as to say that "promiscuity in sexual

[1] See R. Michels, *Sexual Ethics*, p. 97, etc.
[2] Flexner, *Prostitution*, p. 84.
[3] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 275, etc.

relations might constitute a legal subtype of the ' moral defective,' "[1] shows indeed little knowledge of, and still less insight into, the ethical bearing of this sex question. Vice is immoral, but it is sheer ruthlessness to assert that people, because they are given to vice, are *eo ipso* morally defective.

This notion is contradicted by the well-ascertained fact that " most girls who eventually become prostitutes have lost their virginity at an early age and in the great majority of cases through men of their own class."[2] Unless, indeed, we do not hesitate to go a step further and stigmatize every sexual lapse as a sign of mental defectiveness, we are constrained to admit that it is more likely that youthful ardour and ignorance, going unchecked amidst unfavourable social surroundings, form the first step in the " downward path." But this is only the first step.

Apart from the social ostracism that makes it difficult for a " fallen girl " to right herself with society,—our self-righteous society, which claims to be working towards the uplifting of sex morality—there is an additional factor which finally lands such a girl into the world of the gilded *demi-monde*. There is the strong incitement and love of finery, the attraction of an apparently easy life combined with luxury; and there is, at least for the finer spirits, the bid for freedom and relief from the shackles of a ceaseless, monotonous routine of toil without reward.[3]

If we take into consideration these factors, it becomes obvious why the problem of prostitution seems insoluble when attacked merely from the woman's side. The factors active are general and not specific. Any remedy concerned with the prostitute woman alone must be

[1] See *Eugenics Review*, October, 1917, p. 255.
[2] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 292.
[3] See H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 293; also I. Bloch, *Sexual Life of our Time*, p. 334.

futile. As regards the economic point, no mere increase in women's earnings can affect the supply in any appreciable way; for, as H. Ellis points out: "No practicable rise in the rate of wages paid to women in ordinary industries can possibly compete with the wages which fairly attractive women of quite ordinary ability can earn by prostitution."[1] And, furthermore, where there is a real demand, there is always a price. "Like every other industry, prostitution is governed by the demand of the need to which it responds. As long as that need and that demand persist they will provoke an offer. It is the need and the demand that we must act on, and perhaps science will furnish us the means to do so."[2] It would require a total revolution of social conditions such as to make life worth living for the average woman worker, in order to buy her off from the more easily earned wages of lust combined with what appears to her to be freedom.

In so far as prostitution is due to feeble-mindedness in women, we might be able to exercise a certain control by stricter supervision and legislation. But nothing short of permanent segregation would remove these unfortunate victims from their immoral calling. (The subject of eugenics methods will be discussed fully in a later chapter on Eugenics.) Moral education, so assiduously advocated by a certain school of reformers, can here do little or nothing. In any case, feeble-mindedness only lies at the fringe of the problem of prostitution.

All this explains why rescue work, the favourite pastime of superior ladies, who, according to Lecky, are "charitable from the height of their social security," is generally so unsuccessful. Northcote, whilst praising the work as "of capital value to society,"[3] cannot but

[1] H. Ellis, *loc. cit.*, Vol. VI., p. 263.

[2] G. de Molinari, *La Viriculture*, 1897, p. 155, quoted by H. Ellis, *loc. cit.*, Vol. VI., p. 263.

[3] H. Northcote, *Christianity and Sex Problems*, p. 167.

admit that "the permanent success of rescue work would appear to be quantitatively small."[1] Indeed, the problem of prostitution once more seems to split on the rock of social facts.

So we are left with our final issue—prostitution as a man's problem. It has ever been a puzzle to a good many minds how it is that man can stoop so low as to soil the very spring of life with the muddy backwash of whoredom. To women especially this seems so incredible that they would fain deny the very nature of man rather than admit such a damaging indictment against him. Yet the very existence of prostitution in our midst should warn us that there must be something wrong with easy-going optimism. The truth is, as we had occasion to state before, that man's erotic impulse differs from that of woman. "Woman's love is richer, more spiritual, and more diffuse in its content, while a man often reaches the full limit of his physical capacity for love at a single step, and it would appear that his psychic limits are often not more difficult to reach."[2] This explains why a man is more easily incited by passion and more readily jumps the barrier of decency, forgetting himself in an orgy of lust. Being denied an outlet for his natural desires by the cry for rigid abstinence, he is often driven to the opposite extreme of reckless licence. As a very sensitive woman writer puts it: "When you are not thirsty you do not think about drinking. When you are thirsty, you do. When you are driven mad with thirst, you think of nothing else. And sometimes—not always—when you can't get clean water, you drink water that's not so clean. Though you may be very particular."[3] This is greatly to be deplored, and, let it be said here outright,

[1] H. Northcote, *loc. cit.*, p. 163.

[2] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 541.

[3] May Sinclair, *The Helpmate*.

is a state of affairs which no clean-minded person can possibly contemplate without a feeling of revulsion. It is the lowest pit man or woman can reach—be it even in a moment of forgetfulness.

But the remedy is not, as our purists imagine, a renewed campaign for self-denying asceticism. To try to level down man's desire to that of woman has ever proved a failure, the fruitless effort at repression merely leading to a general state of hypocrisy.

Of course, there always have been men who are morally so constituted that they would submit to any mental trials rather than sully their bodies, and withal their souls. With these the appeal to an ethical standard will always have weight; and the insistence upon a chaste life should for this reason be one of the axioms of sexual conduct for everybody. But it is a fallacy to assume that all men are, as a matter of course, equally amenable to the influence of such an appeal. Chastity, like honesty, is an ideal, and we should in matters of sex show at least as much forbearance as in other walks of life. To expect to find a universal remedy for unchastity is no less foolish than to imagine that there exists a panacea against dishonesty. We can only set the highest standard and try to inculcate it by degrees.

How little the upholders of the conventional sex morality understand the problem of male unchastity is shown by the fact that they insist upon early marriage as the prime remedy for prostitution. Apart from the disastrous effect of too early unions on the happiness of married life, and the fact that early marriage is in any case impossible under modern conditions,—of which later—it is well known that unchastity starts with men at an age when marriage is as yet not to be thought of. Again, we cannot avoid the unpleasant truth that irregular sex habits by no means cease with married

life. Among the clientele of prostitution a good proportion—and by no means a small one—is found to be married men.[1] We are here face to face with a fundamental fact of sex life which no cavilling will avail against.

How can we account for this fact? Is it inherent wickedness in man like that attributed by some to prostitutes? No, such a view merely betrays ignorance or wilful obtuseness. A phenomenon that has obtruded itself so obstinately right through the history of civilization must have some natural basis. If, as Bloch declares, prostitution, from a biological point of view, is nothing but "a form of Dionysian self-expression,"[2] then we must recognize the same potent spirit also in the case of married men. Civilization has, according to Schurtz, led to an over-nicety of sex relations, so that by its dull routine of correctness it drives man from time to time into an outbreak of unrefined and coarse naturalism.[3] Man often finds something in the free naturalness of the more intelligent street girl, in place of which civilized society so far has not seen fit to offer any legitimate counter-attractions.

Here, then, is the true way of reform: the safe piloting of the vessel of sex between the rocks of asceticism and the whirlpools of sensuality. We have already mentioned that the gusts of sex passion start long before the marriageable age, and that early marriage as a remedy is out of the question. Apart from the general educational reforms in sex matters that have to be carried out in order to create saner notions on sex among the young—of this more anon—we have to realize that decent sex

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., pp. 296 and 495.

[2] I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, p. xviii.

[3] After a quotation from H. Bloch, *Sexual Life of Our Time*, . 325.

relationships are the best antidote to the deleterious influence of sex curiosity. Flexner is inclined to believe —and we agree with him—that in England "correct living is in certain strata of society distinctly more probable than on the Continent."[1] We would attribute this to the commonsense attitude taken up with regard to our young people of both sexes, who are allowed a fair share of freedom in meeting with each other, unknown on the Continent. It is liberty that frees the soul, here as in all cases.

But even with us liberty is still timid. We have too much yet of the spirit of distrust, of cramping narrowness, and fussy interference; we are still afraid of human nature, and would fain bind it with "mail-chain fetters." What else could dictate, to women of all beings, the idea that girls have to be guarded against themselves by keeping them at a safe distance from men, even invoking the law towards this end. It is thought that by raising the age of consent the prostituting of young girls could, as it were, be nipped in the bud. Are such methods likely to stem the stream of unchastity? All they will do is to drive it underground, into dark corners and alleys; for it is well known that the clandestine forms of unchastity flourish quite independently of open prostitution, if not in inverse ratio to it. At least, if there is to be equality between the sexes, why not protect the unwary lad as well, against corruption by female elders?[2] It is the woman who is generally more precocious in her development, much more mature, and therefore more self-possessed than the boy at the same age. Besides, what avails legal protection against the vagaries of love, seeing that most girls have their first sexual experience,

[1] Flexner, *Prostitution*, p. 41, note.

[2] See on this point H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. III., p. 222.

not with chance comers, but with their sweethearts? Are we to punish the boy lover—and only him and not her? No; the advocacy of a high age of consent is inconsistent with the claim of woman to the guardianship of her own body, and is merely a relic, a blind acceptance of the old double-standard morality of man, who treated woman as a frail vessel—and broke her.

Are we to perpetrate the old mistake of trying to protect woman against man by limiting her freedom? It used to be the old-fashioned notion that the best way of inculcating sex morality was to hide the facts of life from young people; girls especially were deemed innocent, when they were ignorant. But facts have proved stronger than theory. We are wiser now in recognizing that not suppression, but knowledge is the true road to chastity. Modesty was at one time strictly enforced upon women, to ensure immaculate possession to the happy male elect, and this is still largely the case at the present time. For, as Meredith says: "The devouring male egoist prefers them as inanimate, overwrought, polished, pure-metal, precious vessels, fresh from the hand of the artificer, for him to walk away with hugging, call all his own, drink of and fill and drink of, and forget that he stole them."[1] Yes, he forgets that for this he stole away the personality of woman, by making her subservient to his sexual *gourmandise*. And all this in order to keep her safe from him and him safe from his passion!

We suffer this cleavage between the original primitive sensualism of man and his lofty spiritualism of a higher evolutionary stage, as if no reconciliation were ever possible. We are eternally tossing him to and fro on the horns of this ancient dilemma: either ascetic repression or unchaste profligacy, holding out for him no third alternative. Attention has already been drawn

[1] George Meredith, *The Egoist.*

to Miss Royden's plea advocating greater liberty between the sexes before marriage as the one essential preliminary to true love. Encouragement in this direction should be given as much for the woman's sake as for the man's. Might it not just be possible that, instead of man dragging down the womanhood of our girls, woman may raise and elevate his manhood ? Why should we take for granted that evil must necessarily follow because two young people come together in complete mutual confidence ? With Miss Royden we would rather submit " that it is our suggestive ignorances and hints, our grimy expectation of indecency, that has made sex an obsession, and created disaster, and that to expect from youth a noble reverence for a great mystery and force is to go far towards creating victory—or, rather, letting conquer a purity which is native, and which we have done our best to destroy."[1]

Truly, it is putting a low estimate on the purity of our own sisters and daughters—not to speak of the insult to man—to imply the existence of such a base general standard of moral behaviour that we cannot trust our young people to come together in love and play. No; even men, as they are to-day, are generally not inclined to drink muddy water when they can get clean, nor are they likely to pollute the nectar offered them by their love-mates out of sheer wantonness. If nothing else kept them from such a course, it would be the consideration that it is from these very maidens that they will have to choose their future wives.

It is certainly a significant fact that the prevalence of syphilis in males (as indicated by their recorded death-rate) is greatest among the highest (richest) and lowest (poorest) social classes; while the frequency is much less among the skilled workers, and least among agri-

[1] A. Maude Royden in *The Making of Women*, p. 47.

cultural labourers.[1] Now we can take the extent of syphilis occurring in any one class as an approximate index of the promiscuous intercourse indulged in by that class. We have, then, the spectacle that, with the exception of the lowest class of labourers, among whom vagrancy, shiftlessness, and insanitary conditions tend to swell the army of syphilitically infected, it is the richest, the upper and middle classes, which come next with their frequency of deaths from syphilis, in spite of their excellent hygienic conditions and their possibility of prompt medical treatment; and still more notable, the agricultural labourer shows the least number of infections with syphilis. How is that? He that runs may read. It is prostitution that gives the key. The agricultural working-class do not practise prostitution, because they have natural sex relationships—prostitution does not flourish in the country; and to a lesser degree we find similar conditions among the town labourers, as already pointed out previously in this book. The scions of our so-called upper classes, however, in order to keep their own womenfolk pure, must corrupt and defile the working-class girls to serve their own end. And this is their vaunted superior sex morality, from the height of which they deign to look down upon the primitive sex 'immorality' of the working-classes—and dictate the law. A change of custom would do these would-be leaders of society good, and perhaps teach them that the primitiveness of nature is sometimes better than the sham morality of civilization.

If we are to sum up our survey of prostitution and the means towards its solution, we come to the conclusion that there is no royal road to save men from their own sins. We neither agree with those who look upon prosti-

[1] Final Report of Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases, 1916, p. 19.

tution as entirely avoidable, nor, on the other hand, can we see eye to eye with those who already envision a time when prostitution will have dropped out altogether from the sex life of man. This, it must be confessed, is rather a disappointing statement to make—even vague, as it stands. To be more precise, we must once more distinguish between the customary social definition of prostitution as commercialized vice and our own ethical definition of it as physical sex relationship without due psychic reciprocity. As regards the former, we can perhaps definitely assert that it will die out some day, at least in its crassest form. The whole trend of our modern sex consciousness is against it, and the steady growth of the feminist movement is a sure sign of its ultimate disappearance. In fact, a strong tendency has already set in everywhere against the public form of prostitution, the brothel, which is gradually disappearing by slow decay.[1]

It stands otherwise with prostitution regarded from a purely ethical point of view as unchastity in its grosser forms. He would be a bold man, indeed, who would prophesy here. For, as remarked before, unchastity is like dishonesty: it is second nature with some people. And we know that, as there are certain people not amenable to ordinary rules of decent dealing, so there always will be people who are incapable of clean thoughts and feelings on sex. Neither prison nor precept will avail here. But with the majority of men it is not so much the desire for unchastity as the craving for sex satisfaction that drives them on to the wrong path. They go to the muddy pool because they cannot get the clean spring. It is here that real moral improvement is possible and already in progress; the day of purity is dawning, however faint the signs may be as yet.

The first indications lie in the fact that men are becoming

[1] A. Flexner, *Prostitution*, p. 180, etc.

reluctant to seek the prostitute; they rather court girls of their own or the nearest class, and form what we have termed sexual friendships. It is true this is prostitution still, but prostitution of a lesser kind. There is here at least a glimmer of true human sex relationship such as is totally wanting in commercialized prostitution. And it may be hoped that with the gradual enlightenment of the youth of both sexes, with a clearer consciousness of the beauty of sex relationship from its spiritual side, the unchaste sex relations will slowly be replaced and superseded by chaste love unions. Gentle and persuasive help, true heartfelt understanding of the real difficulties of both, boys and girls, will do more to bring this time near than violent denunciations, harassing interference, and ruthless repression. The modern moralist, in trying to abolish once for all the ancient obnoxious double sex standard, is aiming at finding a true reconciliation between the warring sex tendencies of man and woman. It may be that he will succeed in solving a problem which so far has shown itself refractory to all genuine improvement. At least, "he is prepared," in the words of Havelock Ellis, "to consider whether reform in this matter is not most likely to take place in the shape of a fairer apportionment of sexual privileges and sexual duties to women generally, with an inevitably resultant elevation in the sexual lives of men also."[1] And we would further quote Edward Carpenter, who says: "Prostitution naturally has little chance, and cannot compete in a world where alliances are free and there is an open field for friendship."[2]

It is commonly objected that this would mean a lowering of the standard of purity. We can only answer that we have already given evidence to show that, on the whole, only a small proportion of the population is pure even in the

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 313.

[2] E. Carpenter, *The Intermediate Sex*, fourth edition, p. 126. London, 1916.

commonly accepted sense. Besides, as we have emphasized over and over again, true chastity is not so much of the body as of the mind; or, rather, it consists in the continent use of physical means towards spiritual ends. To achieve true chastity by social efforts a change of heart must take place, from what the French philosopher Alfred Fouillée calls the "moral imperative" to the "moral persuasive." It may be that in this process "there will result some anarchy on some points."[1] This is inevitable; for, as A. Maude Royden remarks in this respect: "No system can be devised whereby human beings can be infallibly saved from their own weaknesses and mistakes."[2] But in risking so much we should not forget that, as Fouillée continues, "there will also be more life and more spontaneity"—and in our case, incidentally, less prostitution. And this is, after all, what we are striving for.

2. Venereal Disease.

Venereal disease, as the name signifies, is the outcome of promiscuous addiction to the goddess Venus; it is thus an incident of prostitution. For, though the venereal diseases are, in the first instance, due to the infection with specific microbes, they are spread in the vast majority of cases by intimate sexual contact, indiscriminate sex intercourse being the main factor in the dissemination of the diseases from person to person. They can, however, be communicated to innocent people by the usual channels of infection, as by contaminated vessels, towels, etc. Thus, on the one hand, innocent people and children may acquire the disease through no fault of their own; while, on the other, protection against the disease-producing microbes by prophylactic means

[1] Alfred Fouillée, *Morale des Idées-Forces*, second edition, p. liv. Paris, 1908.

[2] A. Maude Royden in *The Making of Women*, p. 47.

may ensure safety against infection without at all altering the conditions of sex relationship. These facts should be a sufficient refutation of those people—if there still are any—who believe that venereal disease is the natural result of illicit intercourse, a Divine punishment for sinful sex relationship.

Venereal disease and prostitution are thus closely bound up together; but not in the way usually understood by the public. It is true that what affects prostitution will to a large degree also influence venereal disease, its prevalence varying in direct ratio to that of prostitution. (The suppression of open prostitution does not diminish venereal disease; it is, if anything, at least as rampant among unregistered prostitutes.[1]) But the relation between prostitution and venereal disease does not hold good when applied in the reverse way—*i.e.*, the diminution of venereal disease does not necessarily lead to less sex immorality. Rigorous attention directed against venereal disease, unless it takes into proper consideration the very source of infection, will not have concordant results; it will leave largely untouched the fountain-head of the disease—and with it the disease itself. Even if it were possible to stamp out venereal disease by hygienic measures altogether, prostitution would thereby not have disappeared. We would have clean prostitution—no more. It is necessary to emphasize this point, because there are a good many social reformers who seem by no means clear what they are aiming at in the campaign against venereal disease.* The fight against venereal disease will have to resolve itself in the long run into nothing else than the fight against prostitution. This

[1] A. Flexner, *Prostitution*, p. 242.

* Unfortunately this confusion of issues has been given a strong impetus by the Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases (1916), the "terms of reference of which precluded consideration of the moral aspects of the questions dealt with." It is as if we

furnishes the feeding-ground for the disease; and until it is either swept clean or done away with altogether, there is no hope of ever getting rid of venereal disease completely. Hygienic measures are by themselves very helpful; but, as we shall see, unless augmented by other more vigorous methods, they are entirely inadequate to stem the ever-flowing tide of new infections. Unless we are prepared to remove the very foci of infection, we cannot look forward even to an approximate elimination of venereal disease from our midst.

The problem, then, of attacking venereal disease can be approached in two different ways. The one is to root out prostitution—at least in its grossest, most polluted forms—which is the main cause of venereal disease. This, as we have seen, has never yet been attempted in a proper manner. We have been too half-hearted in this question, as modern sex psychology proves, and have contented ourselves with laying down a moral code for the masses which the majority have never yet held. There remained the alternative effort of rendering prostitution, if not effete, at least innocuous. This has been the method of reglementation, which, apart from its moral drawbacks, is now generally acknowledged to have failed utterly; it has not even achieved its immediate object, that of supplying an uncontaminated human material.[1]*

were to enquire into the extent and spread of typhoid fever and leave out of the terms of reference all consideration of the vital element—the drainage system. The public have taken up eagerly the discussion of the problem of venereal disease without realizing that the main issue behind venereal disease is the problem of prostitution.

[1] Flexner, *Prostitution*, chap. vii.

* Here, too, it is not amiss to point out that military authorities are loth to learn this lesson. It would seem like flogging a dead horse, were it not for the fact that the Under-Secretary for War declared in the House of Commons that "he was not at all sure that it was such a bad thing to have certain houses where the women were registered and kept clean" (see report, *Manchester Guardian*, February 26, 1918).

We have now entered another phase of experimentation, that of the sanitary regulation—not of prostitution, but of venereal disease. It is proposed, not so much to deal directly with prostitution, but rather to fight venereal disease itself; though some reformers seem to think that the campaign against venereal disease may incidentally have the effect of reducing prostitution also. The means adopted towards this end are proper medical treatment, free to all patients suffering from venereal disease, through the agency of the State, generally the local authorities. This method was first adopted in Norway, and has been in existence there for a long period; Denmark followed in 1906, Italy in 1907,[1] and England has now followed suit in carrying out a similar plan, though not so thoroughgoing. This system of voluntary treatment is bound to touch a much larger proportion of the population than has hitherto been reached. Seeing that it has been found that about 10 per cent. of the average population is contaminated with syphilis, and a much higher percentage still with gonorrhœa,[2] it will become apparent how important this work is for the health of society. What actual reduction in the incidence of disease it will effect without further, more thoroughgoing, measures it is too early yet to say, there being so far no reliable statistics.

But curative treatment, after the disease has broken out, is only the last device in the armoury of hygiene. The whole trend of modern medicine is in the direction, rather, of prevention of disease, or prophylaxis. This includes all those measures that would render infection difficult, if not impossible. The public conscience is, unfortunately, not yet developed enough to encourage steps to be taken towards this end. Under this heading

[1] Flexner, *Prostitution*, chap. x.
[2] Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases, p. 22, par. 68.

would come such matters as special prophylaxis, notification, laws with regard to the communication of disease, etc.

Seeing that prostitution does exist, and is not likely to disappear in the near future, the question has been ventilated how far it would be right to advise safeguards against infection with venereal disease; indeed, such measures have been taken at some time or other by the military authorities in order to improve the health of soldiers and sailors, who are notorious for their addiction to promiscuity. From a moral point of view such a procedure may be said, in an indirect way, to set a premium on irregular sex relationship by making it less dangerous, and may be classed in this respect with the regulation of vice. But the two cases are not quite on a par. In the latter case public provision is made of a special class of women for immoral purposes, while in the former instruction would be given to avoid infection only, during a course of action that in any case is not under control of authorities. From a hygienic point of view one can hardly see why, if free treatment is offered after the event, prophylaxis should not be encouraged before it. The indirect inducement to immorality is perhaps, on the whole, not so fundamentally different. This becomes still more obvious when we remember that it has been made a strong point in the new campaign to discourage any of the old feeling against venereal diseases as "the shameful diseases." On the other hand, there is no denying the fact that anything that savours of facilitating immoral intercourse should be sternly discouraged as being against the best feelings of humanity. Hygiene and morality are here not at one. Since venereal disease is very prevalent and prostitution is not likely to disappear in the near future, it would seem that the only means at present of saving society

from further contamination by this scourge lies in the use of prophylactics as a palliative remedy.*

It stands similarly with the other prophylactic measures mentioned above, notification and punishment for communication of disease. As to the former, though public opinion is not ripe for it yet, this would seem to us merely due to the fact that we are still too much impressed by the male attitude in this matter. Apart from those women who lead a notoriously unchaste life, it is only the would-be respectable citizen that has to fear exposure from notification. It is very doubtful how far fear of disease leads to abstention from illegitimate sex gratification; but it would mean a wholesome sobering of the whole unchaste male population if they understood once for all that their sexual transgressions are no longer going to be overlooked when they endanger other people. Society has a right to rid itself of disease, even if it be that of man, the master; and the only means towards this, as in all infectious diseases, is notification, and, if need be, compulsory treatment and even segregation.

The arguments used against notification are, that it would drive venereal disease underground and thus prevent proper medical treatment, and also that it would not be applied rigorously to all classes alike, the better situated classes under private care escaping notification. All this seems plausible; but the same reasons were adduced against the notification of consumption, and have proved unfounded. In any case, as Professor Osler pointed out, there is no reason why, if other infectious diseases are notified, an exception should be made for one of the worst.[1] All that is necessary is to educate the public about the

* This step has been taken by the Society for the Prevention of Venereal Disease, which publishes a leaflet with directions for this purpose.

[1] Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases, Minutes of Evidence 14163.

danger of venereal disease, and disabuse it of the idea hitherto prevailing that it is a just punishment for the sin of illicit intercourse. In order to prevent the disease from hiding itself, it is imperative, however, to abolish quackery. The first step in this direction has been taken already, independently of notification (which was not recommended by the Commissioners), in the new Venereal Disease Act (1917), which forbids unqualified treatment of venereal diseases or the touting for it wherever a scheme of gratuitous medical treatment has been established by the authorities.* The only real drawback to compulsory notification is that it would not work well until the populace is sufficiently educated in these matters. Perhaps a reasonable proposal would be to allow a time limit, say, of five years, at the end of which notification would be compulsory. This would mitigate any hardship due to the present feeling about venereal disease, as it would allow all affected persons to become cured before the expiration of the time limit.† The attempts that have been made in Denmark[1] to trace further the source of infection of a given patient, by private denunciation of the alleged culpable person who transmitted the disease, have failed, and certainly cannot be recommended. But in principle notification stands. If it will not better things immediately, it will certainly create a sense of responsibility in the population, which is now being taught to look upon venereal diseases as curable, at the same time as it is offered a free cure under the

* Here, too, the timidity of official legislation has shown itself. As though medical treatment were not in all cases to be preferred to unqualified treatment, even where no gratuitous treatment is as yet available. The reservation seems the more inexplicable, as medical treatment of venereal disease is now provided under the Insurance Act also for all insured people. And insurance is compulsory.

[1] Cure is now possible, in the majority of cases, even of syphilis. Flexner, *Prostitution*, p. 354.

seal of secrecy. The consequences of such a policy without other safeguards—notification or other legislative measures—however good from the hygienic point of view, may work havoc where least expected. Though we are not of those who think that fear is the best moral teacher in matters of vice, still we believe that only the practical evidence of the righteous indignation of all well-minded persons, especially women, will teach men that theirs is not the privilege of contaminating society unchecked.

The same rule applies to a still more important matter, the communication of venereal disease. This has so far been made a legally punishable offence only in Norway and Denmark,[1] though in practice damages can be claimed for injury inflicted, at least in some countries, as, *e.g.*, France and Germany.[2] In England no such provision as yet exists. Even where legitimate marriage is concerned we find that there is by no means any definite legal enactment preventing an affected man from transmitting the disease to his own wife and children. Not only does contamination thus go unchecked, but it is not even legally possible for the attending physician to forestall further mischief by giving due warning to the relations of an infected patient, or even to a man's own wife. The law forbids any breach of professional secrecy, and makes no exception even here, where innocent people are likely to suffer most cruelly for the wrong committed by someone else. Whatever legislation there is to be, we have to see that it is so formulated as to apply with equal force to man and to woman. For it has been well said: "There are fallen men as well as fallen women." It will not do to continue to pass laws—as has been done all along—that penalize the woman whilst leaving the male

[1] Flexner, *Prostitution*, pp. 346 and 348.
[2] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 346.

partner unscathed. This, it must be admitted, is difficult to attain; but the difficulty of the task ought not to deter us from a course of action that is a demand of sheer justice. There are indications, however, that the day is not so far off when the public will no longer tolerate such an easy-going attitude to one of the direst scourges of mankind. The new feminist movement with its strong impetus of women's demands is gathering force, and is creating a new conscience against the obsolete man-made sex laws, which will hasten the advent of a better and more moral adjustment in all matters concerning sex.

A great and decisive step has been taken in most civilized countries by the advocacy, and to some extent by the introduction, of sex education. It has at last been realized that only knowledge can ensure reasonable safeguards against the pitfalls of sexuality; that ignorance is not always equivalent with innocence; and that purity will perhaps be more readily attained by forewarning than by after-punishment. In this connection it is often assumed that instruction about the danger of venereal disease will considerably diminish the tendency to promiscuous intercourse. This remains, however, to be seen. It is doubtful in any case how far prudential considerations are an aid to true morality; but in this instance there is evidence to show that sexual passion very often outruns discretion. It is well known that better-informed intelligent young people, nay, even medical students, who are quite cognizant of the risks incurred by frequenting prostitutes, are none the less unrestrained in their addiction to loose sex relationships. To inculcate fear of disease and at the same time promise free cure in case of contamination would hardly seem very logical to young folk who, driven by the promptings of desire, are only too ready to make light of any danger lurking ahead.

Only prompt public action by notification, and eventual punishment for communication of disease, of man as well as of woman, will hold in check such people, who, by their very action, show that ethical considerations do not avail with them in matters of sex. Those who keep moral control over themselves will be very little in need of the adjunctive restraint of fear. In fact, taking it all in all, we find that the true remedy against venereal disease does not lie so much in palliatives, helpful though they be, but in a thoroughgoing revision of our sex morality. In order to sap the strength of venereal disease it is necessary to attack it at its very root—that is, to take up in all seriousness the fight against prostitution.

CHAPTER IV

SEX ABERRATIONS AND ABNORMALITIES

I. Auto-erotism

It may appear strange that in our last chapter, which dealt with sex vice, no mention was made of that phenomenon which, in England at least, is generally vaguely spoken of as "the vice" in connection with sex—namely, self-abuse, or masturbation. This was done with a purpose. Vice, properly speaking, is moral delinquency; and though self-abuse may under certain conditions become an immoral act—as, indeed, may sexual intercourse—it is not in itself a vice, but rather a sexual aberration, a deviation from the normal physiological sex process, which, however undesirable, still cannot *eo ipso* be stamped as vicious. If not exactly moral, acts of self-abuse are perhaps better classed as non-moral rather than immoral, unless they are accompanied by special characteristics that approximate them, as we shall see later, to sexual vice proper. It is essential at the outset to discriminate here; for a great deal of mischief has been and is being done by well-intentioned social reformers who without any special knowledge of the subject go crusading against this so-called vice, which by their very invectives they help to bring to the cognizance of a good many young people whom they are anxious to save.

And besides, the phenomena we are speaking of may be mental as well as physical. We have repeatedly had occasion to point out how, through over-emphasizing the

bodily side of purity, spiritual chastity is apt to be overlooked, it being taken for granted that where there is physical abstinence there also is psychic emptiness. But this is not so. If with Havelock Ellis we denote as auto-erotism all those phenomena of the sex impulse which instead of flowing towards another person are abnormally centred in the self, we can see that this self may be either the bodily or the psychic (spiritual) self. In other words, auto-erotic manifestations include not only the gross bodily forms of sexual gratification, but also all those mental states of sensuous imagery, such as reverie, erotic dreams, etc., which play so large a part during adolescence. If not artificially stimulated, these can hardly be said to be abnormal; for it must not be forgotten that they form a part-expression of groping adolescent love, which in its finer efflorescences constitutes such a powerful stimulus to the development of the religious, æsthetic, and philanthropic emotions.*

But leaving aside these higher aspects of the auto-erotic impulses, it cannot even be asserted that actual physical masturbation in itself is always a deliberate act of sexual malpraxis. Quite apart from Freud's assumption of an infantile sex impulse, according to which the thumb-sucking of children must be interpreted as a sort of self-abuse,[1] Metchnikoff[2] has pointed out that masturbatory practices in boys very often show themselves at a time when the sex impulse is not sufficiently developed to make it a sex act proper. In such cases it is merely a premature physiological reaction of

* The intimate relation between religion and sex is too well authenticated to need any further elaboration here. See H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. I., Note C; A. Forel, *Sexuelle Frage*, chap. xii.; I. Bloch, *Sexual Life of Our Time*, chap. vi.; G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, chap. xi. London, 1905.

[1] S. Freud, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, second edition, p. 43. New York, 1916.

[2] E. Metchnikoff, *The Nature of Man*, p. 97.

the sex organs to physical stimuli, which can in nowise be classed in the same category as the later voluntary acts of self-abuse. The non-recognition of this elemental fact of sex is one of those unlooked-for evils of ignorant sex reform of which not a few moral reformers of the present-day are guilty. To lump together all young masturbants as heinous sinners, and visit upon them the direst threats for an act of which they are very often barely conscious, is not to abolish but to create vice. In fact, this tendency is merely the thoughtless continuance of the medieval Christian idea of sexuality, which regarded all physical sex expression as sinful.

To form a true estimate of masturbation we must not judge it merely by a prejudiced ethical standard, but must try to understand its proper physiological meaning. Thus alone shall we be able to arrive at a sane judgment of all its bearings. Apart from its actual physical and psychic bad effects, with which we shall deal presently, masturbation may be looked upon as a misdirected form of sex gratification, which, having no proper biological or social meaning, would in the majority of cases seem to be a futile act rather than a vicious one. If we compare it with the true sexual mode of self-expression we see that it must ever lack an adequate spiritual content, which forms the finest part of every mutual sex relationship. It may be, and very often indeed is, nothing but a substitute for prostitute intercourse, in which case it must be classed as such, even if practised alone with the aid of the imagination. It is evident that lasciviousness under whatever guise must be severely condemned without qualification. Our whole force of ethical reprobation must be directed against sex vice under whatever form it may show itself. We cannot but heartily agree with the campaign for purity, when properly directed. We must, however, be careful to differentiate from these

cases of gross unchastity all those minor forms of masturbation which, if not entirely involuntary, are to a large extent unwilled and due merely to the vehement action of the uncontrolled sex impulse during the adolescent age. The period of storm and stress having been safely passed, most youths, if otherwise healthy, become in sexual matters quite normal, perhaps not better but certainly not worse than others who have escaped this pitfall of sex—if, to believe some people, there are many such to be found. As a matter of fact, to condemn a young man because at some time or other he could not escape the temptation of the flesh is to indict the majority of the male sex, and a good proportion of the female.[1] And we should like to draw attention once more to the fact that mere physical abstention does not by any means imply purity of mind; on the contrary, bodily abstinence may and often does go together with mental pruriency; and it is those who manage to save their bodies in the turmoil of sex emotion that are often most in danger of losing their souls. In fact, the real point in the moral estimation of the auto-erotic phenomena is not so much the "what," but rather the "how much."

Putting aside those cases of self-abuse which occur at the threshold of adolescence, and are a more or less natural passing phase, we are left with those instances of self-induced auto-erotic practices that are prolonged for some time. Not only was the whole moral weight of puritanical zeal directed against masturbation, but expert opinion also, following in the wake of clerical opinion, lent all its authority to the condemnation of a practice which was not only considered sinful, but also highly prejudicial to health. As Havelock Ellis puts it, masturbation "was raised to the position of a colossal bogy which during a hundred years has not only had an

[1] See H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. I., p. 236.

unfortunate influence on medical opinion in these matters, but has been productive of incalculable harm to ignorant youth and tender consciences."[1] From this position of the last century we have receded a good deal. It is now generally admitted that the effect of masturbation, if not quite harmless, is in any case not by far so disastrous as orthodox opinion would have us believe.[2] Even such an ultra-conservative writer as the Swedish professor, Dr. S. Ribbing, holds that masturbation, if not driven to excess, has from the hygienic point of view by no means such dire consequences as is generally assumed (though he is careful, of course, to guard himself against any possible implication of over-leniency towards masturbation as a sex vice).[3] Indeed, it would seem that what is found as the evil results of physical self-gratification is not so much the direct effect of the practice itself as the consequence of the constant self-reproach and the hidden strife in impressible minds, which, torn between the impulsion of a strong sex instinct on the one hand and fear of consequences and the moral disapprobation of society on the other, gradually fall into a state of morbid hypersensitiveness and neurasthenia. It is the very people that prognosticate these mental evils who create them to a large extent in the young.

Of course, excess here, as in all things, can only be productive of evil. If not so disastrous to physical health as is generally made out, still its results are anything but beneficial to the moral and spiritual well-being of the individual. It is apt to undermine and pervert the normal sense of sex feeling, and thus, in the long run, defeat its own end. It plucks the flower before the fruit has ripened, and when the true need comes, goes out empty. The

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. I., p. 280.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 252, etc.
[3] S. Ribbing, *L'Hygiène sexuelle*, fourth edition, p. 160. Paris, 1911.

best treatment for these early cases of misdirected sex impulse is the diversion of the ebullient sex feelings into healthy emotional channels. One of the best means for this purpose is the free and chaste co-mingling of boys and girls in social intercourse and play. In fact, one of the causes of a good deal of the prevailing sexual aberration in boarding-schools and other institutions is the lack of companionship in the pure and healthy atmosphere of the other sex. A wise system of co-education could here do more than all the efforts of moral persuasion, which is apt rather to over-accentuate any sporadic occurrence of masturbation.

Coming now to the evaluation of the category of more continuous auto-erotic practices, we still have to guard against too sweeping a statement. There is need for yet further discrimination. From an ethical point of view we must be careful to distinguish here between masturbation "out of stress" (as Forel designates it) and masturbation out of sheer sexual indulgence. In the latter case, as was pointed out before, it is merely the auto-erotic expression of a prostitute act, and must be judged accordingly. It is here that we can truly speak of masturbation as a vice, which must be stamped out by all the means at our disposal. But we must realize that we have a phenomenon before us which belongs to prostitution proper, and can only be dealt with accordingly. As we have already seen when discussing prostitution, mere moral persuasion does not avail here; only by a drastic reform in sex matters may we hope to reach to final elimination of unchaste sex indulgence that is the aim and hope of all serious sex reformers.

But after saying so much, we are still left with those cases of self-abuse which, though more or less prolonged, are due to quite another cause, and must therefore be differentiated from those before mentioned. It is wise

here to suspend judgment awhile; those especially who are so ready with their wholesale condemnation of 'sex vice' should try to study and to understand before they hurl their anathema against those who "fain would, but cannot." We should at least stop to consider whether masturbation under such conditions should not, after all, rather be looked upon as a sort of natural compensation for sexual activity which otherwise can find no adequate outlet. For if there are such cases, however deplorable the fact, we cannot completely ignore it, unless and until we are prepared to compromise with Nature in another, more satisfactory, manner. For a compromise it has to be, as we shall see presently.

Of course, those of the puritanical mind have their answer ready—total abstinence, no sex gratification of any kind; but it would be only fair to add, for the sake of true sex morality—no mental indulgence either. But alas! Nature is not so thoroughgoing nor so moral. People who would claim to be so, without being hypocrites, are commonly recognized as of the frigid type, and do not constitute the norm. It cannot be our business here to repeat our arguments against absolute abstinence. Freud has shown conclusively that the suppressed desire for sex gratification leads in a large number of cases to hysteria, the hysterical symptom being a sort of auto-erotic substitute for repressed sex satisfaction.[1] And hysteria is, significantly enough, a woman's disease. 'Sex hunger' is too imperative a call to the average person, man or woman, to be kept in abeyance permanently or even for a very long time, once the stage of full maturity has been reached. This may be said to be attained at about the age of twenty-one, though in women the period of conscious sexual desire is, as we have seen,

[1] See Freud, *Selected Papers on Hysteria*, New York, 1915, and the modern psycho-analytical school of Freud.

often delayed till the thirties. Up to that time strict abstinence is a possibility for everybody, and no exception can be allowed from this rule. After this age some sex expression seems, at least for the majority of people, sooner or later unavoidable. Now, since prostitution in any form, either major or minor, is proscribed for ethical reasons, and other sex relationship is precluded by social custom, the only alternative left to the average man is the act of pollution.* Whether involuntary nocturnal pollution (with erotic dreams) is morally less reprehensible than the voluntary, sometimes semi-voluntary, process could not be definitely decided even by the hair-splitting controversies of medieval ecclesiastics,[1] and we are hardly in a better position to-day. All we can do is to leave it meekly to the choice of the individual conscience. To the moral feeling of a sensitive soul both states are alike irksome and distasteful. With present-day restrictions on the free play of the sex impulse, it is hard to see what there is left to do for the averagely sexed person. All our invective avails nothing here. We must either change our sex morality and adjust it to the true condition of men and women, or go on refusing to see that all we manage to put in the place of solitary gratification is prostitute unchastity, disguised by cant.

This does by no means imply that we regard the autoerotic expression of the sex impulse as a desirable phenomenon. However unavoidable from the purely physical point of view, it denotes—and always must denote—a certain aberration from the highest ideal of sexual behaviour, and cannot but be discordant with the finest feeling in us. The claim of chastity—and all self-abuse, if not vicious, is unchaste—remains paramount. We

* This word is the technical term for seminal emissions, voluntary or involuntary, without copulation.

[1] See H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. I., p. 188.

cannot do better here than quote Edward Carpenter's inspiring plea for restraint: "After all, purity (in the sense of continence) is of the first importance to boyhood. To prolong the period of continence in a boy's life is to prolong the period of *growth*. This is a simple physiological law, and a very obvious one; and, whatever other things may be said in favour of purity, it remains, perhaps, the most weighty. To introduce sensual and sexual habits—and one of the worst of them is self-abuse—at an early age is to arrest growth, both physical and mental. And what is even more, it means to arrest the capacity for affection. All experience shows that the early outlet towards sex cheapens and weakens affectional capacity."[1] Seeing that there does not exist in masturbation any reciprocal psychic interaction with the physical expression of the sex impulse, we cannot but class it under the head of unchastity. Yet in view of the fact that we do not allow for any other outlet of Nature, it is hard to see how the average individual can live up to a lofty absolute standard of sex ethics. Solitary self-help can at best only be a clumsy makeshift in the satisfaction of a need for which there is no truly chaste provision made under the unnatural conditions of our modern civilized life. Only with a complete reform of sex morality can we be at all sure of approaching this most perplexing of all sexual problems with any degree of confidence.

2. Sexual Inversion.

It will have become clear from the preceding discussion that it will not do to judge sex behaviour blindly from an exclusive, preconceived ethical point of view, without taking fully into consideration the physiological facts. To class together as sex vice all unusual sex phenomena,

[1] E. Carpenter, *The Intermediate Sex*, fourth edition, p. 93. 1916.

simply because they shock our feelings, not only betrays ignorance, but is an act of sheer injustice. And this manner of condemning a sex act summarily without further inquiry is still more aggravated in those other cases which in the public mind are linked together with 'sex vice,' and are held heinous enough to be punished unconditionally by the common law as a crime. Metchnikoff has declared that masturbation, though abnormal, is not unnatural.[1] Except in those cases where there is a deliberate intention, it must be considered a sort of physiological aberration of the sex function. The same arguments apply with still greater force to those acts of mutual sex gratification between persons of the same sex, which are the outcome of a true sexual abnormality. They are usually held to indicate merely gross licentiousness. And there is no gainsaying the fact that such acts are often committed by normal people out of sheer lust, when they are, of course, a mere perversity and must be treated as coming under the same category as any other act of prostitution. Wherever there exist physical sex manifestations without a corresponding psychic content, there we are morally entitled to lay our ban on them with all rigour.

But the question is: are all physical acts of endearment between persons of the same sex *eo ipso* due to a perverse vicious tendency? Public opinion does not hesitate to stamp them as such, and thereby professes its utter ignorance of the actual complexity of the problem. Nay, it even calls the law to its aid, which, by inflicting a heavy punishment on every offender, shows little discrimination in this matter. It is time that a little more trouble was taken by the would-be moralist, before invoking the law, in studying a subject which, however unpleasant, is more complex than he, in his unsophisticated ignorance, is

[1] E. Metchnikoff, *Nature of Man*, p. 95.

wont to believe. It is not dealing fairly to refuse to hear the other side also; and, as a matter of fact, there is a strong case to be made out for the other side.

Just as masturbation appears at a certain age without being consciously sexual, so we find similarly that there is a stage of sex development, before sex consciousness is fully developed, when the attachment is not yet definitely fixed upon the opposite sex. This transition stage can be observed in those youthful friendships between persons of the same sex which, by their very ardour and sensuousness, show their close relationship to real love. And yet such cases by no means always indicate any permanent perversion of the sex impulse, but imply merely a passing phase of love's apprenticeship. Such romantic attachments are very common among boys and still more so among girls, and often take on a most extreme emotional character.[1] Not to understand these first misdirected efforts of sexuality, and to brush them aside brusquely as mere perversion, only means doing harm to the delicate feelings of growing adolescents. The physical expressions of such loves are generally slight, while the psychic ebullition forms a useful safety valve for the surging romantic spirit of youth. Ruthless interference here only encourages secretiveness and rebellion, and often throws out morbid suggestions about an attachment that otherwise appears to most young people merely the highest expression of universal human love. It is only too true, as Carpenter remarks, that "the trouble in schools from bad sexual habits and frivolities arises greatly—though, of course, not altogether —from the suppression and misdirection of the natural emotions of boy-attachment."[2] That there exists a good deal of vice at schools and other institutions where

[1] See H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. II., p. 75, and Appendix B.

[2] E. Carpenter, *My Days and Dreams*, p. 28. London, 1918.

numbers of people of one sex are secluded more or less from normal contact with the other sex, no one would deny. But this is no reason for indiscriminate vilification of every innocent sign of emotionalism between young people. It is too easily taken for granted that all that is needed is a sound sermon; or, if that fails, a sound punishment of the offender. Evil has never yet been destroyed in this way. A much better method is to try to fathom the trouble, to approach it with understanding, to distinguish between the innocent defaulter and the inveterate habitué, and mete out treatment accordingly. But for this purpose a much more thorough study of sex, including its abnormal modifications, is necessary than is generally given by the social reformer to this subject. We must cease to taboo the subject, and must give the public access to knowledge that is essential for their guidance through life's entanglement.

No wonder the same attitude prevails with regard to those unfortunate beings who are entirely abnormal in their sex impulse. In a previous chapter we have already made mention of those instances of double sexuality, where a person, though being bodily and mentally of one sex, has the sex feeling concomitant with the individuality of the opposite sex. Thus a man, more or less normal in all other respects, will have erotic needs like a woman, his love-craving going out, not towards the female sex, but towards individuals of his own sex; and similarly in the case of women. Such individuals, exhibiting a sex impulse towards their own sex, are called homosexual (*homoios*—the same), in contradistinction to the normal individuals, who are called heterosexual (*heteros*—other). They also go by the name of Uranians, in reference to the word used by Plato for this condition (from *ouranos*—heaven). The condition itself is known as homosexuality or sexual inversion. There exists an intermediate state between

heterosexuality and full homosexuality in those persons who are, in a greater or lesser degree, attracted to both sexes alike. This state is called bisexuality and is, as we have seen, a common phase passed through by many young persons, who afterwards grow up quite normal as regards their sexual impulse.[1]

It must be fully understood that, whatever judgment we may have about the physical attachment of homosexual people from the ethical point of view, they are endowed with a true feeling of spiritual love, which may take on all shades and degrees of actuality in real life, just as in love of the usual heterosexual type. Although the erotism is directed by Nature towards an individual of the same sex, it loses by this circumstance nothing of its intensity, its seriousness, its romantic glamour, or its high-mindedness. The attachments of homosexuals possess, or at least may possess, all the insignia of real love, but for the fact that propagation is physically out of the question. And it is according to this standard that they ought to be judged, however disagreeable otherwise their case may appear to normal people. It is true the physical side seems abhorrent to us, and can *prima facie* not be distinguished from those cases where it merely expresses the morbidness of a vicious habit. But still this should not deter us from realizing that the punishment meted out to an inveterate sexual roué must necessarily be a grave injustice when applied to those who by Nature are attracted to persons of their own sex, and who cannot but obey this powerful impulse. Sexual inversion is now admitted by most modern authorities to be, not a

[1] For details see H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. II., *Sexual Inversion*.—M. Hirschfeld, *Die Homosexualität*. Berlin, 1914.—E. Carpenter, *The Intermediate Sex*, fourth edition. London, 1916.—E. Carpenter, *Intermediate Types among Primitive Folk* (London, 1914), and a short account in the author's *Introduction to the Physiology and Psychology of Sex*, chap. vi., 3.

perversion, but an abnormality of the sex instinct. The homosexuals form a distinct variation of human kind;* and we ought to allow for this as much as we do for other human variations, such as colour-blindness or deaf-mutism.

It will be objected that this is playing into the hands of the perverted sexual habitué. Against this we would put forward two considerations. In the first place, the fact that some people act ethically wrongly in a certain manner can be no valid reason for visiting their sins upon the heads of other people, for whom physical endearments are merely the expression of spiritual love, however little we may be able to appreciate such an attraction; and secondly, society has no right to interfere in any love affair, so long as public scandal is avoided, and the innocent are safeguarded against corruption. Love is a private affair, and the State cannot set itself up as an arbiter of what is to be its true expression. Indeed, it would appear ridiculous—and would be held so in a normal love relationship—were it not dangerous to admit "a censorship over private morals (entirely apart from social results) which is beyond its province, and which—even if it were its province—it could not possibly fulfil."[1] The mere fact that medieval tradition bids us to view certain sexual acts with disgust[2] does not justify us in setting the law in motion against people

* The latest researches in psycho-analysis have revealed the fact that homo-sexuality (of the supposed inborn type) can often be shown to have been in reality acquired very early during childhood. But since such cases of homosexuality have become definitely fixed in life and are beyond the control of the individual, they are from a social point of view not distinguishable from a true inborn type. See Hirschfeld, *Die Homosexualität*, chap. lxxii., Berlin, 1914; Dr. Ferenczi, *Contributions to Psycho-analysis*, chap. v., Boston, 1916.

[1] E. Carpenter, *The Intermediate Sex*, p. 79.

[2] E. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, vol. ii., p. 489.

who are otherwise most respectable and decent citizens. It is certainly significant that an act which is considered a crime in men should (in most countries) go unpunished when committed by women.[1] This certainly shows the arbitrariness and the real underlying cause of public opinion, as embodied in the law of the present day. To mitigate the injustice by imposing a merely slight penalty for homosexual acts in true inverts, as Northcote suggests,[2] in order to meet the hardship of the genuine case, only betrays the lingering bias. The sexual invert is not a misdemeanant; he claims justice, not pity. The final argument, however, against the existing law is that, harsh as it is, it does not even achieve what it sets out to do. There is no evidence to show that homosexual practices are less frequent in England than in those countries where all such laws have been abolished.[3] We have seen that prohibition and regulation in no way appreciably affect the extent of prostitution, and here we have evidence of a similar kind. Vice is not stamped out by legislative measures, but by proper social amelioration of the actual conditions causing the mischief.

It is estimated that about one to two per cent. of the population are born with the homosexual tendency. We are thus face to face with a serious problem; for, whatever steps we may take against malpractices, we must recognize that these people form a definite variety of human kind and, while they exist, have a right to the enjoyment of life, so long as they do not publicly offend against propriety. Indeed, some of these men and women are known to have been of the highest mental and moral attainment, their peculiar combination of fine male intellectuality and female emotionality giving their personality a special

[1] See comprehensive list in Hirschfeld, *Homosexualität*, p. 842, etc.

[2] H. Northcote, *Christianity and Sex Problems*, p. 297.

[3] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. II., p. 350.

depth and charm. Not a few of the greatest geniuses have been of the homosexual temperament, and some of the best men and women are ever likely to be of this type.

There is a tendency among some enthusiasts not only to over-accentuate the importance of this trait, but also to give this very constitution a sort of grandiose aspect, which would make the homosexuals not equal but in a sense superior to the ordinary population. Thus Friedländer holds that all mutual friendships between persons of the same sex are based on a kind of physiological attraction, which does not differ essentially from homosexual friendship, the sexual element in homosexual love being merely superadded, as it would be in heterosexual love.[1] But though it cannot be denied that there may perhaps obtain some sort of physical attraction in friendships of the usual type, this is certainly different from the mode of attachment between two homosexual friends, which in its very basis must be classed as of the sexual kind, in the sense of what we called in our analysis of love sub-erotic attraction, if it is not stronger still and of the erotic or even the erethic type.* Homosexual attraction would thus be due, according to our explanation, to a specific sexual stimulation (by sexual end organules ?); and the phases of homosexual love would run on exactly parallel lines with those of heterosexual love, except that it holds between persons of the same sex, instead of persons of opposite sexes.

Carpenter thinks that such comrade-unions are of special value to human society. "It is difficult to believe," he

[1] See statement and criticism of this view in *Jahrbuch für Sexuelle Zwischenstufen*, VII. Jahrgang, p. 785, etc. Leipzig, 1905.

* The theory, advocated especially by Freud's school, that all human relationships are genetically based upon sex attraction does not invalidate the above argument. Though the unconscious (genetic) source of friendship may be sexual, ordinary friendship in its conscious aspect is not sexual, whereas homosexual attachment is.

says, " that anything can supply the force and liberate the energies required for social and mental activities of the most necessary kind so well as a comrade-union which yet leaves the two lovers free from the responsibilities and impedimenta of family life."[1] Altogether, he holds that the Uranian temperament has played in the past, and will play in the future, an important rôle in the evolution of the race.[2] He has tried to show that there exists an organic connection between the homosexual feeling and unusual psychic and divinatory powers; that it was the homosexual intermediate type of man that was productive of the first elements of the domestic arts, of priestcraft, and in their ultra-virile type among the Dorian Greeks, of military prowess and comradeship. With their " double-engine psychic power " the homosexuals have, according to him, a special capacity for devoting themselves to the task of broadening the basis of human attachment, of being the pioneers of a true democratic humanitarian movement. " It is possible that the Uranian spirit may lead to something like a general enthusiasm of humanity, and that the Uranian people may be destined to form the advance guard of that great movement which will one day transform the common life by substituting the bond of personal affection and compassion for the monetary, legal, and other external ties which now control and confine society."[3]

We feel loth to pour cold water upon such an idealistic outlook; but we should like to submit that it throws the burden of the future development of the world upon a rather small proportion of mankind, and, in addition, upon that part of it which by the biological law is destined to leave no progeny, if they are true to themselves. We do

[1] E. Carpenter, *The Intermediate Sex*, p. 74.
[2] E. Carpenter, *Intermediate Types among Primitive Folk*, London, 1914.
[3] E. Carpenter, *The Intermediate Sex*, p. 116.

not wish to deny the part the homosexual can play in the advancement of art, philanthropy, and social service generally. But we must not forget that, however valuable the invert may be as a social force on account of his peculiar qualities, the same combination of masculine and feminine characters is frequently found in people who have no trace of homosexuality in them. In fact, it has often been observed that a dash of youthfulness and femininity is typical of the genius. Thus, whilst not wishing to deny the useful rôle of the homosexual, we would merely point out that there is a much wider field to draw upon than the small percentage of invert individuals.

In order to prove his value to society the homosexual is rather apt to over-emphasize his own importance in the scheme of society. If it is mentioned, for instance, that the Uranian has a special aptitude for devoting himself to the care of the young, it may be doubted whether such influence is all to the good. Homosexual affection seems to have a tendency to give a sort of hothouse atmosphere to the relationship between persons of the same sex, which cannot be considered altogether healthy for the normal youth. And besides, finally, homosexual love can never be equivalent to normal love. Since sexual inverts are, or at least ought to be, by the law of their own being, precluded from marrying—marriage in their case generally turning out disastrous for both partners[1]—homosexual love must remain barren. As we have said in another place, "love from a biological and social point of view, however justified and beautiful in itself, has after all another, not less important, function in life—namely, that of procreation. It is this which gives wedded love a zest and aim which homosexual love can never attain."[2]

[1] M. Hirschfeld, *Die Homosexualität*, chap. xxi.
[2] *Physiology and Psychology of Sex*, p. 114.

PART III

MARITAL RELATIONSHIP

The sexual impulse in its physiological action can be divided into two stages, the initial stage of physical desire and erethism, and the final act of mating and pairing. The former leads to courtship, and in Man to all those highly spiritualized phenomena which we call love. The erotic feelings in Man, from the lowest to the highest, are nothing but the psychic elaborations of the primary promptings of the sexual instinct during the process of courtship. We have seen how this phase, which is so short and passing in animals, becomes a most potent social factor in human society, furnishing the original matrix, as it were, of all those complex sex relationships that we have passed in review.

Now, similarly, mating and pairing among animals is also confined to short seasons; the breeding and rearing of the young is a relatively simple and primitive affair. With the exception of some birds which pair for life, animal mates rarely live together for long periods. Even where the male does help for some time in provisioning the mother and young, in most cases he soon leaves them, the young remaining attached to the mother only, until they are able to shift for themselves. This happens very early, so that the family bond is of the most fleeting and rudimentary kind. It is only among the highest animals, especially the apes, that a family in the social sense can be said to exist, the parents here developing a closer union with each other in the common task of rearing and attend-

ing jointly to a succession of offspring. This indicates the beginning of true family relationship and sentiment.

Marital relationship, implying the conscious will to propagate, is only to be found in the human species. In man the mere blind creative force of nature has become a deliberate process, physical union blossoming out in manifold ways into the various forms of family life, which are at once the centre and source of all human progress. Sex unions, of whatever kind, constitute only the preliminary to marital relationship, which has as its main, though not only, purpose the propagation of the race. Towards this supreme end family organization has shaped itself during the course of civilization, issuing ultimately in the marriage system as we have it to-day.

It is too often forgotten by social reformers that our present marital system is the outcome of a long process of evolution, and that, in accordance with natural law, it is subject to the process of change, like all things. If it is to be a living reality and not merely an empty form, it is bound to remould itself constantly with ever newly arising conditions of life. What to retain as vital and what to discard as obsolete, can only be decided by a proper biological and sociological evaluation of facts. The best preliminary towards this end is a review of marriage in evolution.

CHAPTER I

MARRIAGE IN EVOLUTION

"MARRIAGE and family," as Westermarck has pointed out, "are intimately connected with each other: it is for the benefit of the young that male and female continue to live together. Marriage is therefore rooted in family."[1] Taking this idea of marriage as our starting point, we find that the marital bond naturally involves a double relationship: on the one hand, there is the relation of the parents to the offspring, and on the other that of the parents to each other. We shall see in the sequel that these two relationships are closely interconnected in their action upon each other, the various evolutionary phases of marriage being to a large extent expressive of the changing modes of their double relationship. Now there are three possible ways of reckoning kinship in the family: the maternal, the paternal, and the bi-parental system. In the maternal system the offspring, organically connected with the mother, remain so also socially; descent is reckoned in the female line only; the mother herself remains a member of her own clan even after marriage. The paternal system, in its purest form, recognizes kinship in the male line only: all social relationship is based on the fact of paternal power; the woman after marriage ceases to belong to her own clan and enters that of her husband. The bi-parental system, finally, implies the acknowledgment of both parents as co-partners in the marriage relationship;

[1] Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, p. 22.

descent is now reckoned in both lines, male and female; the wife gradually gains, with the development of this system, certain rights against those of the husband as to the control of herself and her children.

All these three types of family relationship have found actual expression in the course of human history; they form, according to the generally accepted view, a more or less progressive series in the gradual evolution of marriage. Some authorities assume that the maternal family system has been preceded by a still more primitive phase, that of the horde, where general promiscuity obtained, or what Lubbock called "communal marriage." It is true, there are instances of group marriage where a number of women have in common a number of men as husbands, and vice versa, but these cases have been explained in various other ways without the assumption of original promiscuous pairing.*

In any case, according to our present stage of knowledge it cannot now be considered to have been a general primitive stage in the evolution of marriage.[1] Certainly, its influence has not been decisive enough in the evolution of matrimonial institutions to require special elaboration here.

The maternal system is generally known as that of mother-right or the matriarchate. The natural physical bond between mother and child found its primitive social counterpart in the maternal clan system, in which blood relationship was reckoned in the female line only. The children belonged to the mother or rather to her clan,

* Promiscuity as a marriage system must not be confounded with promiscuity as mere looseness of sex relationship before or outside marriage. The existence of the former as a socially sanctioned institution can most probably be discounted; the latter, however, as we have seen in a previous chapter, is quite a common occurrence among primitive and even advanced races.

[1] See for full discussion of theories, G. E. Howard, *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, three vols., vol. i. Chicago, 1904.

and only inherited from the mother's family. In fact, the mother after marriage remained a member of her tribe with all the attendant rights and duties. The maternal kinsfolk stood together in blood feud; they, and not the husband, defended and avenged the wife and children. They might even, under certain circumstances, protect her against the husband himself, should need arise in case of ill-treatment, etc. In case of divorce the children went with the mother. Generally the husband lived with the wife among her tribesmen; but mother-right might exist even where the wife moved to her husband's tribe after marriage.

In some instances of fully developed maternal kinship, mother-descent went together with a certain amount of actual social power of the mother; this is then a true matriarchate or mother-rule, in contradistinction to mother-right, which denotes merely descent in the female line without involving any specially privileged position of woman. Indeed, it is now generally admitted that mother-right rarely implied mother-rule; it by no means carried with it, as used to be held, freedom and self-determination of the woman: she had no rights either over her own person or over her children. While not subject to her husband, she yet remained under the control of her nearest male relative, usually her brother, who also had authority over her children (avunculate). As Westermarck pointed out: "The subjection of women is not due to certain social marriage customs, matriarchate or patriarchate, but to the greater strength and courage of men, which makes them not only their protectors, but also their masters."[1] On the other hand, we find, however, according to the same authority, that wherever woman takes a prominent part in the production of food together with man, there shows itself a tendency towards

[1] Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, chap. xxvi.

a certain economic and social independence of the mother.[1] Indeed, many writers have tried to establish a close parallel between sex relationship and the ownership of property.[2] Where woman owns property, there she also acquires certain rights over her own person. The maternal family system, based upon matrilineal descent of the family, appeared as a rule during the earlier stages of civilization, while mother-rule leading to a relatively independent status of womanhood is most frequently met with among lower agricultural tribes living in a state of primitive village communism.[3]

As the next stage in the evolution of the family, after the maternal system, we may regard the paternal system. The former changed into the latter by slow degrees, both systems often existing side by side in a given community. Yet it would be rash to infer from this that all human societies have necessarily passed through these two stages successively. The paternal system in its pure form was a patriarchate—*i.e.*, it involved not only father-descent (descent reckoned in the male line alone), but also father-rule. "The father was the natural guardian and protector of the children and in case of divorce retained them. . . . The wife and her children ceased to have any claim in her family." The house-father (*pater familias*), being the religious and legal head of the family, had unlimited power (*patria potestas*) over his wife and his household, even over married sons, their wives and children. He could sell them, chastise them, dispose of sons and daughters in marriage, divorce them, at will; in extreme cases he could even kill them, if so disposed,

[1] Westermarck, *loc. cit.*, p. 660.

[2] See, *e.g.*, Karl Pearson, *The Ethic of Freethought*, p. 431.

[3] See for further details, Marianne Weber, *Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung*, chap. i. (Tübingen, 1907); also L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, chap. iv.; G. E. Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., chap. ii.

though this right became mitigated in time. Woman was considered legally a minor. While in the house of her father, she was under his tutelage; at marriage she passed into the tutelage of her husband, and after his death into that of her own son or male next of kin. Inheritance, like kinship, went in the male line only. The patriarchate denotes, as Marianne Weber puts it, "the complete sexual subjection of womanhood."[1] It is the most common type of family organization to be found among the ancient classic civilizations.

The original mode of procuring a wife in primitive societies was either by capture or by purchase. Capture most probably has to be considered a rather irregular, though not infrequent, method of finding a mate. As a rule, the man bought his wife from her parents or male next of kin, either, in the simplest way, by exchanging a woman of his own tribe, a sister or a daughter, or by giving a certain price for her in chattels or goods, the market value varying with the rank or beauty of the woman, or her strength and capacity for bearing children. For in primitive society woman was treated as a commodity, her worth lying in her working power. The price paid for her was looked upon as a compensation to her people for the lost labour value. In fact, should she run away or be disowned by her husband for some reason or other, the price had to be repaid; whilst, on the other hand, the woman was shielded against the worst abuses of her husband through the economic interest her own family had in her in case of divorce.

In many instances we find the bride was won, not by the giving of goods or money, but by services rendered to the parents of the bride. In these cases the man had to enter the future wife's family, either permanently, or temporarily, until the bride's price was worked off. In marriage

[1] Marianne Weber, *Ehefrau und Mutter*, chap. ii.—L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, chap. iv.—G. E. Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., chap. i.

by service the children generally belonged to the woman's family, while the purchased wife, as a rule, followed her husband, she and her children passing completely into the husband's clan. Transition stages between these two types of marriage were, however, not infrequent. Thus, *e.g.*, marriage by purchase and marriage by service often existed side by side, involving a combination of mother-right and father-right in the same tribe. For it happened that the richer parents, being loth to part with their daughter, would insist upon the man's entering the clan for service in their own family, poor men often having only this chance of acquiring a wife. On the other hand, the rich man would rather buy a wife outright and take her into his own clan as his personal possession. With the increase of riches marriage by service, favouring mother-right, gave way to marriage by purchase, which tended to set up the strong conjugal power of the husband. Further, a man could gain as many wives as he liked by capture, who as slave-wives came, of course, under his complete unconditional control. This reacted upon the position of the legitimately purchased wives, so that there was a constant tendency towards the establishment of male rule to the detriment of woman. Wherever military power develops, there also we find increasing subordination of woman.[1] If mother-right was relatively favourable to woman, uniting her in the closest bond to her offspring, socially as well as physically, it had the drawback of depriving the children of their natural co-begetter—the father. The patriarchal stage was an advance upon this incomplete maternal family; it knit together the family and drew closer the bond between father, mother, and children. But this advantage was brought about at the cost of the mother

[1] See Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, chap. xvii.—G. E. Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., chap. iv.—L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, chap. iv.—Marianne Weber, *Ehefrau und Mutter*, chap. i.

herself, who, it is true, came together with the children under the protection, but at the same time also under the tutelage, of the *pater familias*.

The patriarchate is found chiefly in the pastoral stage of society. It represents the typical form of family organization of the ancient world. It existed among the Jews in biblical times, and also in classical Greece and Rome; it was the system in vogue among the primitive Teutonic tribes, and has as such become in the course of historical development the prototype of our own marriage system. We have already pointed out that the patriarchate implied in principle the complete sexual subjection of woman. Polygamy, in the shape of polygyny or plurality of wives, was a common feature of the patriarchal family system. Each man was allowed a number of wives; either these were all of the same rank, or one of the wives, generally the one first married, occupied the position of chief wife with superior authority in the household, the others having a more or less dependent position under her. Often such polygamy was restricted to the chief or the nobility, while the common people had to content themselves each with one wife only. In true polygamy all the children belonged to the father; they were reckoned to be his legitimate offspring. In any case, it rested with the father which of the children he wished to claim as his legitimate heirs. Many a bastard (in the modern sense) ascended a king's throne in olden times with full right of possession. The aim and object of marriage during this stage of culture lay solely in the propagation of the race, woman being held to be merely the bearer of the living issue, the vessel, as it were, passing on the vital spark from generation to generation. "Be fruitful and multiply" was an axiom acted upon not by the ancient Hebrews alone. It was the tenor of the whole ancient civilization.

A mitigation of full polygamy took place in those cases

where the husband was legally entitled only to one wife, though having in addition the right to concubines. It is here that there generally arises for the first time the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate offspring; for the children of the legally wedded wife alone were reckoned as belonging to the father, while the children begotten in concubinage belonged to the mother's kin and were, in consequence, excluded from the father's inheritance. Thus in ancient Greece, *e.g.*, a citizen could only wed as wife a true citizen woman, her children alone could carry on the true line of the race. Unions with freedwomen or slaves were customarily permitted, but considered irregular; the children of such unions belonged to the family of the mother, and were excluded from all citizen rights. Even in Rome, where monogamy was prescribed, the keeping of a mistress (*pælex*) was not considered legally an infringement against it; it was not held to constitute adultery.[1] Among the Teutonic tribes, too, concubinage was recognized at the side of legal wedlock; it continued to exist in Europe up to the early Middle Ages. It persisted for a long time as the privilege of the nobility, and still lingers on in the form of the morganatic marriage among royalty.[2]

Herbert Spencer, and after him Westermarck, has explained the change of polygamy into monogamy by the gradual elimination of the lesser forms of wifehood.[3] The keeping of accessory wives became restricted in time to the richer classes of society, sometimes to the chief only; and ultimately ceased altogether. As a matter of fact, Westermarck points out that in the majority of cases

[1] Marianne Weber, *Ehfrau und Mutter*, p. 277.

[2] See L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, chaps. iv. and v.—G. E. Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., chap. iii.—Marianne Weber, *Ehefrau und Mutter*, chaps. ii. and iii.—I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, vol. i., p. 580, etc.

[3] H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, vol. i., p. 552, etc. London, 1893.—Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, chap. xx.

men can rarely afford to keep more than one wife, and that therefore monogamy virtually prevails even in those countries where polygamy is sanctioned by law. What it was that gradually led to the total abolition of legally permitted concubinage is still a moot problem. The Christian Church up to the Middle Ages did not expressly condemn concubinage, though it tried to suppress it when practised by the side of true marriage. "What it aimed at was monogamy rather than a uniform standard of legal sex relationship."[1] Marianne Weber holds that it lay in the woman's interest to see that her own children were the true and legitimate heirs of her husband, and that it must have been her aim to exclude the offspring of the less favoured rivals from the father's inheritance altogether. Women would thus come to look askance upon concubinage, so that it would gradually fall into disfavour. Other writers have assumed that monogamy became established through the desire of the man to limit inheritance to his legitimate offspring only, of whom he could be sure that they were truly his.[2] Whatever the reasons, marriage gradually changed in form. Concubinage, implying a loose form of family relationship, slowly yielded to true monogamous unions, thus bringing about the stabilization of family life; for the exclusion of extraneous marriage encumbrances tended to strengthen the bond between husband and wife, and the children belonging to both.

We have followed in the above description the more general view of the evolution of marriage, which traces it through the various stages of mother-right and patriarchate up to the more or less pure state of monogamy.[3] In

[1] Marianne Weber, *Ehefrau und Mutter*, p. 209.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 53, etc., 209.

[3] This is the view still taken by Professor Hobhouse in his *Morals in Evolution*; Professor W. I. Thomas in *Sex and Society;* Professor J. G. Frazer in *Folklore in the Old Testament*, vol. ii.,

doing so we have by no means forgotten Westermarck's famous theory of original monogamy, which, first propounded by him in his *History of Human Marriage*,[1] has of late found a good deal of acceptance.[2] According to this view "marriage or pairing between one man and one woman, though the union be often transitory and the rule frequently violated, is the typical form of sexual union from the infancy of the human race."[3] Polygamy, from this point of view, appears only as an atypical form of marriage, running, as it were, outside the true course of marriage. We have felt justified in adhering to the old view, because we do not consider Professor Westermarck's theory sufficiently established by the facts he adduces. He seems to us to be building up his case too much in disregard of the evidence telling against his theory. This cannot be the place to enter into a full discussion of the arguments pro and contra.[4] We can only deal here with a few important points. Professor Westermarck tries to establish his theory on the strength of four main facts: firstly, most of the highest prehuman apes live, so far as is known, monogamously; secondly, promiscuity as a state of marriage cannot be proved to have been an original condition of mankind; thirdly, monogamy is prevalent among low, primitive people, polygyny presupposing "a considerable advance of society together with the development of superior and inferior classes and some kind of wealth";[5] and finally

"The Sororate and the Levirate," London, 1918; also by Marianne Weber in *Die Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung*; and by I. Bloch in his *Prostitution*.

[1] E. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, third edition. London, 1903.

[2] Thus Professor G. E. Howard follows this authority in his *History of Matrimonial Institutions;* Forel also in *Die Sexuelle Frage*.

[3] G. E. Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., p. 91.

[4] See especially an article by Dr. Rosenthal, "Der Ursprung der Ehe," in *Neue Generation*, April 14, 1909.

[5] Quoted by Westermarck from Morgan, *Human Marriage*, p. 506.

monogamy generally prevails as a matter of actual necessity even in those countries where polygamy is legally permitted, since the relative numerical proportion of man and woman does not, as a rule, yield a sufficient surplus of women to allow of polygyny except for the richest and highest classes. Against these four points the following may be argued: firstly, the reference to the apes is not decisive; it is more than doubtful whether any of the now existing higher apes represent the direct ascendants of Man; besides, it is generally assumed that, with few exceptions, primitive man lived in hordes rather than in small, isolated families. Secondly, a primitive state of promiscuity is not an absolute *sine qua non* of the polygamous theory, which, in its full form, is held nowadays by very few authorities. Still, even thus its refutation does not in itself prove the opposite theory of original monogamous pairing. As to the actual existence of polygamous unions, Professor Westermarck seems to us, for the sake of his theory, to make too light of the mass of well-authenticated cases of polygamy prevailing in many stages of civilization. Indeed, we have found it to lie at the basis of most of the ancient marriage systems of the historically important nations, as, *e.g.*, the old Hebrews, the Greeks, the Teutons, etc.* It will not do, as Professor Westermarck attempts, to argue away the impor-

* Forel, an adherent of Westermarck's theory, assumes with him an original (phylogenetic) monogamic stage, followed by polygamy "due to the aberration of power and riches." Primitive monogamy, however, according to this author, is not to be reckoned as equivalent to our modern "religious and formal monogamy" (Forel, *Die Sexuelle Frage*, p. 222). The latter has arisen, as we stated in the text, from a previous polygamous stage, which is, as it were, interpolated between the two different stages of monogamy. Thus viewed, the question of an original primitive monogamy loses its relevancy. Though positing monogamy as the true type of marriage, Westermarck himself seems to construe a similar series of stages, a primitive and a later type of monogamy with a middle stage tending to a prevalence of polygamy (*Human Marriage*, p. 505).

tance of polygamy by showing that in reality little actual polygyny obtains even in polygamous countries. As Professor Hobhouse well remarks: "We must distinguish between polygamy as a permitted custom and as a general practice, and between an ethical monogamy based on the belief that it is wrong to have more than one wife, and an habitual monogamy based on the practical difficulty of obtaining and maintaining more than one wife."[1] Whatever the actual extent of polygamous unions, it is the principle of their legal and social sanction that constitutes in any given case the valid form of marriage. Seen from this point of view, true monogamy may be said to have gradually crystallized out, as it were, from a more primitive polygamous type of marriage.

But not only did the form of marriage change in time: its very substance and meaning also changed. As we have seen above, marriage, as originally conceived in primitive society, really constituted a true sale, the husband buying a wife, who henceforth passed into his absolute possession as his property. Gradually, however, the practice of purchase fell into disrepute and decayed, though the principle of sale-marriage persisted in an attenuated form through a variety of marriage modes. Finally, we find that marriage by purchase, in which the bridegroom paid for the bride, was replaced by the very opposite state of affairs, the bride now procuring a husband by the attraction of a dowry bestowed upon her by her parent. How this change came about is difficult to disentangle in every particular case; but, on the whole, a series of modifications can be traced among different peoples which all led slowly to the same result. In the first place, it became customary for the parents of the bride to give return gifts to the bridegroom, which in time became more expensive and valuable than even the actual bride price; indeed, some-

[1] L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 141.

times purchase as such seems to be abolished, only a mutual exchange of presents taking place between the contracting parties. On the other hand, we meet with cases where the gifts received as purchase price were given back to the daughter; or the gift, indicating the purchase, was bestowed by the bridegroom directly upon the bride.

Among the old Teutons the *beweddung* was at first a "real contract of sale."* Later on it became customary to pay the guardian only a small sum at the betrothal (the *arrha* or *hand-geld*), the main part of the bride money being given to the bride herself. As Howard puts it: the *beweddung* was still a "real contract," though not a "contract of sale."[1] Thus the original purchase price was converted into the dower (*dos*) of the bride. In time it became customary for the parent or guardian to provide this dower out of his own means. We find this practice everywhere among the ancient peoples—for example, among the old Hebrews, in Greece and Rome, and among the old Germans. This *dos* was generally considered to belong to the wife, and fell back to the widow after the death of her husband. Indeed, so much value was attached to the *dos* as an instrument of marriage that the bestowal of the *dos* by itself constituted the true token of a real marriage in contradistinction to an illegitimate marital union.

In Rome the sale-marriage had already disappeared in historical times, the marriage known as *coemptio* being merely in the nature of a formal sale by which the wife passed into the power (*manus*) of her husband. In old Germany and old England, also, the betrothal became a merely formal act, a solemn oath or vow; in the later

* "As a matter of fact, the old English law speaks bluntly of 'buying a maid'; and in Germany 'to buy a wife' was a familiar phrase for marriage throughout the Middle Ages" (Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., p. 261.)

[1] G. E. Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., p. 267.

Middle Age this was weakened still more into a mere *hand-schlag* or 'hand-fasting,' which came to constitute the real marriage ceremony. The betrothal sum was at the same time transformed into the morning gift or dotal portion, given to the bride either directly by the bridegroom or by her father.[1]

With this we have reached a stage of marriage that was of considerable importance; for with it another change gradually came about, which had far-reaching consequences. We have seen that originally the father possessed absolute power over the daughter; it was he who decided her fate, gave her away in marriage, and could divorce her from her husband. Now, though this was the rule in patriarchal society, there is no lack of examples among primitive tribes of marriage being free and based merely upon the mutual consent of the partners.[2] Even under the patriarchal system the power of the father gradually dwindled, women acquiring slowly a certain degree of independence with the right of self-disposal. In Rome there existed a mode of marriage by use (*usus*) without any ceremony whatsoever. The mere living together of the two parties as man and wife for a whole year without interruption made them legally husband and wife. If, however, cohabitation was broken for three nights in every year, the wife did not pass into the *manus* of her husband, but remained under the tutelage of her father (this too becoming in time merely nominal). This custom gained greatly in prevalence, so that finally a marriage came into vogue in which the wife was free from her husband. The consent of the father also fell away gradually, until a kind of free marriage arose in which the woman enjoyed practically equal liberty with

[1] See Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, chap. xviii. —Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., chap. iv., part iii.; chap. vi., part i.

[2] Howard, *loc. cit.*, vol. i., chap. iv., part iv.

her husband.[1] In Germany and England, too, during the course of the Middle Ages the consent of the father or guardian was slowly eliminated as not essential under certain conditions, so that *self-beweddung* could take place between a couple by a mere "declaratory act," a mere confession of betrothal. Such a marriage was a purely private transaction, a "lay marriage," in contradistinction to the ecclesiastical and civil marriage, as known to-day.[2] How the private marriage gradually came to be superseded, how the Church slowly arrogated to itself the sole control of marriage, and how this control ultimately passed into the hand of the secular powers, must now be related.

Primitive man has ever shown a tendency towards a sense of the uncanny and fearful. This is wont to express itself most markedly during special events of life, such as birth, puberty, marriage, etc., when extraordinary precautions are taken to ensure a lucky turn of the occasion. Special rites are performed in order to keep away the influence of evil spirits at such times. Thence arise, as Crawley has shown, ceremonial functions, which, becoming fixed by religious usage, are found to persist among all kinds of peoples, primitive and advanced. Marriage ceremonies, according to this authority, have the same origin, being originally intended as a propitiation of evil spirits, in order to prevent possible danger to the contracting parties for breaking the sexual taboo.[3] Thus we find that there existed in ancient Rome and Greece a sacred marriage ceremony: in Rome this was called *confarreatio*, and consisted in the eating of a cake by both bride and bridegroom, which religious magical

[1] See Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, pp. 202 to 209.—Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*, twenty-first edition, p. 369, etc. Paris, 1910.

[2] Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., chap. vi., part ii.

[3] E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, p. 320.

rite symbolized the unity of the man and woman.[1] Such a religious union was difficult to break; it fell, however, into abeyance gradually, its place being taken by the informal marriage by *usus*, which could be contracted freely and was easily dissolved.

The Christian Church, which stepped into the temporal inheritance of the Roman Empire, based its conception of marriage upon the Pauline doctrine of the original sin of the flesh. Asceticism, which, as we have seen in a previous chapter, coloured the whole outlook of the Christian world, exerted its baneful influence also upon the idea of marriage. Celibacy was held to be of higher spiritual attainment than the married state. "It is better to marry than to burn," said St. Paul. Following his teaching, the Church declared wedlock a sacrament, as a means for prevention of fornication. In the eyes of the Holy Fathers marriage was at best a necessary evil. "St. Augustine himself could see no justification for marriage except in a grave desire deliberately adopted of having children." "If 'marriage is sought after for the sake of children, it is justifiable; if entered into as a *remedium* to avoid worse evils, it is pardonable.'"[2] The Church, therefore, encouraged easy entry into marriage as "a safety valve against the temptations of the flesh." It was merely in the nature of a remedy for concupiscence.

The early Church at first simply accepted the temporal form of marriage that she found. But slowly she began to bend all her energy towards bringing marriage (as all other worldly concerns) under her domain. The process was a gradual one. Originally the marriage ceremony, which was, as we have seen, a mere declaratory act, did not take place in church. In accordance with the rise of the new religious spirit, however, it became customary

[1] Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*, book ii., chap. ii.
[2] Quoted by Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., p. 328.

for the newly-wedded couple to celebrate the bride Mass and to receive the benediction of the priest. Later on, the nuptials were entered into at the church door in the presence of the priest, the bride Mass following inside the church. We have seen that, according to old Teuton custom, the parties "married themselves," the guardian merely giving the bride away and conducting the ceremony. When the priest appeared on the scene, he at first merely took the place of the guardian; he was only the orator in a private lay transaction. But by the beginning of the thirteenth century the Church had arrogated to itself the exclusive right of marriage celebration. It now insisted upon the presence of the officiating priest; and the last step in the same direction was taken when the parties ceased to simply "marry themselves," but were married by the priest in the church. Thus the sacramental idea of marriage achieved its final consummation in the form of the ecclesiastical or canonical marriage. The Church, being anxious to encourage early marriage, was loth to put any obstacles in its way, "lest without a safety valve the temptations of the flesh should become too strong for weak human nature."[1] Paradoxical though it may seem, this very urgency led to a laxity of marriage observance. For though only a properly consecrated marriage was considered "legal," "no religious ceremony, no record or witness was essential" to make a marriage "valid." The mere formal betrothal by a mutual declaration of present consent (*sponsalia per verba de præsenti*) was held sufficient to constitute a true marriage, while the *copula carnalis* (physical union) in itself was made a "legal ground for assuming the foregoing promise to wed."[2] The result was that the door was widely opened for the abuse of the married state as a

[1] Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. i., p. 339.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 338.

mere convenience. Secret marriages and even child-marriages occurred in abundance, and were only finally abolished when the State ultimately took over the regulation of religious as well as of civil marriage.* But even now, according to good legal authority, the living together "by habit and repute" without any previous form or ceremony whatsoever establishes marriage as "a fact" (at least in Great Britain and the United States).[1]

Christian marriage, being based upon the idea of sinfulness of sex, naturally allocated to woman, as the weaker vessel, an inferior position. With this it simply went back to the primitive patriarchal system. Even in the Bible Eve is punished for her transgression against God by being put under the tutelage of man. "And thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee."[2] The New Testament, too, emulating the same spirit, declares: "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife. . . . Therefore, as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in everything."[3] And again: "For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man. Neither was the man created for the woman but the woman for the man."[4] This subjection of woman, however, was mitigated by the teaching of the Church in one respect. Insisting, as it did, upon the equal duty of both husband and wife to conjugal fidelity, it thereby paved the way for a more equitable and chivalrous adjustment of sex responsibility. Though the Church was unable to control human sex passion—indeed, its over-emphasis upon sex denial led, during the Middle Ages, to a recrudescence rather than a chastening of sexual life—still it cannot be

* By the Hardwicke Act in 1753.

[1] H. Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 478.

[2] Gen. iii. 17. [3] Eph. v. 22–24. [4] 1 Cor. xi. 8, 9.

denied that the appreciation given to the gentler moods of domestic life, fostered by the Christian ideal, acted in time as a softening influence upon the wilder spirit of man.

With the rise of Protestantism, the canonical theory of marriage—still rigorously adhered to by the Catholic Church—became modified in accordance with the new and freer spirit of the Reformation. Luther himself seems to have somewhat wavered in his attitude towards the sacramental idea of marriage, but was on the whole inclined to look upon matrimonial questions as belonging to "the temporal power." "Marriage," he declared, "is a temporal, worldly thing which does not concern the Church."[1] But while the sacramental character of marriage was thus abandoned by the reformers, the Protestant Church, especially in England, maintained nevertheless — somewhat inconsistently — the religious ceremony. Marriage, though no longer a sacrament, was deemed to be a public and not a private transaction, and had to be solemnized in church.[2] Though the Puritans under Cromwell instituted a purely secular marriage, asserting "marriage to be no sacrament, nor peculiar to the Church of God, but common to mankind and of public interest to every Commonwealth,"[3] this radical reform was swept away by the reaction of the Restoration period.[4]

But the tide of progress flowed on. The spirit of reform embodied in the puritanical movement was carried over into the New England colonies, where obligatory civil marriage, independent of any religious sanction, became established. It took England nearly two centuries more before the marriage disabilities imposed by the Established

[1] Quoted by Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, Vol. I., p. 388.
[2] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 442.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 443.
[4] Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, Vol. I., chap. x., part i.

Church upon Dissenters were finally abolished. The Civil Marriage Act of 1836, whilst preserving the religious celebration for those who wish to submit to it, instituted by its side a civil procedure before the registrar, which is based upon a mere declaration of assent without any religious rites whatsoever.[1] This is now the rule prevailing in most civilized countries. Marriage thus once more has become a secular affair—a simple contract, the State merely safeguarding against abuse by the insistence of proper publicity.

[1] Howard, *Matrimonial Institutions*, Vol. I., chap. x., part iii.

CHAPTER II

MORAL FACTORS

HAVING traced the evolution of marriage to a certain point, are we thereby enabled to construe its further course? If progress there is, can we read its signs? Can we venture further, and outline, however tentatively, the future of marriage? Nay, can we direct its further development by our conscious effort, and determine not only what might be, but what ought to be?

Our historical account of marriage showed us that it passed through two well-defined phases. The first stage is marked by its proprietary character, man holding woman in fact and law as his possession, as he would hold chattel, the ethical bond, so far as it existed, being of the slightest. This primitive system, represented mainly by the patriarchate—and as such not yet quite obsolete—gradually gave way to a more personal relationship between husband and wife. Sympathy and affection slowly came to replace the original purely economic and traditional marriage tie. The man, instead of acquiring rights over his wife and children, now entered into a moral bond with his family. These moral factors have come to constitute the bed-rock of modern marriage; it is upon these alone that an enduring fabric of marital life can be reared.

1. MARRIAGE AND LOVE.

The chapter on the evolution of marriage has shown us such a variety of marital types, that it would seem to tend rather towards a confusion than a clearing of the issue.

What we have now to do is to make order and see whether we can deduce any thoroughgoing principle that may consistently be applied to marriage. In short, we have to find a definition that will give us the true meaning of marriage apart from its historical accidents. Before trying to build up an ideal marriage relationship we have first to answer the question: What is marriage? For the answer, as will appear in the sequel, is by no means self-evident, though it would seem so at first sight; and any solution given will profoundly affect our attitude towards marriage as a social institution.

Westermarck, in his *History of Human Marriage*, has defined marriage as "a more or less durable connection between male and female lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring."[1] This is a biological definition of marriage, and applies, according to Westermarck, both to man and his animal precursors. Now, taking the definition as it stands, one may agree with the author that it is a satisfactory statement of marriage in so far as "it implies not only sexual relations, but also the living together" of the partners.[2] Yet, it may be doubted whether it is wise so to enlarge the meaning of marriage as to include animal unions; for as a result the distinctive feature of human marriage becomes obscured and tends to be lost in the too wide term employed. While sexual union is generally known as mating, we can comprise the living together of male and female for the purpose of propagation as pairing. We would then reserve the term "marriage" only to human marriage, which is perhaps more in conformity with custom.

As a matter of fact, Westermarck's definition, being a biological one, fails to do justice to the specifically human element of marriage. For, on the one hand, it includes

[1] E. Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, p. 19.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

all those illegitimate unions that are generally excluded from this category, yet, on the other, it does not cover those temporary unions where marriage is entered into for a short term only, merely for convenience—as, *e.g.*, among some Arab tribes, who take a wife for the period of a journey or even for a night.[1] Indeed, as Dr. Rosenthal has pointed out, it is not the duration of marriage nor the birth of progeny that constitutes wedlock.[2] For even without offspring, a living together of two partners must still be counted a marriage, so long as there is the intention of procreation. It is the purpose of race propagation, rather than the actual result, that forms the first prerequisite of marriage.[3] But in order to constitute such a sexual union a marriage, one other thing is necessary, according to this authority—namely, the legitimization or legal recognition of the union. It is the social approbation that distinguishes marriage from all those other loose forms of sex relationships which, though having a similar purpose, still are not socially recognized as marriage. According to this definition, then, marriage is "the legally recognized sex union between persons of the opposite sexes which has the purpose of race propagation."[4] This legal definition is right enough in its simplicity, but it does not touch the problem at heart. It merely states a fact, namely—that marriage depends upon a legally recognized status. The real question further to be pursued is: What sort of union should socially come under the term of a legally recognized marriage? In short, the biological factor of marriage, as defined by

[1] E. Westermarck, *loc. cit.*, p. 519. Also I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, p. 201.

[2] Dr. Rosenthal, "Grundfragen des Eheproblems," *Neue Generation*, December 14, 1908, p. 453.

[3] Dr. Rosenthal, "Der Ursprung der Ehe," *Neue Generation*, April 14, 1909.

[4] Dr. Rosenthal, "Grundfragen des Eheproblems," *Neue Generation*, December 14, 1908, p. 460.

Westermarck, must be supplemented by a social factor which, underlying the legal form of marriage, varies in conformity with the spirit of the age.

Whilst reviewing the history of marriage we have seen that the idea of marriage altered with time. Marriage as conceived by primitive society was intrinsically a tribal institution: it was held essential in order to ensure the propagation of the race, and towards this end received the strongest religious sanction. The purpose of marriage was not pleasure, but the continuance of the family.[1] There were two potent reasons for this: in the first instance, the tribe could only maintain itself against its ever-ready enemies by its fighting quality, and therefore sons were generally much more welcome than daughters; and secondly, the worship of the spirits of the dead, which was an inexorable duty with the ancients, devolved, as a rule, upon the eldest male of the line.[2] Now, in order to ensure a pure line of descendants, the ancient Greeks and early Romans allowed marriages only between full citizens, all other sex unions being considered as outside the pale of true marriage, however much they might otherwise emulate true conjugal life. As a matter of fact, such a conception of marriage excluded the erotic element altogether, and relegated it, so far as it existed, to extra-marital relationships. The early Christian Church, as we have already had occasion to point out, did not deviate much from this view, except that it tried to banish sexual love altogether from the scheme of life, looking upon wedlock as a carnal connection, a safety-valve against lust, yet sanctifying it by declaring it a sacrament.[3]

But with time this extreme physical view of marriage gave way to a more truly human idea of sex partnership.

[1] Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*, p. 52.
[2] *Ibid.*, livre i.
[3] Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 509.

The free spirit of the Reformation asserted itself, finding one of its earliest expressions in the eloquence of the poet Milton. He emphasized the personal factor of marital relationship, declaring marriage to be "a covenant, the very being whereof consists not in a forced cohabitation and counterfeit performance of duties, but in unfeigned love and peace."[1] It is this view of marriage, the human or spiritual, that has steadily asserted itself more and more at the side of the more primitive factor of race propagation. It now stands out as the generally accepted social factor of every true marriage. To quote Miss A. Maude Royden "marriage should be, in its origin, the spontaneous coming together, after wide opportunities for choice, of two individuals that are uniquely adapted the one to the other."[2]

Marriage, then, in the full sense of the word, has a double purport: on the one hand, there is what Havelock Ellis calls the primary end—namely, to beget and to bear offspring;[3] and, on the other, there is the spiritual end, implying "all those higher mental and emotional processes which in human evolution are ever gaining greater power."[4] With this we reach the modern ethical conception of marriage, endorsed by most of the thoughtful writers of to-day. Marriage, according to Havelock Ellis, "is a union prompted by mutual love; . . . and a method for propagating the race."[5] "Marriage," declares Ellen Key, "signifies the living together of two people upon the ground of love and the common parenthood of children."[6] In short, we may subsume marriage

[1] Quoted by Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 444.
[2] A. Maude Royden, *The Making of Women*, p. 22.
[3] H. Ellis, *The Objects of Marriage*, Publication 5 of British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology, p. 17.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[5] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 507.
[6] Ellen Key, *The Women's Movement*, p. 150.

under its ethical aspect as a physico-spiritual communion between man and woman for the purpose of procreation.

Marriage, then, conceived in this new modern spirit, presents a double aspect: there is the old time-honoured idea of race production, which makes up its social purport; and there is the more recent, but none the less essential, individual purpose realizing itself in the complete union of two human personalities. It is important to distinguish carefully between these two factors of marriage and keep them clearly apart in our minds; for only thus shall we be able to evaluate their respective spheres and to disentangle somewhat their intricate interaction, which causes so much of the complexity and confusion of the modern marriage problem. "For women as for men," writes Elsie Clews Parsons, "mating and parenthood are separable facts."[1] We shall treat them thus in the following pages. We shall deal with mating first, for it is the preliminary to all parenthood—*i.e.*, we shall discuss that "will of twain" which by the merging of two individuals into one creates a third.

What now is that power that draws man and woman together towards the supreme act of life, irresistibly, and sometimes so unrelentingly? What is it that makes a person select his life's partner in love? In short, what are the forces at work in the process of sexual selection in man? We have already stated (in our chapter on the analysis of love) that sexual attraction may be traced in the last analysis to a physical reaction between the two persons concerned, sensory stimuli of sight, sound, touch, smell, and hearing being powerful means for arousing and enhancing sexual emotions. Taking for granted the general action of this mechanism, we have now to go a step farther and enquire how sexual attraction is deter-

[1] Elsie Clews Parsons, "Feminism and Sex Ethics," *Internat. Journ. of Ethics*, July, 1916, p. 462.

mined in particular cases. For we may take it as a fact that there exists some rule about "falling in love," in spite of Cupid's proverbial waywardness.

Given the capacity of reaction to certain sensorial stimuli, Moll assumes that a number of such reactions is combined (psychically) into one total reaction complex, in the same way as a number of simple sounds is apperceived as a musical harmony. Such complexes, which are inherited, are on the whole the same for different species, but also show individual differences.[1] The individual differences Moll would account for by the psychical elaboration of the received sensorial complexes.[2] Whatever it is due to, sexual attraction may be said to run in types which are more or less fixed in the bodily organization. Hirschfeld strongly contends for the inborn tendency of sexual taste, and posits for this purpose a specific sexual psyche, a sex centre in the brain which only reacts to adequate, individually given stimuli.[3] It must be admitted, however, that other and not less weighty authorities tend to the opinion that the direction of the sexual instinct is acquired, the erotic type being fixed by accidental experiences, especially during childhood. This is the view taken at present chiefly by the psycho-analytical school of Freud.[4] Havelock Ellis takes up a position midway, holding that "every individual builds up an ideal of his own, in part on the basis of his own special organization and its demands, in part on the actual accidental attraction he has experienced."[5] Whatever standpoint we may take up, our argument in the

[1] A. Moll, *Untersuchungen über die Libido Sexualis*, Vol. I., pp. 156 and 159. Berlin, 1898.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 199.
[3] Magnus Hirschfeld, *Naturgesetze der Liebe*, p. 149 Berlin, 914.
[4] S. Freud, *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, p. 85.
[5] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. IV., p. 183.

following is thereby not affected, seeing that the acquired types, when once established, are relatively fixed.

Given now more or less stable sexual types, we come to the question, What determines the quality of the sex relationship that any given case of sexual attraction will assume? In other words, why does one affair stop contentedly at platonic friendship, while another will rise up to erotic intimacies, and yet a third, brooking no interference, will rush headlong into passionate love? We can



FIG. 7.

explain the differences in behaviour only by the difference in the sum of the part attractions. For love is made up of part attractions of various kinds, and the intensity of love depends on the extent of these. We can picture the process to ourselves diagrammatically in the following scheme:

We assume that an individual A (represented by point A) is attracted to another individual aa_1 (represented by the line aa_1). The totality of attraction between both is then represented by the triangle Aaa_1. We now assume another

individual B similarly attracted to bb_1, and a third individual C attracted to cc_1. We so construct the triangle Bbb_1 and Ccc_1 that they overlap with the first triangle Aaa_1 and have part of their bases in common (see Fig. 7). We can see at a glance that the individual B will share with the individual bb_1 the totality of sexual emotion (namely, Bbb_1), but with A and aa_1 only a part (viz., Dba_1); also that C shares the total attraction complex with cc_1 (Ccc_1), a lesser part with B and bb_1 (Fcb_1) and a still smaller part with A and aa_1 (Eca_1). Now when the totality of the sexual emotion is shared by two individuals, we have love; though in practice it will hardly ever be realized to the full, an approach to the ideal being more or less sufficient for this purpose. If part only is shared, we have the lesser kinds of sex feelings—namely, that of erotic friendship when the share in common is fairly large (as between B and A, and C and B); and that of platonic friendship when the sexual attraction falls below a certain point (as between C and A). If we take care to make the subdivisions of aa_1 into proper proportions—namely, a_1c equal to one part, cb equal to four, and ba equal to two parts—we get the exact correspondence to our previous diagram of love relationships (Fig. 4).* It must be added that these quantitative differences are at the same time accompanied by a qualitative distinction, the feeling of love, of erotic friendship and of platonic friendship varying from each other in

* Perhaps we should mention here the theory of Weininger, who assumes that for a true sexual union (love union ?) there must come together a complete male plus a complete female. Weininger assumes, as noted in a previous place, that every individual is partly male and partly female, in various combinations. If we take a male made up of three-quarters male (M) and one quarter female (F), such an individual would have the formula ($\frac{3}{4}$M+$\frac{1}{4}$F). In order to form a true sexual union such a male would have to mate with a female of the formula ($\frac{3}{4}$F + $\frac{1}{4}$M). But as all these arithmetical proportions are entirely fictitious, no value can be attached to these speculations (see Weininger, *Sex and Character*, p. 29).

emotional content; just as in chemistry a quantitative difference expresses itself by a difference of qualities.

Love, then, is a total attraction, as compared with the lesser erotic emotions, which are due to partial attractions. But if this is so, what of those cases of love which do not burst out in full flame at first sight, but reach their climax only by gradual stages ? Can any distinction be drawn between love in its preliminary phases and those sex feelings which lead to erotic and platonic friendship respectively, and which never encompass the full diapason of sex emotion. Is there a criterion, for instance, between platonic friendship as a passing phase of love and that permanent platonic friendship which remains unaltered because, based upon a partial attraction, it is unalterable ? General experience teaches how difficult it is to judge between a budding love and a more platonic friendship. But, however hard to make in actual practice, the distinction on theoretical grounds should be clear. Love, covering a wider field of attraction, cannot but make itself felt in all its phases; though less intense in its earlier stages, it will nevertheless, by the range of its extensity, colour and suffuse every kind of sex relationship it may happen to inspire at a given moment. Though not explicitly, love betrays itself implicitly. As a matter of fact, it is notorious that the unbiased onlooker will often discern a love affair with more perspicacity than the partners implicated. Not only this: the lovers themselves, when becoming aware of the real state of their feelings, will be able to interpret retrospectively many small signs which were indicative of true lovers' love.* This, of course, does not exclude the possibility of another

* This can be explained on the theory of the Unconscious, propounded by Freud and the school of psycho-analysts, by saying that in such cases only a part of the love attraction makes itself consciously felt, the other parts remaining for the time unconscious —though, for this reason, not less active.

type of cases, where a true love relationship is only attained gradually after passing successively through the stages of platonic and erotic friendship. In these cases the passing phases of love are not differentiated in any way from the pure friendship stages, and cannot be discriminated from them.

One serious complaint may be made here against the exposition of love given above. It will be objected that what we have described is not so much love as sex impulse. Our reply is that love as an alluring, enticing force is—in our opinion—primarily sensual. There cannot be love without passion, though there is passion without love. Yet, though this is so, it should not be forgotten, as reiterated again and again in this book, that love, whilst based on passion, is not mere passion. It needs the additional spiritual element that alone can make the sexual impulse truly human. It is this deeper psychic content that gives solidity and durability to an otherwise fleeting passion. Spirituality is the flywheel of sexual emotion. Our whole mental organization is attuned to, if not entirely built upon, the fundament of sex.* It is the sexual psyche that determines to the greatest extent our character. As Hirschfeld aptly remarks: "It may well be that we love after all in the physical—by means of the ideas associated with it—something adequately spiritual."[1]

Love found no place in marriage as conceived by the ancients. The erotic life, as far as it was provided for, was relegated to extra-marital relationships. The married man took his pleasure outside wedlock with women who were outside the pale of citizenship. The virtuous *mater familias*, being the worthy bearer of the race, was only deemed to come up to the highest standard

* This is a truth which has of late found substantial corroboration through the work of Freud and the psycho-analytical school.

[1] M. Hirschfeld, *Naturgesetze der Liebe*, p. 97.

of pure motherhood by relinquishing all that lustful desire which was considered the sign either of male virility or of wanton womanhood. Christianity, with its insistence on the sinfulness of all flesh, if it did not create, greatly reinforced this attitude: marriage was to be a passionless union, a mere carnal necessity.

The consequences of such an attitude have been twofold: on the one hand, sexual ignorance—posing as innocence—is held to be the *sine qua non* for all those who would be deemed to enter pure into matrimony; on the other hand, man, whilst imposing this rule upon womankind with the utmost rigour, managed to assure his pleasure in spite of all injunctions—either inside or outside marriage. And stranger still, he even succeeded in the end in imposing upon woman herself this man-made view, which boldly declares that his needs are her privilege.

Now there is no doubt that woman's sexual emotion is, on the whole, less sensual than that of man; woman's love is more diffuse, more apt to irradiate into the spiritual sphere. Woman is also much more willing to give in love, while man is more ready to take. But this is no reason for immolating woman's tenderness upon the altar of man's sexual greed. It must be admitted that in spite of woman's reticences there exists a real need in her for sexual satisfaction, as real in her as in man, except that it is differently attuned. Up to now man—at least according to the official code—has not even had as much as a guess at this side of woman's nature, unless he sought it—clandestinely. Man, by denying to woman her natural privilege of sex, in despoiling her has deprived himself of the splendour and glory of a common sex life. For truly, man and woman, however parted by artifice, are one in nature.[1]

[1] See the beautiful allegories by Olive Schreiner, *Three Dreams in a Desert.*

It is generally taken for granted by those who would fain defend the old system, that "passion which was prohibited till the register was signed will awake at the right moment."[1] The response expected by man often fails in the woman; or, if it comes, it shows itself in quite an unexpected manner as a horror of the 'vulgarity' of the sexual embrace. Sex and its manifestations being tabooed before marriage, being "cabin'd, cribb'd, and confin'd" to the utmost, what wonder that, when suddenly released, it is blinded by its own effulgence, and recoils. Those who are not shocked often find "nothing in it," the mere physical element—the only one known to them—being empty and unsatisfactory. This proves a source of sore disappointment to many, and is the cause of a good deal of conjugal unhappiness. For whatever may be said to the contrary "marriage and love are both based on the erotic life."[2] As a matter of fact, we cannot have the fruit of the tree without encouraging the flower. "The specialization of women to a physical end"[3] by man has the deplorable result of unfitting her for the more refined intimacies of conjugal life. Love, "being the finest of all arts," is not learned in a day. How often are its sensitive tendrils bruised and broken by the first rough onslaught of a wedding night! "More rapes," says Havelock Ellis, "have been effected in marriage than outside it."[4]

And, reversing the situation, is it not strange that women are so often fascinated by the type of man who, though reprehensible in morals, yet enthrals the feminine heart by his sexual flair and connoisseurship? It is easily explained: such men stir the erotic sensibilities of women, which, in spite of repression, crave for satis-

[1] A. Maude Royden, *The Making of Women*, p. 41.
[2] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 550.
[3] A. Maude Royden, *Women and the Sovereign State*, p. 10.
[4] H. Ellis, *loc. cit.*, p. 80.

faction. And this need exists in every normal woman.[1] As a sensitive modern woman writer puts it: "Woman demands that man should combine with unsullied chastity accomplished erotic experience—should be in fact Parsifal and Don Juan in one."[2]

Indeed, the old notion of married life is worn out. It does not fit in any longer with the finer susceptibilities in the field of our erotic and moral demands alike. Marriage of the old kind too often savours of barbarism, implying, as it so frequently does, complete domination over and violation of woman's individual desires. If we note also that in a good many cases the marital bond is entered into merely for reasons *de convenance*, it will not be very far wrong to designate such unions as "legitimized prostitution." As such at least they appear to all those who maintain the sanctity of all human personality —including that of woman—and who see the essence of marriage not so much in a carnal connection based upon correct formality, but rather, to use the fine phrase of Wells, in a "coalescence of souls."

Realizing then woman's erotic rights, we must mould our ethics of "married love" in accordance. First and foremost it must be laid down as an axiomatic principle that "a married woman's body and soul should be essentially her own."[3] In the words of Elsie Clews Parsons, "single-heartedness in mating" and "desire for responsiveness" must replace the old notion of proprietorship in marriage. The very idea of conjugal rights and duties appears preposterous from this point of view. Where there is mutual devotion, what need is there for legal rights? In the absence of love, of what good are duties? For, "as an ethical sacrament, marriage is the fruition of

[1] H. Ellis, *The Erotic Rights of Women*, Publication 5, British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology.
[2] Gabriele Reuter, *Das Problem der Ehe*, p. 44. Berlin, 1907.
[3] Dr. Marie C. Stopes, *Married Love*, p. 71.

perfect love, in which, at its best, men and women pass beyond themselves."[1] It presupposes freedom of action and intrinsic spontaneity in both partners.[2]

Coming now to the application of the aforesaid principles, what is the best way for attaining a true state of marriage? How can this ideal of married love most perfectly be attained? We are too ready nowadays to let the sexes acquire knowledge about each other as best they may. Even engaged couples learn little about each other, as long as they meet together under the special conditions of a festive and erotic mood, when each is trying to give only of the best. An unbiased valuation of each other, a proper perspective, is impossible under such circumstances. Passion passes as love and mars a marriage which will unavoidably be carried on under more natural workaday conditions. The only test of life is reality itself. It is for this reason that Mrs. Havelock Ellis advocates 'a noviciate of marriage.'[3] According to her, young people, before entering finally upon wedlock, should undergo a probation period with each other by living some time before marriage (up to a year) under the same roof in either of the parents' houses. They would then be in a position of learning thoroughly to understand each other, of either accepting or rejecting each other, before making the final irrevocable step. Just as the nun, the bride of God, before giving herself to the holy life of her religious vows, passes through a noviciate in order to test herself, so bride and bridegroom would henceforth enter married life only after a true probation period. What disappointments would be spared by this simple device, what miseries of married life, what failures! This idea is not intended to carry with itself the suggestion

[1] L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 231.
[2] See also R. Michels, *Sexual Ethics*, part i., chap. i.
[3] Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *The New Horizon*, MS. Essays.

of real married life before wedlock. "Physical surrender," in the opinion of Mrs. Havelock Ellis, "should be the last expression in mutual love and not the first."

Proper knowledge of the physiology and hygiene of sex is indispensable to all those who would aspire to be perfect lovers.[1] For though Nature has made the aim of love pretty obvious, the right use of the means of love has been greatly obscured by the persistent ignoring of the natural impulses. What ought to have been natural has come to be thought of as immoral. "Nature has been falsely regarded as excluding all that is best in what is natural."[2] "Courtship," as Havelock Ellis has pointed out, "is not a mere preliminary to marriage, but a biologically essential part of the marriage relationship throughout."[3] Every act of coition, in order to rouse the proper emotion, ought to be preceded by the appropriate stimulation. "The life of love is a continuous courtship with constant progression,"[4] and as such holds a free brief for all of Nature's possibilities. "The lower," says Dr. Jessie Murray, "is never —ought never to be—eliminated, but rather subsumed by the higher."[5] This holds good for love as for all things of life. James Hinton, the pioneer mind in sex reform, saw this clearly: "The idea he wanted to change in the minds of men and women was that physical love is a mere matter of bodily gratification. If, for a generation, it could be considered as a matter of soul gratification struggling to express itself through the inadequate medium of the body, the reform in morals and the joy

[1] See S. Herbert, *Introduction to the Physiology and Psychology of Sex*, chap. vii., 2.—Dr. Marie C. Stopes, *Married Love*. London, 1918.—Also Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., chap. xi.

[2] Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 38. London, 1918.

[3] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 515.

[4] H. Ellis, *loc. cit.*, p. 547.

[5] Quoted from letter in Dr. Marie Stopes' *Married Love*, p. ix.

in love would be built up. Because the continuance of the race is dependent upon bodily contact, moralists have confused the place of physical desire in evolved human beings. What is a simple uncomplicated function in the ape, the tiger, or the primitive man, may be a supreme expression of the soul in the evolved human being."[1] What is needed is "a new vision of the purity of pure passions and pure pleasures." "To see any physical relation from the physical side only is to mis-see it altogether, to condemn it to abuse and evil. What is used as spiritual is spiritual."[2]

But this does not mean licentiousness in marriage, or licence. Continence is a virtue inside marriage, as outside it. Indeed, the very insistence on the spiritual side of the sexual embrace implies not only inwardness but moderation. We cannot scale the heights of emotion, except at inspired moments. The act of coition intended as a spiritual communion of two bodies and souls will thus commend itself only when the proper conditions are fulfilled. And, furthermore, seeing that both partners have to share in this communion, it follows that it can never be represented by an act which is brutality on one side and passive submission on the other. For, as Hinton so well said: "Her need is truly man's need of her, but no woman gives herself unreservedly except to one who loves her beyond herself and himself." "Man's need," to continue in the words of the same author, "ought never to mean woman's sacrifice, but the needs of woman should alone constitute man's pleasure."[3] Only when the instinctive struggle for subjugation gives way to "the passionate desire for fellowship" then, and then only, will true marriage come into its own.

[1] Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *James Hinton*, p. 69. London, 1918.
[2] Quoted by Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *James Hinton*, p. 44.
[3] Quoted by Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *loc. cit.*, p. 234.

2. The Marriage Status.

Love and parenthood, we have found, are the basic factors of marriage; they are, so to speak, the warp and woof of the fabric of married life; or, rather, we should say, love is the beautiful, joyous, flaming pattern woven into the otherwise drab, commonplace background of child production. The question now arises: How far does love make itself felt as an influence upon the marriage status? What are the implications from the "will to love" with regard to the question of illegitimacy and other similar problems?

We have seen in our chapter on the history of marriage that originally the idea of illegitimacy is entirely unknown. For in the matriarchal stage all children belonged to the mother and her clan; they were all her natural children irrespective of the begetter. Thus no distinction could be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate offspring. Under the patriarchate, with its polygamous tendencies, the same held good; the children of the same father from different mothers were all reckoned to the father and his clan; they all belonged to the same household and generally had equal rights. If there was any choice at all, it lay entirely with the father, who could claim as his legitimate heirs whichever of his offspring he chose, even those who, according to modern ideas, would be looked upon as bastards. Indeed, according to the old Teutonic law, the bastard could inherit equally with the legitimate children, a rule which was abrogated only as late as the twelfth or thirteenth century.[1]

It was only with the establishment of our own modern exclusive monogamous marriage system that the gulf between legitimate offspring, born in wedlock, and

[1] Marianne Weber, *Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung*, p. 213.

illegitimate or natural offspring, born outside it, was made absolute. Antiquity knew no such sharp, narrow circumscription of the married state; indeed, various kinds of marital relationship were more or less recognized at the side of formal marriage, and maintained themselves, as was already pointed out, up to late in the Middle Ages. Such irregular marriage relations are generally spoken of as concubinage. Flourishing freely in ancient society under social sanction, they have never ceased altogether even in our day; though driven underground, they have, for this very reason, gone far toward losing that naturalness which clung to many of the old-time free unions. In judging this relationship, therefore, we must be careful not to be misled by a mere word. Concubinage nowadays denotes an illegal marriage relationship and carries as such an unwholesome flavour of sex immorality. But, as we shall see directly, the term "concubinage" covers a heterogeneous assortment of widely divergent sex relations, which historically and ethically have quite different values.

In the first instance, it must be remembered that under a polygynous system a man was allowed secondary slave wives, who, in modern terminology, are often described as concubines. Such concubines, as, *e.g.*, among the Homeric Greeks or the ancient Jews, are in reality to be looked upon as real wives; for they and their children had equal rights with the legitimate members of the family. Quite different is the status of concubinage as it existed among the later Greeks and early Romans. As purity of descent was considered the *sine qua non* of national existence, marriage with a non-citizen was legally not permissible. Any marital relation entered into with a non-citizen was concubinage, and was considered socially inferior to a full marriage contracted according to the true law. The children of such

extra-marital unions did not belong to the father, but followed the mother as in mother-right. Yet a third kind of concubinage has to be recognized, which flourished in the Roman Empire (from Augustus onward) and was in law and fact a true marriage, though not contracted according to the old customary sanctions. The only distinction lay in the fact that the children were reckoned according to mother-right. This kind of union was at first confined to persons who, according to the old laws, were prohibited from entering into full legal marriage; but later on the advantage accruing from such a relationship, which was free from the hampering restrictions of a legal marriage, led to its general adoption.[1] This form of concubinage lasted right into the Middle Ages, and was often resorted to by the clergy as a substitute for full marriage in order to evade the interdict of marriage by the Church. In its true sense such a concubinage, far from being an irregular extra-marital relation, rather took the place of marriage itself, and was fully equivalent to it.[2]

When legal marriage was once more made obligatory, concubinage reverted to its old style; but the times having changed, and there being no supply of slaves or freedwomen, resource was had to courtesans. In short, the concubine was replaced by the *maîtresse*, and concubinage degenerated into something very near prostitution. But in addition to this form of extra-marital relationship, which may properly be called a liaison rather than concubinage, there has prevailed, and still prevails, to a large extent a kind of sex relationship which, though often confounded with the liaison, is *toto cælo* different from it. We refer to those unions between young people, which, so common in all rural districts of

[1] I. Bloch, *Prostitution*, p. 581.—Weber, *Ehefrau und Mutter*, p. 175.

[2] Lea, *Sacerdotal Celibacy*, p. 350.—Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 498.

Europe, and partly also among a certain type of working-class, have rather the aspect of a more or less permanent marital relationship than that of illicit demi-mondism. Such living together takes the place of formal marriage, and, as Booth has said of the London working-class, is "not unusual and is indulgently regarded."[1] Often it is merely the preliminary to marriage proper, and then constitutes what is historically known as trial-marriage. Trial-marriage, far from being looked upon as immoral under such conditions, is rather considered to be a social advantage, since it enables the partners to test their respective suitability and fecundity. In fact, in many cases a girl is only deemed worthy of marriage after having proved her fertility in this manner.[2]

Coming now to the problem of illegitimacy as it presents itself to-day, we can best get a right estimate of it by approaching it from the same point of view as we did concubinage. Indeed, we can make out a fairly close parallel between the historical forms of concubinage and the illegitimate marriage unions of the present time Here, too, popular opinion carelessly throws together in one great sweep of condemnation any and every kind of irregular union, without scrutiny, without judgment, and—without charity. Yet discrimination, sympathy, and tolerance alone will enable us to treat "the unmarried mother" with anything like justice. As a matter of fact, there are different types of unmarried mothers, which have to be judged each according to merit. We can construct a graduated scale of pretermarital unions (incidentally resulting in illegitimate offspring) which runs the whole gamut of sex relationship outlined in our previous chapter on the analysis of

[1] Charles Booth, *Life and Labour*, vol. x., p. 44.
[2] Westermarck, *Human Marriage*, p. 519.—Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 379.

love. They include all possible forms of chaste and unchaste relationships in so far as they imply sexual intercourse, ranging from prostitution (in its various forms) right through the liaison up to a true love relationship (see Fig. 5). For it must not be forgotten that illegitimacy, as defined nowadays, denotes nothing but propagation outside legal wedlock. We shall simplify the problem very much by distinguishing these various types. Procreation being left out at the present juncture as a merely accidental factor, we can deal with illegitimacy as a sex relationship as if it had no issue. In so far as it represents prostitution we do not need to add anything new. All arguments as regards causation, symptoms, and remedies are substantially the same. This applies also to illegitimacy in so far as it is due to feeble-mindedness, for this is generally connected with some sort of prostitution. The problem of the illegitimate offspring we shall deal with separately. There remains the liaison and the pretermarital love relationship.

The liaison, as we have seen previously, forms one of the sex relations that we called unbalanced, because it assumes a physical form not justified by its spiritual content. It presumes upon a right which should only be the prerogative of a full love relationship—namely, the act of procreation. For procreation is only warranted where there is the appropriate feeling of personal union, physical and spiritual, which finds its final consummation in the generation to come. Where there is not the intention, or the possibility of the intention, of a family bond, there we have a liaison. It mocks marriage by claiming its privileges whilst flouting its duties.

It stands quite otherwise with those pretermarital unions which are based upon a genuine love relationship. The difference is merely one of formal sanction. They comprise the bulk of the illegal marriage relationships

mentioned above as occurring so freely among the rural and urban working-class population. They are, in fact, a real substitute for marriage. Strange to say, against all expectation of the would-be puritans, such unions are found to be as stable and reliable as the formal marriages. Indeed, Booth, an acknowledged authority, takes occasion to point out that such couples "manage to live fairly peaceably as long as they are not married."[1] The woman, not tied down to the man by the legal vows, evidently receives a due meed of consideration from her partner, to which he does not think her entitled when she is married to him for life. Kammerer, in his scholarly book on *The Unmarried Mother*,[2] also comes to the conclusion that in the majority of cases illegitimacy is not due to seduction of young girls by older men, but is rather the outcome of mutual sex attraction. "The responsibility for the birth of an illegitimate child is, in most instances, evenly distributed on both parents."[3]

The incidence of illegitimacy would also seem to point to the same conclusion. For, as Prinzing has shown (and Kammerer agrees with him): "The chief determinant of illegitimacy lies in the ratio of the number of unmarried males capable of paternity to the number of unmarried women capable of bearing children in a given community. Where there is a preponderance of unmarried women over men in a community, one may always look for illegitimate births."[4] In other words, it is the natural expression of the sex instinct in woman, which cannot find its adequate outlet in legitimate wedlock. Delay of marriage, due either to stringent marriage laws or to a high social standard of living, raises the illegitimate

[1] Charles Booth, *Life and Labour*, vol. x., p. 41.
[2] P. G. Kammerer, *The Unmarried Mother*. Boston, 1918.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 304 and 306.
[4] Quoted by Kammerer, *loc. cit.*, pp. 315, 316.

birth-rate.[1] Nor does it militate against the statement that illegitimacy is more prevalent among the ignorant section of the population. For, as Kammerer emphasizes, "no accurate estimate [of the rate of illegitimacy] can be secured which would indicate the sexual ethics of those who are intelligent enough to rob the sex act of its normal results."[2] In short, illegitimacy is essentially a problem of sex, economic and other social factors playing only a relatively subordinate rôle.

This comes out also in the consideration of remedial measures. Here we can distinguish palliatives, which are intended to remove the worst consequences of economic and social ill-adjustment, and radical proposals, which aim at abolishing illegitimacy altogether (or at least at minimizing it, as far as possible). As regards ameliorative endeavours, a great step forward has been made of late in the awakening of the public conscience. The old notion that every girl who has given birth to an illegitimate child is *eo ipso* a fallen creature and has for her sin to be cast out of society, together with her bastard, is now fortunately giving way to a more humane and enlightened view.* The unmarried mother and her child claim now the attention of the earnest reformer, and attempts are being made to lighten her burden, were it only for the sake of the future generation. It is being recognized at last that it is manifestly unjust to throw the burden of responsibility for what is often only an act of 'wrong haste' upon the woman alone, with all the consequences it entails. The penalties heaped upon the unfortunate mother are out of proportion to the initial guilt; and in any case, if guilt there is, it should be borne by both partners alike. As regards the child,

[1] According to Professor Ingram, quoted *ibid.* p. 3.

[2] Kammerer, *loc. cit.*, p. 2.

* Witness the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and her Child, established in 1918.

it may well exclaim with Edmund in *King Lear*: "Why bastard? Wherefore base? Why brand they us with base?" Crude as this conception of the unrighteousness of the illegitimate offspring would appear, it is not yet extinct, and still stalks the stage, though in a modern scientific disguise. Says a eugenic writer (in all seriousness): "The descendants of illegitimate unions are, I myself have no doubt, on the average inferior in civic worth to the descendants of legitimate unions."[1] No specific reasons are advanced for this opinion. Against such a view we should like to point out the fact that, first having prevented the illegitimate child from rising to a fair social level by rigid ostracism, the writer may well find the defects he himself is so anxious to perpetuate by his system. Kammerer expressly draws attention to the latest investigations, which tend to show that the percentage of criminality of illegitimates is "due not to innate mental or physical weakness, but to the treatment which the illegitimate child gets during its developmental period."[2] There is no shred of evidence to show that, eugenically speaking, the offspring of the poorer (so-called lower) classes are on the average of less social value (physically, intellectually, and morally) than those of the richer (higher) classes;[3] and, as we have seen, persons of illegitimate origin are people who just happen to be born somewhat before time. Indeed, such views as to the unworthiness of the illegitimate mother and her child are becoming somewhat out of date. A healthier current of opinion is now sweeping away the old musty atmosphere, which cast a blight on every case of illegitimacy as an 'irrevocable disaster.'

The first reform, then, would lie in a change of hearts

[1] *Eugenics Review*, January, 1918, p. 303.
[2] Kammerer, *The Unmarried Mother*, p. 13.
[3] See the Author's "The Discovery of the Fittest," *Westminster Review*, January, 1911.

towards illegitimacy. It must be looked upon as an 'accident' rather than a 'sin.' Succour must be given to the mother and her child, now so ill-protected by law and custom. It is gratifying to be able to report that a vigorous movement has set in in this direction. At present the only claim the mother has against the father of her child is an allowance of ten* shillings per week up to the child's sixteenth year, quite irrespective of the father's income. No order for payment can be made until after the birth of the child; paternity claims against the father have to be established (within twelve months of the child's birth) personally by the mother in open court. Though, according to law, the mother is the sole parent of her illegitimate child (the father not being held responsible except as regards the weekly alimony), and is personally liable for its support, she cannot appoint testamentary guardians for it in case of her death (the court may, however, take her wishes into consideration). Nor, if she die intestate, does her own illegitimate child inherit her property. It goes without saying, of course, that the child is excluded from the inheritance of its father under the same conditions.† "England is the only country in Christendom, or even in Islam, that persists in refusing to legitimate the child born out of wedlock by the subsequent marriage of the parents."[1] And to add to the hardship, the child cannot be fully and legally adopted by strangers either; for "there is at present no method by which a person may take a stranger into his family and give him the title and privileges and

* This is the allowance since the Great War, which equals the pre-war allowance of five shillings (!).

† If the parent, however, leave a gift to his illegitimate child, or if one illegitimate child leaves anything to its illegitimate brother or sister, a duty of 10 per cent. is payable to the Inland Revenue authorities (!).

[1] Report of the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and her Child, p. 5.

rights of the child, and by which he may be charged with the correlative duties which should thereby be assumed."[1] And finally, as if to add insult to injury, the English law decrees that an unmarried mother, if unable to support her child, should never be given out-relief, but must be forced to go into the workhouse with her child.[2] This is a terrible list of disabilities, which might satisfy the most hardened medieval moralist wishing to establish an example of wickedness and therewith setting to work to perpetuate it. It is entirely out of accord with the modern spirit of enlightened tolerance. Indeed, a counter-current has already set in that is destined to sweep away all such legal relics, which, being punitive in principle, are a disgrace to humanity and in their severity achieve less than nothing. They simply take away from the unmarried mother and her child the only chance of remaining, in spite of her slip, respectable members of society, social assets, instead of a focus of vice and crime.

To inaugurate the new era, a number of reforms are necessary, which by strengthening the legal claim of the mother against the father of her illegitimate child will at the same time better her economic position whilst removing, as far as possible, the disadvantages of bastardy from the child itself. Whatever may be said about the sin of the mother (if we are intent on forgetting the sin of the father), the child in any case is innocent. Why should it be punished for the wrong committed by the parents? The aim, then, is to make provision alike for mother and child immediately by creating special centres

[1] Report of the National Council for the Unmarried Mother, p. 5.

[2] See Mrs. H. M. Swanwick, *Some Points of English Law affecting Working Women as Wives and Mothers*, Women's Co-operative Guild. London, 1914.—J. W. F. Jacques, *Woman and the Unfair Position which they Occupy at the Present Time*, National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies. London, 191 .

where both can be taken care of as long as necessary (maternity homes, day nurseries, hostels, etc.); and ultimately by so changing the law as to make the father equally responsible with the mother for the proper upbringing of the child. We cannot here do better than enumerate the legal reforms proposed by the National Council for the Unmarried Mother and her Child (founded in 1918):

1. That the law of affiliation should be altered by offering additional facilities to expectant mothers, both to enable them to make known their condition in the proper quarters, and to take paternity proceedings, and also by relieving them from all costs of any such proceedings.

2. That provision be made for enabling a magistrate, on application by an expectant mother, to summon the parties before the birth of the child, and to hear the case *in camera*, and where paternity is admitted to make a final order.

3. That where an affiliation order has been made payment of the weekly amount awarded be made to run from the date of the child's birth in all cases, and at the discretion of the magistrate from a period prior thereto, not exceeding two months. It shall be the duty of the State itself to institute proceedings for the enforcement of such payments as if they were a State debt, and without charge to the mother. Failing enforcement of payment by fathers, adequate provision shall be made by the State before and after birth for the children of such necessitous mothers.

4. That the present limit of ten shillings a week under an affiliation order be abolished and the amount granted be in proportion to the circumstances of both parents.

5. That adoption, with proper legal safeguards, be instituted.

6. That the subsequent marriage of the mother and father of the child shall legitimate the child.

7. That if any illegitimate intestate die without spouse or issue, the inheritance shall descend to or through his mother or brothers or sisters as if they were legitimate, and that if a man or woman die leaving an illegitimate child, the inheritance shall descend to him as if he were legitimate.[1]

It is essential to note that the responsibility of the father should begin *before* the birth of the child and should cover expenses incident to confinement, etc. This is already done in the State of Oregon. Further, in case of default of the father—" and it has been stated on good authority that not five per cent. of the unmarried mothers get any payment from the father and that of those very few indeed get the full amount "[2]—it is imperative that the State should institute proceedings for the enforcement of the alimony without any cost to the mother, who is generally necessitous and without the means of doing so. A step in the right direction has already been made during the war, the State giving separation allowances to all mothers and children, whether the parents were married or not, provided they could be proved to have lived together. Such a provision goes far towards recognizing the principle of responsible fatherhood in illegitimacy. Legitimation of the child by subsequent marriage of the parents is already established as law in West Australia, New South Wales, Germany, Switzerland, and other countries. But the most far-reaching reforms in this direction have been carried through in Norway. Here the new law of 1915 decrees that the illegitimate child has the right to its father's

[1] Report of the National Council for the Unmarried Mother, pp. 3 and 4.

[2] H. M. Swanwick, *Some Points of English Law affecting Working Women as Wives and Mothers*, p. 29.

name and thus belongs to the father's family as well as the mother's. The establishment of paternity is compulsory, in direct contrast to the Code Napoléon, which declares: *La recherche de la paternité est interdite.* Nor does the *exceptio plurium concubantium* (exception in case of many cohabitants) hold good. If more than one man is involved in the case (promiscuity on the side of the mother) each participant has to share in the alimony; (under such circumstances, however, the child keeps its mother's name, nor is it allowed to inherit).[1] It is this last regulation that is perhaps the best safeguard against the seduction of young girls by unscrupulous men. Only the knowledge that they will be made to pay—whether there are other associates or not—will put the bridle upon a certain type of untamed Don Juan.

There is one reform with regard to illegitimacy which affects the whole problem of motherhood. It is the provision, carried out already in Norway, that if the father of the illegitimate child is not found, the State shall undertake the maintenance of the child of the necessitous mother. This is a far-reaching proposition. It involves nothing less than the recognition of the child's right to State protection, being, in fact, a sort of State endowment for illegitimate children. As we shall deal with the subject of the endowment of motherhood in full in a later chapter, we just take cognizance here of the point, leading up as it does to much wider issues in the problem of illegitimacy. In fact, leaving aside palliatives now and coming to radical proposals, we find that there are two possible modes of dealing with unwedded love, both of which have found their advocates. The one way is to undercut, as it were, illegitimacy by encouraging and facilitating early marriage; the other is frankly to recog-

[1] See *Jus Suffragii*, August 1, 1916, pp. 160 and 161.—Kammerer, *The Unmarried Mother*, p. 281.

nize illegitimate unions, devising means for rendering them socially serviceable by putting them on a healthy moral basis. We shall first deal with the proposal of early marriage as a remedy against illegitimacy.

It has ever been the wont of a certain section of reformers to make late marriage responsible for all the sexual ills of the present day. They have the implicit belief that, if marriage could only be arranged early enough, if everybody could be brought into the fold of matrimony before sexual passion has its chance of corruption, purity would be attained and morality be saved withal. The one panacea for all the sins of the flesh, according to the recipe of such people, is early marriage. Now there seems to be some truth in their contention. It is a fact that the sex problem is very much simplified in all those communities where marriage takes place soon after puberty. The question of sex satisfaction for the unmarried here hardly ever arises; though, as we have seen in a previous chapter, even under such conditions pretermarital sex relations are by no means always excluded. Accordingly, it is held that in modern society also early marriage would counteract the tendency to illicit sex relationship. But unfortunately this does not fulfil what it seems to promise.

In the first instance, it assumes that early marriage is possible or can be made possible in modern society. Now, if anything is evident it is the fact that the age of marriage has a constant tendency to rise in all civilized countries. With the growth of industrialization, with the advent of education and the training of the masses, the time of youth tends to be prolonged more and more, and there is no likelihood of the age of marriage ever returning to its primitive level. Furthermore, our mental outlook has become too extended to view with favour marriages contracted at the very threshold of sexual maturity. This

appears to an enlightened world as much waste as it used to be physical waste when children were sent to do work which was only fit for grown-up people. We place too high a standard nowadays upon the moral and spiritual responsibilities of parents to think that mere youths can fulfil parental duties efficiently for the good of their children. Besides this, the cares and worries of married life prevent young parents from acquiring that store of knowledge, worldly wisdom, and even temperament, which becomes the greatest asset to their children in after-years. "Premature marriages," says Ellen Key, "whether lawful or unlawful in form, may arrest in their growth countless excellent forces, and ruin the full possibilities of happiness in later years."[1] Furthermore, even on individual grounds, early marriage often turns out anything but fortunate for the young couple. "Love is blind," says the proverb, and young love doubly so. It is a commonplace observation that early love is often mistaken in its passion and therefore does wisely to wait. This is also borne out by the fact mentioned by Havelock Ellis that in England the percentage of divorces in early marriages (where the women are under twenty-one at marriage) is disproportionately high.[2] Also, according to the same authority, "early marriages lead to prostitution in innumerable cases, even when no outward separation takes place."[3] This is due to the fact that the poorest, the most irresponsible, marry first, the very people who, on the whole, are lacking in a feeling of moral obligation.

But is early marriage really the remedy it is supposed to be? Will it have the result expected? Kammerer found that the maximum of illegitimate births occurs with women between the ages from sixteen to twenty

[1] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 116.
[2] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 379.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 378.

years, and drops after that considerably.[1] The relative age of the men, according to him, ranges from the same age to an average of five years more. To obviate the incidence of illegitimacy, then, it would be necessary to put the marriage age still somewhat lower, or at least as low as sixteen for girls and twenty to twenty-five for men. Now it is agreed on all sides that the best age for marriage for women is about twenty-one, for men about twenty-five;[2] it follows that, unless marriage is entered upon immediately at that age or even earlier illegitimacy cannot be prevented. This shows clearly, that early marriage by itself is not an alternative to illicit unions, unless we are actually prepared to encourage marriage at an age that is inadvisable on social grounds. Another point is this: though the poorest of the population generally marry earliest, it is precisely among them that free unions prevail most. In short, early marriage and illegitimacy by no means exclude each other. This is also corroborated by an observation of Dr. Grünspan, who found that in Berlin, though the age of marriage in a certain period had actually declined, illegitimacy nevertheless showed an increase.[3]

And now, assuming we have early marriage, what then? Is it supposed that all is well in wedland once the register has been signed? We have already had occasion to quote evidence showing that early marriages are frequently foredoomed to disaster. If people are to be encouraged to make an early choice, to bind themselves at an age when neither experience nor prudence can teach them, surely the means ought to be given to them to correct their mistake, if mistake they have made.

[1] Kammerer, *The Unmarried Mother*, p. 305.

[2] See H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 633.—Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 117.—Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. iii., p. 191.

[3] Dr. Grünspan in *Neue Generation*, July, 1911, p. 299.

In other words, as Ellen Key, an ardent advocate of early marriage, declares: "The consequence of early marriage must be free divorce."[1] But this is just what those who advise early marriage as a moral mend-all are least willing to concede. To them it would be like driving out Baal by Beelzebub. And still another argument! Do we really get any further in the moralization of marriage by merely putting a formal seal upon it? Does licence truly become less licentious because an official, either secular or religious, declares the union legal? Where improvidence or hasty passion has dictated the act, the mere legalization of such a union cannot alter its moral content. What was a 'disgrace' outside marriage cannot be converted into an ethical bond by an added formality. Whatever we may think about the value of the marriage ceremony—and for many it has a true inward meaning—for those who are led into marriage by passion this inward meaning is lost.

As a matter of fact, looking at illegitimate unions from this point of view, we ought to distinguish between the sexual act as such and the incidental (generally unwilled) result. The former may be moral or immoral according to the condition of the spiritual situation, but its moral value does not depend upon the external formality of marriage. As Mrs. Havelock Ellis says: "Love ever lives above legalities."[2] The love act in itself, being a personal affair between two people, can only be judged according to spiritual standards. It is quite otherwise with the resulting issue. Here we are in the presence of a new bit of humanity, a living being that claims its full share of care and attention, and that is entitled to the goods of this world, physical, intellectual, and moral. It therefore involves a great responsibility. It

[1] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 312.
[2] Mrs. Havelock Ellis, "The New Horizon," *MS. Essays.*

is just in this respect that illegitimacy through force of circumstances fails so utterly; for it is only in rare cases that the children of such unions will find the adequate conditions for a healthy and good life. But it must be pointed out that an improvident marriage appears to us just as imprudent and unwarrantable as an illicit union. Both stand condemned by their infringement of the moral law of obligation towards the future generation. To think that the ethical sex code is fulfilled by rushing an offending young couple into matrimony is surely forgetting the spirit over the letter. What is needed is the teaching of restraint in love outside and inside marriage, a proper feeling of responsibility towards society in the procreation and rearing of progeny. A hasty marriage should be considered as ill-advised and wicked as an immoral love union. The standard should be, not what formality the partners are willing to undergo, but what duties they are ready for, and capable of undertaking.

This brings us to the second great proposal for the cure of illegitimacy. It intends to cut the knot of the problem of illegitimacy simply by abolishing the distinction between legitimacy and illegitimacy altogether. Ellen Key, the most famous protagonist of this movement, would go back with her thoroughgoing reform to the old system of the matriarchate, instituting once more the precedence of mother-right over father-right.* Love being the sole arbiter of sex relationship, every union is to be considered ethical which fulfils this prime condition. "They who love each other are husband and wife." The second requisite of true marriage lies in the feeling of responsibility towards the ensuing offspring. Wherever there is the possibility of a healthy

* Ellen Key's chief books on this subject are: *Love and Marriage, The Century of the Child,* and *The Woman's Movement.*

issue, there exists not only the right but the duty to consummate the union so that the State may reap the full benefit of such a love union. "It is right that they [the two lovers] should come together, even though it may not be possible for their pure desire of common life and common work to take the form of marriage."[1] According to her, "the ideal form of marriage is the perfectly free union of a man and a woman who through mutual love desire to promote the happiness of each other and the race."[2] On the other hand, she declares immoral all parentage without love; all irresponsible parentage; all parentage of immature or degenerate persons; all voluntary sterility of married people fitted for the mission of the race; and, finally, all such manifestations of sexual life as involve violence or seduction, and entail unwillingness or incapacity to fulfil the mission of the race."[3] Seduction may here be defined fittingly with Elsie Clews Parsons as "any deception in courtship by either woman or man as to what she or he would take from or give to the other."[4] Indeed, Ellen Key's canon of sex ethics is largely subscribed to by Elsie Clews Parsons, who would alter the aspect of illegitimacy in a similar manner by abolishing altogether the idea of illegitimate children. "Illegitimacy," she says, "will refer to parents only, not to offspring, and to parents in so far as they shirk their responsibilities both to their offspring and to the State."[5] As regards motherhood, it is to be free, but "a free motherhood dependent upon responsible motherhood."[6]

Mother-right represents the extreme left of a new

[1] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 127.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 359.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 155.
[4] Elsie Clews Parsons, "When Mating and Parenthood are Theoretically Distinguished," *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1916, p. 209.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 212.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 213.

movement in sex ethics, which has found expression in more or less modified proposals of a similar kind. We, for our part, do not hesitate to reject full mother-right for two reasons: In the first instance, it is contrary to the modern spirit of the realization of fatherhood. By fatherhood we do not mean the old idea of *patria potestas*, according to which fatherhood is looked upon as a natural fact of supremacy, expressed in the legal and social proprietorship of the husband over wife and children; but we mean the recognition of spiritual fatherhood, the acknowledgment of a psychic bond (in addition to the physical) between the father and his family, a reciprocal relationship which finds its appropriate expression in the form of union that can only be bi-parental in the full meaning of the word. The second objection, which flows from the first, lies in the following: free motherhood in the sense of a matriarchate would tend to obfuscate the significance of the complete family union between father, mother, and offspring, and would thus fail to distinguish it from those unions which, embracing mother and child only, are in reality concubinates (in the modern sense). Such free unions have been advocated by many sex reformers as a necessary modification of the present-day monogamic order. Before deciding, however, on the merit of such proposals, and apprising their proper place and value in the scheme of marital relationship, we must find a definite standard alike as regards marriage itself and its relation to erotism.

We have already given it as our opinion that a marriage union is perfect only when it comprises the complete family—namely, father, mother, and children. And we must now further point out that such a family can realize its full life only when united in one home. Only thus does there exist the possibility for the partners to cement their pristine love, to rejuvenate it constantly

by the ever-replenished stream of jointly-experienced thoughts and emotions, and to give of their happiness and spiritual riches to the children of their love. But such a destiny cannot find its fulfilment except in a truly monogamous union, where husband and wife, in the unity of their common life, based upon the fundament of true love, form, as it were, a radiating centre from which goes out new life and a new force. The highest ideal of married life must ever be this social cell of the compact family, a source of strength and power to the race and society. Furthermore, if it is to fulfil its function, it must be lasting; it must run the gamut of life's phases so as to keep up the continuity in the cycle of existence and make marriage truly what it ought to be, the handing on of life's torch from generation to generation. To modify a saying of Nietzsche: "Not the intensity, but the duration of the emotion makes a marriage great."

A monogamy to deserve this exceptional position must be a real monogamy, not a monogamy merely in form and based upon a formality, but a true inward bond between two partners, two abiding lovers. This presupposes a new conception of love in marriage. "Our sexual morality," says Havelock Ellis, "is in reality a bastard born of the union of property-morality with primitive ascetic morality."[1] From both these sides it has invaded our married life, drawing into it a sense of ownership and propriety which is the death to all true passion. We hear still too much of the "spiritual woman—the woman who is 'too good' for an ordinary husband"[2]; and, on the other hand, there are too many husbands who in their ignorance overlook their wives' yearnings, and consequently are tempted to seek the path of pleasure

[1] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 375.
[2] May Sinclair, *The Helpmate*.

outside married life. If we are to have monogamy, let it be a monogamy that allows free development to the senses, to the emotions, and to the mind of man and woman alike, a monogamy which is a garden of freedom and not a prison-house.

But such a monogamy has still to be created. It is too readily taken for granted that, because we have legal monogamy, therefore we have the best form of marriage. It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that "it is not monogamy that is the main thing, but the kind of lives people lead in monogamy."[1] And, after all, who would be so bold as to assert that monogamy, real monogamy, a monogamy in fact as well as in name, has ever existed as an integral part of society? What we have had so far has been a marriage system that aped monogamy by its formal correctness and mocked its spirit by its inward barrenness or outward licence. To maintain monogamy, at least in appearance, it has had to be liberally tempered, either by gifts or by fasts; "to keep it safe, prostitution and exclusiveness must be its administering friends."[2] And what is the reason? We have presumed to dictate to Nature where Nature should have taught us. Basing our code of sexuality upon an old-fashioned preconceived standard, we have made monogamy, in the words of Forel, "a sort of straight-jacket for humanity." Says H. G. Wells: "Modern conditions and modern ideas, and in particular the intenser and subtler perceptions of modern life, press more and more heavily upon a marriage tie whose fashion comes from an earlier and less discriminating time."[3]

In fact, whilst keeping true monogamy as our ideal, our beacon of married life, we must not hesitate to

[1] Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 426.
[2] Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *James Hinton*, p. 139.
[3] H. G. Wells, *The New Macchiavelli.*

readjust it in the light of new knowledge. Though holding to the principle itself, we have to make it fit in with modern requirements—requirements that seem never to have changed appreciably throughout the ages, and which only a perverted idea of Nature could persistently try to overlook. The question is: Though the single great love be the ideal, is the exclusiveness foisted upon it as a right and duty truly so commendable as some people would have us believe? In truth, has single love ever been the rule for man, and is it conformable to his intrinsic nature?

We have already shown in a previous chapter that sex relations are by no means so simple as the clear-cut dogmatism of Christian sex ethics would have it. We have repeatedly had occasion to point out that man, the male, has by no means conformed to such arbitrary rule; that, whilst showing external subservience, he has always managed to follow his own sexual bent. This has produced the seemingly insoluble enigma of the sex problem. And the matter becomes still more complex when we consider that this bent of his does not even halt at marriage. "Monogamy," says Professor Thomas, "does not, as a rule, answer to the condition of highest stimulation, since here the problematical and elusive elements disappear to some extent. This explains the fact that married men and women frequently become interested in others than their partners in matrimony."[1] In fact, the desire for variety in sex experience, the polygamous instinct, as it has been called, is admitted on all sides as an elemental factor of man's sexual impulse (see *ante*). Here we have to enquire more closely into this tendency, in order to see whether we can find a rationale for it and place it in the scheme of sexual ethics. We can do this best by referring back to our diagram

[1] Thomas, *Sex and Society*, p. 194.

of sex attraction (Fig. 8, a slightly more complex statement of Fig. 7).

We have seen that there exists a hierarchy of sex relations according to the intensity of the sexual attraction. We have supposed that the number of reactions between two persons making up the reaction complex (in Moll's terminology) determines the kind of attraction towards each other that they will experience, and we have found that different kinds of sex attraction are possible



FIG. 8.

according to the active number of reactions. We can now turn the matter round and assert conversely that a person *A* can be attracted to a number of individuals, the attraction varying in degree according to the intensity of the reaction complex shared by him (or her) and each individual respectively; that is, *A* is capable of being sexually attracted to a number of people in varying degrees and at the same time. But we can now go a step farther. We assumed that the attraction in real love is a total attraction, though it was pointed out at the time that in

practice this will hardly ever be the case. It may be assumed that, generally, a certain approximation to the total reaction is sufficient for the purpose of love. The rule seems to be that love is due to a certain maximum of attraction which does not necessarily involve the whole of the reaction complex. Indeed, we may take it that in the majority of cases a given sum of reactions out of the total reaction complex is sufficient to induce love, and that this sum is not necessarily always made up in the same way. In short, out of a given total reaction complex for a certain individual more than one combination of reactions is possible as leading to love. To make things clearer, we revert once more to our diagram (Fig. 8). If we assume (as before) that A is attracted to aa_1, containing the total reaction complex conforming to A, A will also be attracted to aa_2 and a_1a_3, who exhibit only a part of the reaction complex, though a large percentage of it. (It must be a large percentage of the total reaction complex —say, anything from 75 per cent. upwards—that leads to love; for a fall of the percentage will only allow for erotic attraction.) It can be said that A would be able to be in love simultaneously with aa_1, aa_2, and a_1a_3. This explains why a person is so often seen hesitating between two attractions affecting him (or her) equally strongly, though the favourites in question may by no means appear to be alike. Indeed, there would be little chance of true love-mating if there were not at least some margin of choice as regards suitable mates in the world. The romantic notion of only one possible mate for each person has no foundation in fact. We have already mentioned that A is also able to be attracted at the same time in minor degrees towards other individuals of different reaction complexes (bb_1 and cc_1), with whom he (or she) can share feelings of erotic and platonic friendship respectively.

It will be said that these are mere theoretical considerations. True, but they go far to explain a phenomenon that is only too commonly observed in man: his desire for change and his capacity for harbouring more than one tender affection in his soul. And though woman's love is more single-hearted and steadfast on the whole, we should not be surprised to find some day, when the whole truth will be known, that she too obeys the same law, though perhaps in a lesser degree.* We come, then, to the conclusion that variety of sex attraction is the rule rather than the exception. The desire for change is inherent in man, and to a certain extent most probably in woman also. All the vagaries of love, denounced so vehemently by certain good people, and yet ever striving for expression, find their natural explanation in the law of sexual attraction.

It would be wrong to conclude from the above considerations that we are heading straight for promiscuity or some other such rough-and-ready way out of the sexual quagmire. Nothing is easier than to devise short cuts for the cure of social ills; the misfortune is that they generally do not work out in reality—for society is nothing if not complex. Monogamy in the simple puritanical form does not work either. It has ever been monogamy for woman, relieved by licence for man. This has to be altered. A way out has to be found— a *via media*, allowing for a realization of the highest ideal of marriage, and yet taking cognizance of human sexual needs.

In truth, the facts of sex attraction as given above are

* It is only of late that the subject of simultaneous affection for two persons "without mutual exclusiveness" has been taken up as a deliberate theme in literature. See H. G. Wells, *The Passionate Friends;* John Galsworthy, *Beyond ;* May Sinclair, *The Helpmate ;* and especially the drama of James Joyce, *Exiles.* In making these remarks we do not, of course, refer here to the old well-worn triangular situation and its obvious complications.

still not complete—they are too crude, and do not represent the whole of the case. The desire for change or variety in man is generally described as a polygamous instinct. Havelock Ellis, with his usual penetrative insight, has already pointed out that such a general statement can by no means be accepted. Hirschfeld modifies the statement by declaring that "the sex impulse is polygamous, love is monogamous."[1] But we must take exception even to this definition. Sexual lust, however promiscuous, does not lead, and is not intended to lead, up to marriage in any accepted sense of the term; and in so far as it does not produce polygamy, it cannot be said to be polygamous. Havelock Ellis is much nearer the truth when he declares that "man is an instinctively monogamous animal with a concomitant desire for variation."[2] The distinction is vital. In our society, with our highly evolved sensibilities, there are few men indeed who would be willing to share their lot, their material goods and their ideals, with more than one companion for life. Most men, in spite of their sexuality, have enough idealism left to crave for true companionship in marriage; and they fully realize that this cannot be had with a multiplicity of wives. As for women, we hardly need to point out how thoroughly they are imbued with the feeling for family. Indeed, as Heape points out: "While sexual passion and sex gratification are of far more account to the male, the idea of the family is in its turn essentially a female sentiment."[3] And the view of Professor Thomas is similar. "Monogamy," he says, "is a habit acquired by the race, not because it has answered more completely to the organic interest of the individual, but because it has more completely served social needs, particularly by assuring to the woman and her children the undivided

[1] M. Hirschfeld, *Vom Wesen der Liebe*, p. 138.
[2] Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 495.
[3] W. Heape, *Sex Antagonism*, p. 49.

interest and providence of man."[1] This is the reason why all proposals for a reinstatement of polygamy as a means of solving the present-day sex problem are futile. The idea of the old patriarchal home is dead as a doornail. If some men from the height of their wisdom think that it can be revived, they only show how little they have cast off the old Adam. They forget woman, the other partner to the bargain, who will never submit again with any amount of humouring to conditions that at all resemble the old patriarchate. Does any man really believe that women will in future consent to marry—to be secondary wives, as it were—just for the sake of a provision ?* And what of reciprocal love and affection ? Is it believed that the sense of mutuality and spiritual relationship can be preserved in a home divided between a number of families ?

All this would seem to contradict our previous contention about the possibility of multiple love. We have pointed out (by aid of the diagram, Fig. 8) that a person is capable of loving in the full sense more than one individual, apart from the possibility of simultaneous lesser attachments. Here we should like to add that in practice the problem becomes much simplified. We must distinguish love feeling from the marriage sentiment; though the latter is based on the former, both are not identical. Once the heart is truly taken, all other attractions fade in comparison. Though the capacity for love be great, the marriage bond, fastened on to true love, so strengthens and holds it that single-heartedness in marriage becomes the rule rather than the exception. This does not imply

[1] W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, p. 193.

* Even in Turkey, the modern home of polygamy, a movement has set in towards monogamy. A new law provides that "at the time of contracting the marriage the wife can lay down the condition that in case the husband should wish to form another marriage, the first or second marriage, as the case may be, will *ipso facto* be annulled" (*Manchester Guardian*, February 7, 1918).

that marriage will, or even should, as a rule, extinguish all other sex attractions. In fact, they will play their part in the game of life in spite of all we may say against it; only it must be understood that by the side of the one great love they can only play minor rôles. Indeed, what were great attachments before marriage lose in importance, once the supreme choice is made, and sink down to the relative level of erotic attraction (according to our scale). They make, as we have seen, quite a different appeal to the emotions, and can never take the place of married love. Indeed, if they do, if they usurp its place at all, it only proves a mistaken first choice. To sum up the subject, we can tersely express the above-quoted distinction made by Havelock Ellis by saying: man is monogamous, but poly-erotic. And we have to take the consequences accordingly.

The first lesson to learn is that mating and parenthood have in theory to be sharply distinguished from each other. "Sexual union, for a woman as much as for a man, is a physiological fact; it may also be a spiritual fact; but it is not a social act."[1] Conventional sex ethics, under plea of guarding virtue, has taken upon itself to order the sex life of the people with an iron rule, and has in its vain efforts at purity only managed to cloak vice. By confusing love with marriage it has rigorously set itself against the former, sanctioning everything in marriage as if it were love, and decrying all other sex relationships as if they were, as if they must be, sinful, little realizing that "love brings its own sanctity with it."[2] In matters of love there is no arbiter. Love, being a personal affair, must not and cannot but be free like all things spiritual. It is only when mating leads to parenthood, when wider interests are touched by the

[1] Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 417.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

advent of children, that society has a right to concern itself with the regulation of the union. When this is once properly understood, says Ellen Key, "the flowering as well as the budding of love will be a secret between the lovers, and only its fruit will be a matter between them and society."[1] Elsie Clews Parsons, who combines a wide vision with a true woman's heart, sees farther still, when "instead of a marriage registry and a divorce court we may have a parents' registry and a parents' court; instead of a marriage certificate, a parents' certificate (already in embryo in the eugenic certificate): instead of matrimonial property laws, parent contract law."[2]

The second lesson borne upon us is the acknowledgment of the right to love for woman as well as for man. Conventional morality, laying a ban on all sex expression outside marriage, preaching abstinence as a self-understood virtue wherever marriage is impossible, takes little cognizance of "the griefs endured by thousands of girls and women"—now going into hundreds of thousands—"in the drying up of the well-springs of affection as well as in the crucifixion of their physical needs."[3] With a high and lofty standard of self-denial those who are least called upon to practise it can well afford to disregard the claim of Nature in others, remaining dull to the sight of the "too many dead souls lying, so to speak, at the foot of high unscaleable places."[4] And what about the woman who, though endowed with an ardent, emotional soul, still does not feel the call to be somebody else's wife and child-bearer? This inaptitude in some people for married life is taken for granted as a matter of course in man. While it is true that women, on the whole, are

[1] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 129.
[2] Elsie Clews Parsons, "Marriage and Parenthood—a Distinction," *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1915, p. 515.
[3] Edward Carpenter, *My Days and Dreams*, p. 98.
[4] Joseph Conrad, *Chance*.

perhaps more specialized for the function of love in life, it does not follow that the " teleological differentiation " between man and woman (to use Rosa Mayreder's term) is necessarily complete. It is a fact which has become established in the course of the modern development of girls' education, that there are many women who, gifted with feminine love, are certainly not inclined to undertake the duties of housekeeping and nursing. Eschewing the routine of the household in their zeal for other social work, they are willing to fall out of life's progression and forgo the joys of married life. Still, they rightly object to being altogether deprived for this reason of the expression of their natural promptings. Such personalities—and they are not infrequent nowadays—may be exceptional; they do not, however, by this fact lose the right to love. The road to life should be open to all, except lunatics and criminals. The benefits accruing are double—society gains as well as the individual. If, as Ernest Jones declares, " there seems to be an unavoidable incompatibility between the demands of civilization and the possibility of complete development of sexual capacity,"[1] so much the worse for a civilization that has not the courage to face the problem. Says Ellen Key: " All preaching of morality to youth which does not at the same time condemn the state of society that favours immorality, but makes the realization of youthful love an impossibility, is more than stupid, it is a crime ";[2] for " human life to be in the fullest sense healthy and rich must imply fulfilment of the sexual destiny."[3] And this fundamental rule cannot be simply brushed aside by a sanctimonious propaganda against the immorality and vice of the present age, by goodly advice given to young

[1] Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, second edition, p. 563. London, 1918.

[2] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 139. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 187.

women "to mind other people's babies," and other such palliative injunctions. For it must be understood: the mother instinct may be part, perhaps the greater part, of a woman's desire for love, yet love's consummation leads through the gateway of sex—and sex, as we have seen, is the driving force in woman as well as in man; though it may act in a different way, though it may aim at a different end. We cannot have the fruit without the flower—not even in woman. "Sexual equivalents" may be a substitute in many cases; they cannot, however, absolve society from the duty of providing a moral outlet for forces which, being at the base of all life, sustain and create it. Says H. G. Wells: "A people that will not valiantly face and understand and admit love and passion can understand nothing whatever."[1]

This leads us to the third lesson. The right to love does not cease with marriage—cannot, in view of our physiological facts, possibly cease with marriage. What we mean by love here is not that selfish, self-centred passion, that *égoïsme à deux*, which, shutting itself out from the world, only lives upon itself and for itself; that love "which in most minds is only another word for greed."[2] This is the sentiment fostered by the plea for so-called purity, a purity which can only be conceived as a flower frozen to death in the chilly atmosphere of formal rectitude. Sexual correctness of such a kind is, after all, merely based upon the man's proprietorship of woman—a proprietorship which, submitted to by woman herself, has recoiled upon man and now threatens to strangle both, man and woman, by "the heavy fetters of their love." Such a condition is far from fulfilling love's deepest law—freedom for the soul's development. Marriage under such circumstances savours more of the

[1] H. G. Wells, *The New Macchiavelli*.
[2] James Hinton, quoted by Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *Three Seers*, p. 83.

prison-house, with its narrow perambulating courtyard, than of the garden of life, with its vistas of intellectual and emotional experiences. "Even in a supremely happy marriage," says Dr. Marie Stopes, "which touches, as does the mystic in his raptures, a realization of the whole universe; there cannot lie the *whole* of life's experience. Outside the actual lives of the pair there must always be many types of thought and many potentialities which can only be realized in the lives of other people."[1] Self-seeking is deemed a most reprehensible moral fault; it does not become less so because it is practised by two together. "Jealousy in love is always a fear of selfishness,"[2] when it is not, as Forel remarks, "a brutal folly." A folly it is, for it poisons the very air around love, which cannot live without the breath of freedom. It undermines the very rootlets of affection, which, sown in passion, thrive only in the genial atmosphere of mutual confidence and trust. It overlooks the natural riches of affection existing in the sexual sphere also, and would well-nigh throttle every emotion that does not directly serve its selfish end. As H. G. Wells says: "The ordinary civilized woman and civilized man are alike obsessed with the idea of meeting and possessing one peculiar intimate person, one special exclusive lover who is their very own; and a third person of either sex cannot be associated with that couple without an intolerable sense of privacy and confidence and possession destroyed. But if there are people so exceptionally constituted as not to feel in this way, I do not see what right we have to force conformity to our feelings upon them."[3] And again: "Humanity has yet to find its methods in sexual things; it has to discover the use and limitations of jealousy, and before it can

[1] Dr. Marie Stopes, *Married Love*, p. 96.
[2] Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *James Hinton*, p. 143.
[3] H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*, II. ed. 1917, p. 206.

even begin to attempt to find it, it has to cease its present timid secret groping in shame and darkness and turn on the lights of knowledge."[1] "Monogamy," Hinton declares, "is a beautiful thing; but when it puts a bar between men and women, it requires to be taken from its rigid form and allowed to flow into a more fluid one."[2] Such a monogamy is a monogamy in form, it is true, but a monogamy barren, lifeless, and loveless. For to quote James Hinton once more: "If you make right a rigid thing, a rigid thing in man's life is precisely as a dead thing in a living body."[3] Our deepest question then remains: "How far this jealous greed (of man for woman and woman for man) may be subdued to a more generous passion."[4]

And now to the last and supreme lesson, subsuming all the rest. We have seen that there has arisen in the course of sexual evolution a discrepancy between marriage as instituted by society and the sex impulse, especially in its poly-erotic aspect. While the former has established itself in accordance with the needs of family life upon a progressively stricter basis, ending in monogamy as we have it at the present day, the latter, in opposition to it, has ever tended to break through this imposed restraint. Primitive sexual ethics knew of no such antagonism. If the sex question is ever to be solved in a satisfactory manner, equilibrium must once more be restored between the requirements of the race and the individual. It goes without saying that we cannot go back to the early times of promiscuity and its unstable family relationship. Gabriele Reuter clinches the truth when she declares that "in all probability the child and the growing importance of the offspring will be the regulator

[1] H. G. Wells, *The Passionate Friends.*
[2] Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *James Hinton*, p. 139.
[3] Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *Three Seers*, p. 62.
[4] H. G. Wells, *The Passionate Friends.*

of all future changes in marriage."[1] To that extent "woman's individual freedom is limited by the rights of the potential child."[2] But in admitting so much we must not go to the other extreme and forget the claim of the individual altogether. As Bertrand Russell says: "Traditional morality has erred by laying stress on what ought not to happen rather than on what ought to happen. What is important is that men and women should find, sooner or later, the best relation of which their natures are capable."[3]

It must once for all be realized that the supreme test of sex relationship does not lie in its formal virtue, but in its spiritual truth. This alone ought to decide our judgment—the inward purity, not the outward formality. "It is the restraint in the heart and not the external law that matters."[4] Truly this implies a new vision of sex purity inside and outside marriage. At present chastity is taken as equivalent to physical abstinence, with the distinction, as Björnson so pointedly expresses it, that "a woman owes a man both her past and her future; a man owes a woman only his future."[5] According to the new sex ethics, responsibility and reciprocity in sex relationship, "the receiving and the giving of personality," is the keystone of true sex morality. And this applies not less to marital relationship. Says Havelock Ellis: "It is not the legal or religious formality which sanctifies marriage; it is the reality of the marriage which sanctifies the form."[6] The standard

[1] G. Reuter, *Das Problem der Ehe*, p. 28.

[2] Ellen Key, *The Century of the Child*, p. 76. London, 1909.

[3] Bertrand Russell, "Marriage and the Population Question," *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1916, p. 460; reprinted in *Principles of Social Reconstruction* (London, 1916).

[4] James Hinton, quoted in Mrs. Havelock Ellis's *Three Modern Seers*, p. 77.

[5] Björnson, *The Gauntlet*.

[6] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 427.

of marriage should be not so much its outward expression, but rather the feeling of trust and moral obligation. "Requirements in mating vary, and should be variously met."[1] The enforcement of routine conformity in sex matters is as little productive of good as the one-time insistence on religious orthodoxy. People who would nowadays feel an abhorrence against constraining anybody's religious conscience because it does not tally with their own kind of belief do not hesitate to condemn utterly any mode of love experience as *eo ipso* immoral, simply because it does not conform to their own adopted standard.

"The limitations of love created by law have been fatal to the happiness and goodness of man."[2] This was the view of Blake, the poet and seer, more than a hundred years ago; and his cry has still not found the right answer. What we need is liberty of sex conscience, allowing free play to the complex sexual sensibilities of modern men and women. The moral law may be fulfilled in more ways than one. Variety of love, we have seen, corresponds to the psychic law of sex. "It is probably through this fact of the variety of love," says Edward Carpenter, "that it does remain possible, in some cases, for married people to have intimacies with outsiders, and yet to continue perfectly true to each other; in rare instances for triune and other such relations to be permanently maintained."[3] We talk so much about the sanctity of marriage, and forget, as Havelock Ellis points out, that "much of the polygamy, and polyandry also, which prevails among us to-day is an altogether artificial and unnatural form of polygamy."[4]

[1] Elsie Clews Parsons, "Feminism and the Family," *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1917, p. 57.

[2] See Stopford Brooke in his essay on Blake in *Studies in Poetry*, p. 49.

[3] Edward Carpenter, *Love's Coming of Age*, p. 105.

[4] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 492.

Present-day sex morality still treats adultery in the primitive style as an infringement upon the rights of man's marital proprietorship, and punishes bigamy accordingly. The law seems to say, to use Wells's bitter indictment: "Better ruin a score of women than marry two."[1] The morality of the future, so finely foreshadowed by Elsie Clews Parsons, will refuse to admit any such legal rights; it will only recognize moral bonds. The term "adultery," if still in use then, will be understood "to mean a sex relationship with two men or two women, covert to one or the other or to both,"[2] the covertness being the essential factor. "Variety in marriage," she proclaims, "is what law and custom will come *in time* to recognize."[3] Not only will it abrogate the proprietary right in human souls, still practised by civilized beings under the guise of legal marriage, but it will lead to the enhancement of life by removing the ban which now crushes so many possibilities of rich and beauteous companionship. "In the marriage relation," says Dr. Marie Stopes, "it is supremely true that only by loosening the bonds can one bind two hearts indissolubly together."[4]

The trend in this forward direction shows itself also in the proposals that have been made from certain sides to abolish the legal form of marriage altogether. Marriage, according to this view, should be entirely a private affair, a coming-together, and, if need be, a parting of two lovers according to the dictates of their moral conscience alone. We have seen that such a scheme is well substantiated so far as mating by itself is concerned. Nor would the actual experience of free

[1] H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*, p. 209.
[2] Elsie Clews Parsons, "Mating and Parenthood," *International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1916, p. 210.
[3] Elsie Clews Parsons, "Feminism and the Family," *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1917, p. 17.
[4] Marie C. Stopes, *Married Love*, p. 98.

sexual unions, as they exist in some classes of the population, speak against it. Yet, since the fate of the offspring is a prime concern of society, the State naturally claims, and will claim in future more and more, the right of controlling its living human material at the very source. Some sort of registration of marriage is indispensable for this purpose. "State-registered-marriage,"[1] or, better still, a "parents' register," will take the place of "State-regulated marriage." Some have tried to obviate the difficulty by substituting in place of legal marriage a private marriage contract which could vary according to the predilection of the contracting parties. We agree with Havelock Ellis that this proposal does not meet the object in view—freedom within the four corners of the law. For of what value would it be to enforce a promise made in the flush of love's ardour, when, with the glamour gone, the substance of the contract has disappeared also? Besides, the very notion of a contract is contrary to the spirit of marriage, which, as Havelock Ellis emphasizes, is essentially "a fact," physically and psychically.[2] As such it will prevail on the mere strength of its spiritual content.

The new sex ethics, though hailed by many as a deliverance from bondage, will be as fiercely denounced by others as an unloosening of all sexual restraint. The worst that will be said of it is that it preaches "free love." Those who cannot recognize God but in the very littleness of their own hearts are beyond argument. They do not know the true God. They perish by the letter; for by the spirit they live not. They are deaf to the voice of Nature. To those others who are willing to lend a sympathetic ear we would recommend Ellen

[1] Havelock Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, p. 63. London. 1912.

[2] *Ibid.*, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 471, etc.

Key's vindication: "Instead of defending free love, which is a much-abused term capable of many interpretations, we ought to strive for the freedom of love; for while the former has come to imply freedom for any sort of love, the latter must only mean freedom for a feeling which is worthy the name of love."[1] "The tendency of the monogamic to overpass its self-imposed bounds"[2] is simply the natural expression of the law of progress, which holds as much in sex matters as in other things of life. Of course, there is the possibility of maladjustments under the new order also. Indeed, they are inevitable. For, says A. Maude Royden in this respect: "No system can be devised whereby human beings can be infallibly saved from their own weaknesses and mistakes."[3] Nor is there any guarantee that the new conditions may not be abused by those who never can learn to control their passion. To this we can only reply finally with Dr. Marie Stopes: "It is true that many natures are not yet ready for such trust, and might abuse such freedom. But the baser natures will always find a method of gratifying their desires, and are not likely to err more in trusted freedom than they would inevitably have done through secret intrigues if held in jealous bondage."[4]

3. Divorce.

Divorce signifies the failure of marriage. It implies the dissolution and therewith the negation of marital relationship. It will be clear from the foregoing that the question of divorce must be treated on the same lines as that of marriage. The same considerations have to lead us here as have inspired us in the working out of the

[1] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 129.
[2] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 569.
[3] A. Maude Royden, *The Making of Women*, p. 47.
[4] Marie C. Stopes, *Married Love*, p. 98.

marriage ideal. Now we have seen that, from whatever side we approached the marriage problem, it brought us to the uniform conclusion that marriage, to be true, must be a physico-spiritual union of two free individuals. Nor does this cease to be valid of marriage when it is viewed from its negative side, that of dissolution. In upholding this definition as a thoroughgoing principle, we are enabled at once to lay down two primary rules as regards the proper attitude to divorce: first, there must be freedom of choice in marriage as for marriage; and secondly, there must be equality of rights for both partners alike: the double standard morality must be abolished here as in all matters of sex. As Havelock Ellis points out: "It requires the will of two persons to form a marriage . . . ; equally it requires the will of two persons to maintain a marriage."[1] Where the marital bond is broken *de facto* and all conditions of true marriage have disappeared, there can be no valid reason for continuing the union in mere form. Yet this is exactly what the present English law imposes upon a multitude of couples, alienated, and, it may be, alienated for years; and what a still more rigorous sectarian view of divorce is ready to enforce as an axiomatic guiding rule. To this notion, characterized by Elsie Clews Parsons as that of "marriage as a status,"[2] which declares every union, once contracted, permanent and indissoluble, we must oppose the dynamic view, which looks upon wedlock as a living "relationship between personalities," subject to all the vicissitudes of life's changes. Once this is understood, "lasting love will be accounted a good, like lasting health or energy or happiness. But, as in health or happiness, the enduring character of it will not be considered of itself, will not be its justification, as it

[1] Havelock Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 436.

[2] Elsie Clews Parsons, "Feminism and Sex Ethics," *International Journal of Ethics*, p. 464. July, 1916.

were, for existing. Its loss will be considered a disaster, a tragedy, not an offence; a misfortune society would regret or pity, not condemn or revile."[1]

Marriage is, or at least should be, a spiritual union; where it has ceased to be this, where living-together in the true sense has become impossible, there the conditions are given for dissolving it. It will be apparent to anyone not biased by sectarian preconceptions that from a purely ethical point of view this exigency is reached whenever two partners find it impossible to accommodate themselves to each other, be it through incompatibility of temperament or, worse still, on account of an invincible aversion to each other. Divorce by mutual consent would seem to be the only natural way out for two people in a condition that has been aptly described as a state of 'spiritual divorce.' Compulsion under such circumstances seems valueless, and is, to say the least, meaningless. For, once the wellsprings of affection have dried up in marriage, what remains of it is at best an empty barrenness; at its worst, it is charged with a fount of bitterness and hate, involving all concerned in tragic misery. The conditions are such as should warrant but one solution—namely, the freeing of the unwilling partners from a yoke that has become unbearable. And indeed, there are some who would advocate free divorce in such cases, as the counterpart to free marriage.[2] Now we found reasons for rejecting the idea of free marriage because it contradicts the moral claims that the State has upon its future citizens. And free divorce, which would imply the separation of two partners by their own private will and pleasure, must be objected to on precisely the same ground. Marriage, we have seen, implies a

[1] Elsie Clews Parsons, "Feminism and Sex Ethics," *International Journal of Ethics*, p. 464.

[2] See, for instance, G. B. Shaw, *Getting Married*, Preface.

double responsibility—firstly, that between the parents themselves; and secondly, that of the parents to their offspring. It is in this second respect that the State steps in as a supervising power. Just as the State is entitled to have a voice in matters of matrimony for the benefit of the future generation, so it has a right to control divorce with the same object in view. Divorce by mutual consent, then, though granted in theory, must be subject to the control of society, which has an interest in the children.

We have said that ethically the dissolution of marriage is warranted, whenever the non-fulfilment of its spiritual content leads to its own negation. This happens not only when both partners abrogate in their hearts their marriage vows, but also when one of the partners alone fails to remain true to it. As the marriage bond, which can only rest on mutuality, is broken, no true marital relationship—in the essential, moral sense—any longer exists; hence it is merely a matter of form whether, under such conditions, legal divorce should follow the intrinsic dissolution of marriage. Whether the infringement of the moral law happens to occur with malicious intent or without can surely not by one iota alter the fact that the conjugal relationship is negated in its real essence. To many it would appear only right that relief should be given to the injured party in case of adultery, desertion, or cruelty by the other; but they would demur to the mere suggestion that even without actual offence one of the parties might wish to be absolved from living together with a mate who is no longer loved. Why should it be postulated that the law may only be set in motion after insult has been added to injury? It may be hard for the constant party to endure the pangs of separation in addition to the loss of love; but the situation is in nowise bettered by the additional act of adultery, or

desertion, or cruelty. It is true, some accommodation must be found in these cases of one-sided failure to keep the marriage bond; yet, having regard to proper safeguards, divorce should be made possible in principle.

We can go a step farther. There are circumstances that violate the spiritual union of marriage without involving a direct and deliberate change in the love intention of one of the partners. There are certain diseases that by their very nature tend to destroy conjugal life, making it either hazardous or actually impossible. To these belong chronic alcoholism, insanity, and venereal diseases. We do not need to dilate on the evil consequences of habitual drunkenness, on how it wrecks the home, forming a constant source of evil and misery; nor do we need to point out how it interferes with the decencies of married life, making proper companionship impossible. These considerations apply still more to those cases where one of the partners is afflicted with chronic insanity, which renders the person *eo ipso* unfit for social life. If the meaning and intent of marriage relationship is lost anywhere, it is here, where the afflicted partner is not even capable of realizing conjugal responsibility, and is much less in the position to fulfil it. In both these instances there can be no sensible argument advanced, from an ethical point of view, against the granting of divorce with the appropriate safeguards. To a similar category belongs moral delinquency in one of the partners, proved by conviction for crime to long-continued imprisonment. Here, too, it is obvious that the ethical basis of a common conjugal life is destroyed, and legal dissolution of marriage should be possible in the natural course of events.

Considering now venereal disease, we do not need to point out here its serious consequences in married life Not only is the disease communicable to the innocent

partner in matrimony with dire results, but, in the case of syphilis, the offspring also are apt to be afflicted all their lives for "the sins of their fathers." Surely, no one ought to be under obligation to live with a spouse suffering from a disease of such a dangerous nature; still less so, when it is considered that the disease is generally acquired as the result of infection during illicit intercourse. Yet, as we shall see later, the English law is by no means unequivocal on this point.

The right to divorce should in equity rest evenly with both partners. This follows as a matter of course from the first principles of sex ethics. A communion founded upon the goodwill of two free personalities cannot truly be based on force from either side. Besides, the old disabilities maintained against women for ages are rapidly passing away: it is no longer considered essential to uphold the pride and power of man by the indignity and enslavement of woman. Man and woman are now attempting to fulfil their common destiny as joint-partners in a joyful spiritual aim at a higher life; and it is being realized more and more that this higher life can only be lived, if woman also is allowed her full share as a responsible individual. All this implies equal treatment in marriage and divorce, the right to end marriage as well as to make it. On this point there is now general agreement. The Minority Report, as well as the Majority Report, of the Royal Commission on Divorce is unanimous on this point: "Whatever grounds are permitted to a husband for obtaining a divorce from his wife, the same grounds shall be available for a wife in a suit against her husband."[1]

The above is a short statement of what may be considered the ethical rationale of divorce. It is merely a program, not a worked-out scheme. The elaboration

[1] Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, pp. 89 and 191. 1912.

must be left to the lawyer, who alone is competent to devise the practical details and the necessary safeguards.

It will have become apparent from the foregoing that the proposals here outlined are in direct opposition to the spiritual ideal of those who on high religious grounds believe in the indissolubility of marriage, at least in theory. This doctrine, built upon the teaching of the Bible and the Fathers, is held by its adherents to contain unassailable evidence against what they hold to be the disintegrating tendency of modern marriage reform. To us, on the contrary, such a view denotes merely the fixation of a certain sectarian attitude, setting itself against the whole trend of modern progress. According to our opinion, the sex law must be founded upon purely ethical grounds, apart from any doctrinal considerations. This is the sole criterion that a rational sex morality can admit—and it is the one adopted throughout these pages. It furnishes the only means by which the Christian dogma of divorce can be judged independently. For this purpose we shall have to go somewhat more deeply into this doctrine, tracing it from its historical foundations.

Among the ancients divorce was theoretically possible to both parties alike. Yet in consonance with the general trend of the patriarchal age, the power of divorce lay chiefly with the husband, the woman's right being hemmed in by practical difficulties so that in reality there existed a strong barrier against a successful divorce on her side. This was the case among the ancient Jews, in Greece, and also in early Roman times.[1] Similar conditions are also found among the early Teutons.[2]

We have already seen, in the chapter on the Evolution of Marriage, how in Rome the formal sale-marriage

[1] See Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*, Vol. II., chap. xl.—Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, pp. 198, 208, 210.—Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, pp. 29, 42.

[2] Howard, *loc. cit.*, p. 34.

gradually gave way to a free union based on the mutual consent of both contracting parties. Marriage became a mutual partnership of a most intimate personal nature, in which both consorts had equal rights. It followed, as a matter of course, that, once affection had ceased to hold the union together, such a marriage was dissoluble, and this at the option of either party. Divorce here, as also among the ancient Jews and Teutons, was entirely a private matter, which did not require any judicial or other enquiry.[1]

As we have previously shown, this state of affairs was completely traversed by the Christian notion of marriage. Starting from the idea that sexuality, being of the flesh, was sinful, and that the highest life was best maintained in a state of celibacy, the Fathers only suffered marriage to exist when sanctified as a sacrament. The physical union, though it continued to be recognized in practice as the essential element of marriage, was transformed into a supernatural spiritual union.* As the Church was wedded to Christ, so was the wife wedded to her husband—eternally, indissolubly. The words of the Bible: "The twain shall be one flesh," and "What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder,"[2] were taken in their literal sense to mean the absolute indissolubility of the marriage bond. The sayings of the Gospels condemnatory of divorce[3] were taken as a strict ruling in all matters matrimonial, from which there could be no deviation—at least in theory. Especially St. Paul, with his fulminations against the lust of the flesh, had a most disastrous effect upon the marriage views of the Fathers. "Marriage

[1] See S. B. Kitchen, *History of Divorce*, chap. i. London, 1912.

* Marriage is defined by Gratian as the spiritual union, constituted by the will of the parties, which the physical consummation confirms and perfects.

[2] St. Matthew xix. 5, 6. St. Mark x. 8, 9.

[3] St. Matthew v. 31, 32; xix. 3 to 12. St. Mark x. 2 to 12. St. Luke xiv. 18. 1 Corinthians vii. 1 to 16.

was by all of them regarded as an inferior condition to that of celibacy. Their guiding principle was the well-known text: 'It is better to marry than to burn' . . . Marriage being regarded as a 'defilement' or 'truly fornication,' as it was variously expressed, a second marriage, whether after divorce or after the death of one of the parties, was 'a species of adultery'; for as the Church had 'one God for a husband,' so marriage, if entered into at all by those who were weak enough to indulge in it, should never be made use of again."[1]

There is no complete accord between the various texts of the Bible that deal with divorce. For while, according to Mark and Luke, divorce appears to be absolutely prohibited, in Matthew an exception is made in the case of fornication. Not only this; the very term "fornication" has been interpreted in various ways, being given, apart from its physical meaning as a carnal transgression, an allegorical or spiritual sense also, and being held to include, according to some authorities, such different sins as idolatry, apostasy, and covetousness. Further, it was doubtful, in spite of the original equality of man and woman before God, whether, if divorce and remarriage were allowed to the husband, they should be extended likewise to the wife. St. Augustine himself, who more than anyone else was instrumental in shaping Christian dogma, seems to have wavered a good deal in his view on marriage; and opinion after him was not less divided, in spite of the supposed authority of the Bible. If the Catholic Church ultimately came to adopt the dogma that the nuptial bond is indissoluble and can on no account ever be entirely undone, it was only reached after a severe struggle. We find that the Council of Trent (1545-1563), though asserting the Canon law, did not lay down the indissolubility of marriage as a doctrine essential to

[1] Kitchen, *History of Divorce*, p. 20.

salvation, but merely pronounced "anathema against those who should deny the indissolubility of wedlock as a necessary consequence of its sacramental nature."[1] Nor was it reached finally, as the consequence showed, without doing a great deal of violence to the good sense of the people. According to the Canon doctrine, wedlock was dissoluble on certain grounds; but the spiritual bond entered into at marriage could never be completely severed. "Canon law merely allowed a divorce from bed and board (*divortium a mensa et thoro*): that is, judicial separation; while the term "divorce" by itself (*divortium a vinculo matrimonii*) was commonly employed to designate not the dissolution of a lawful union, but the judicial declaration of nullity of a spurious marriage, which on account of some impediment is void, or at least voidable, from the beginning."[2]

It might be assumed from the foregoing that divorce was rare under these conditions; but nothing would be farther from the truth. On the contrary, as Hobhouse points out: "On the whole, the marriage of the Middle Ages seems to have been almost as loose in practice as it was rigid in theory."[3] For though divorce proper (in the modern sense of the word) was theoretically unattainable, it was granted on a large scale by cloaking it "under the guise of an action for nullifying spurious marriages," a procedure that had the tremendous drawback of being available mainly to those "who were able to pay the ecclesiastical judge for finding a way through the tortuous maze of forbidden degrees." For it was on the latter ground, made more and more complex by the Church, that the desired release was most readily procured.[4]

[1] Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. ii., p. 59.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[3] L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 217, note 4.
[4] Howard, *loc. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 56.

The Reformation, in setting itself against the papal authority, initiated a movement towards a less ascetic view of life. The sacramental idea of marriage was given up, and with this a new interpretation of the right to divorce came into vogue. A return was made to the scriptural texts, Matthew being taken as the guide rather than the stricter injunctions of Mark, Luke, or Paul. Protestantism admitted in general complete divorce on two or three grounds, one being adultery, the other two, in most cases, cruelty and malicious desertion. The more advanced spirits went much farther. Milton, one of the most enlightened men of his time, urged that "matrimony was a society 'more than human,' centring 'in the soul rather than in the body,' a companionship resting upon the 'deep and serious verity' of 'mutual love,' without which wedlock is 'nothing but the empty husk of an outside matrimony, as undelightful and unpleasing to God as any other kind of hypocrisy.' Hence, where such society does not exist, where mutual affection has given place to deceit, the legal bond of the sham wedlock ought to be dissolved."[1] Indeed, he went so far as to reject courts and magistrates, and to approve of self-divorce. In the true modern spirit he protested against "the absurdity of authorizing a judicial court to toss about and divulge the unaccountable and secret reason of disaffection between man and wife."[2] On the whole, however, the actual advance was less than might have been anticipated from the original enthusiasm expended. What the Reformation achieved was "by splitting up the power of the Churches and making religious toleration possible at a future time, gradually to secularize marriage and divorce."[3]

[1] Howard, *loc. cit.*, p. 88.

[2] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 445.—E. S. P. Haynes, *Divorce as it Might be*, p. 2. London, 1915.

[3] Kitchen, *History of Divorce*, p. 122.

In England the trend of events took a much more conservative turn. Though the *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiastiarum,* compiled (1552) under the leadership of Archbishop Cranmer, went far in the liberal direction, advocating the abolition of separation and recommending in its place divorce proper for various causes (such as adultery, cruelty, desertion, and even mutual violent hatred), these proposals were never carried out. On the contrary, the reaction following upon the restoration of the Stuarts swept away any further thought of thorough reform. Indeed, so backward remained the state of divorce legislation in England, that until 1857 it was only possible to obtain a divorce by special Act of Parliament, a procedure that on account of its enormous expense was only accessible to the richest of the land. Even to-day, after various new enactments modifying to some extent the old Canon law, English legislation and English public feeling are still far behind those of other civilized countries in comprehending the finer tendencies of modern married life.[1] As Havelock Ellis points out: "There still lurks in the English conception of divorce too much of the old spirit of asceticism, with its doctrine, on the one hand, of the indissolubility of marriage, and, on the other, of the primitive idea of the proprietorship of woman by man."[2]

Divorce, according to this notion, is deemed immoral. There must be sin or crime on *one* side at least, in order that relief may be allowed to the innocent party. If, however, the other party also has been guilty of a matrimonial offence, then there can be no redress whatever. Upon this claim of 'public morality' is based the notion of 'collusion.' "Any well-founded suspicions of connivance in the commission of an offence, of forgiveness

[1] See Divorce Law Reform Union Leaflet, No. 3.
[2] H. Ellis, *loc. cit.*, p. 449.

or 'condonation' after the offence, or of collusion in the proceedings, is a fatal bar to a claim of divorce."[1] As Havelock Ellis tersely puts it: "The safest way in England to render what is legally termed marriage absolutely indissoluble is for both parties to commit adultery."[2] Better still: no divorce is possible after voluntary separation. According to the law a woman is entitled to a separation order from her husband in case of certain delinquencies, such as cruelty, neglect, drunkenness, etc., including desertion. But this very freedom afforded to her is turned into a fetter should she later find cause to claim a divorce from her husband on account of adultery; for as she had previously applied to be relieved of her husband's presence, she is now deemed unable to plead logically that he has deserted her, and therewith divorce, according to the English state of the law, becomes an impossibility for her (adultery of the man being by itself no sufficient ground for divorce).[3] Surely legal stupidity can hardly go farther in its consistency.

The spirit of discrimination against woman in the English divorce law shows itself in various ways. In the first place, the grounds upon which a divorce can be obtained are not even between husband and wife. For while the husband is entitled to a divorce on proof of his wife's adultery alone, in the reverse case the husband's adultery is not considered a sufficient reason for divorce, unless it be accompanied by aggravating circumstances, such as cruelty, desertion, etc.[4] Furthermore, a husband is entitled to claim damages against the man who entices his wife away; the wife has no corresponding right of

[1] E. Jenks, *Husband and Wife in the Law*, p. 84. London, 1909.
[2] H. Ellis. *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 452, note.
[3] Jenks, *loc. cit.*, p. 79.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

damages against anyone who entices away her husband. And the damages thus given against the male co-respondent in divorce cases are given not "to punish the co-respondent, but to compensate the petitioner for the loss he has suffered."[1] In other words, seduction of a woman is still looked upon, as in olden times, as an infringement of man's property rights, either of the husband or of the father; for, in accordance with this notion, a man whose daughter has been seduced is entitled to sue the seducer for damages for the loss of the daughter's service, while she is with child.[2] All this merely reflects the antiquated ideas of a backward age, when man in his licentiousness was free, but did not hesitate to enforce the purity of his womenfolk by all the rigour of custom and law. Carried into our own age, it implies a "legal barbarity," which would much better be characterized in the words of Mr. Haynes as "barbarous legality."[3]

This, then, is the kind of system, built upon the ideals of a bygone age, that is upheld by its defenders as expressing the true principle of marriage. Their contention is based upon two main considerations: The first is, that it embodies the "highest wisdom" as given in the Lord's teaching, from which no deviation is possible to true believers; the other is, that "it is the duty of the State to legislate for the general good of the whole nation," in determining which "we must not look for guidance to ephemeral conditions."[4] What is implied in such a view is that the authority of Christ's words is unequivocal and final, and that it must be the ultimate test of all true sex morality. It would be out of place here, nor are we

[1] Mrs. H. M. Swanwick, *Some Points of English Law*, etc., p. 10.
[2] E. S. P. Haynes, *Divorce Problems of To-day*, p. 48. London, 1912.
[3] E. S. P. Haynes, *Divorce as it Might be*, Dedication.
[4] Report of Royal Commission on Divorce, Minority Report, p. 186.

competent, to enter into a full discussion of the true interpretation and synthesis of the various biblical texts relating to divorce. The law of the indissolubility of marriage, which, according to Bishop Gore, "has the enormous practical advantage that it alone is plain and explicit,"[1] so far from fulfilling this promise, has, as history shows, merely been a source of perplexity to those who gave it, and of tribulation to those on whom it was imposed. The nominal unanimity claimed for the indissolubility of marriage has in practice always broken down in view of "the conflict of opinion which has existed in all ages, and in all branches of the Christian Church, among scholars and divines equally qualified to judge."[2] Whatever, therefore, those may think or do who feel that they owe allegiance to this principle, it cannot but be our duty to consider this question, as the Majority Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce suggests, "upon an unfettered consideration of what is best for the interest of the State, society, and morality."[3] For even in the minds of devout Christians there exists "a growing perception that the modern State cannot be assumed to be distinctly Christian."[4] It follows therefore, as the signatories to the Minority Report are ready to admit, "that it cannot be the duty of the State simply to translate into Acts of Parliament those canons, however venerable, of the Christian Church which have been supposed by it to express our Lord's mind on divorce."[5] "The burning question," says Bishop Gore, "is not as to the ideal of Christian marriage, but as to what is at the last resort to be countenanced or tolerated,"[6] a declaration with which we are in entire agreement, though it is only too likely

[1] Gore, *The Question of Divorce*, p. 51. London, 1911.
[2] Report of Royal Commission on Divorce, p. 37.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Gore, *loc. cit.*, p. 9.
[5] Minority Report, Divorce Commission, p. 186.
[6] Gore, *loc. cit.*, p. 1.

that we shall arrive at conclusions totally opposed to those of the Bishop. The implication of the orthodox attitude of mind is that only a strict divorce law is consonant with true marriage morality, any relaxation in this direction being bound to impair the standard of sexual purity. The whole case of the opponents of divorce reform is built upon this contention, which we have now to examine.

First of all, it is asserted that an increase of divorce in itself leads directly to social corruption, as witness Roman society during its decline, or the present conditions in some of the American States. Indeed, according to these authorities, the morality of a country is measured by the frequency of divorce. But, as a matter of fact, no such direct relationship between divorce and morality can be established. In the first place, the number of divorces naturally depends upon the stringency of the marriage law; where no divorce is allowed, there as a matter of course will be none. In order to gauge the proper condition of affairs, we have to take into account not only the frequency of divorce, but also the number of separations asked for and granted; to which should be added, if it were possible, the number of other illegitimate sex relationships which may abound at the side of, nay, often in consequence of, the absence of divorce. Thus the English divorce rate is only 2·5 per thousand marriages, which according to the orthodox view would indicate a high standard of morality. This picture assumes a different aspect the moment we add to the divorces the far larger number of separations granted, when we reach for England as the actual number of marriages dissolved 27·9 per thousand marriages.[1] The irrationality of the attempt to judge the state of marital affairs in a country

[1] C. Chapman, *Marriage and Divorce*, 2nd edition, p. 102. London, 1913.

by the divorce rate alone becomes apparent at once. This comes out also in another fact. While, according to Lichtenberger, "60 per cent. of all divorces in the United States during a certain period were granted on grounds of cruelty and desertion, in New York State all were granted for adultery." Taken by itself, this would seem to indicate a lower sexual morality in New York than elsewhere in America. But the strange fact is quite simply accounted for by the circumstance, as Lichtenberger points out, that "the only legal cause for divorce admitted in New York is adultery."[1] Similarly, no one would have the hardihood to maintain that in Scotland, where marriage is dissoluble at the option of either party, family life is in any way less securely founded than in England.[2] The reverse influence has been argued for with much more show of reason. Thus many authorities hold that "the notorious abuse of the system of divorce in Rome after the Punic wars was most probably the result rather than the cause of the gradual decline of morals."[3] And similarly we have Lord Bryce's evidence with regard to America, who says that "there seems to be no ground for concluding that the increase of divorce [in America] necessarily points to a decline in the standard of domestic morality, and the same conclusions may well be true regarding the greater frequency of divorce all over the world."[4] That the absence of divorce is in no way an index of the morality of a country is evidenced by the condition prevailing in South Carolina. South Carolina is the only State in the United States that has no divorce laws, and consequently no divorces; yet, "according to an eminent authority, concubinage is so generally recognized that the laws of

[1] J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce, A Study in Causation*. p. 145. New York, 1909.

[2] E. S. P. Haynes, *Divorce Problems of To-day*, p. 8.

[3] Report of Divorce Commission, Appendix, p. 5.

[4] Quoted after Kitchen, *History of Divorce*, p. 224.

inheritance had to be modified."[1] Finally, it is said that divorce, if granted readily, would make the way easy for the culprit, the breaker of the marital bond, to legalize an illicit amour. It is essential, therefore, so the argument runs, to check t is kind of immorality by withholding the facility for divorce. Now, first of all, the implied contention, that divorce is sought for illicit purposes, rests, like so many of its kind, on a mere assumption. It is not borne out by facts. On the contrary, as Willcox in his scholarly book on *The Divorce Problem* clearly shows: "Divorced men and women are not much more disposed to marry directly after the decree than widowers or widows are to marry after the death of wife or husband."[2]

Indeed, we may go farther and reverse the verdict of the anti-reformers by saying that the absence of divorce, far from being conducive to morality, has on the whole the contrary result. For the refusal to grant full divorce in many cases leads to illicit unions, thereby fostering the very state of immorality it is intended to avoid. The present state of the divorce law, says Chapman, "in refusing to grant divorce, except for adultery, actually encourages immorality, and in granting separations without the power of remarriage promotes immorality, illegitimacy, and concubinage."[3] And this opinion is fully endorsed by the Majority Report of the Royal Divorce Commission, which does not hesitate to maintain that "the remedy of judicial separation is an unnatural and unsatisfactory remedy, leading to evil consequences, and it is inadequate in cases where married life has become practically impossible."[4] Trying to account for the

[1] C. Chapman, *Marriage and Divorce*, p. 101.
[2] W. F. Willcox, *The Divorce Problem*, p. 51. New York, 1891.
[3] C. Chapman, *Marriage and Divorce*, p. 74; also R. T. Gates, *Divorce or Separation, which?* Divorce Law Reform Union. London, 1910.
[4] Report of Royal Divorce Commission, p. 94.

obstinate opposition to marriage reform from the clerical side that persists up to the present day, Haynes comes to the one possible conclusion that it "seems rather like vindicating religion at the cost of morality."[1] Havelock Ellis would even go a step farther, turning with true insight the tables upon the traducers of divorce reform. "The divorce movement," he declares, "is not, as some have foolishly supposed, a movement making for immorality. Immorality is the inevitable accompaniment of indissoluble marriage; the emphasis on the sanctity of a merely formal union discourages the growth of moral responsibility as regards the hypothetically unholy unions which grow up beneath its shadows."[2] We have previously shown how futile the policy of the indissolubility of marriage has proved in practice. Even such an ardent defender of this doctrine as Bishop Gore admits that "when firmly established it was constantly evaded by the process of declaring marriages on various pretexts to have been null and void from the beginning."[3] Nor does the case stand differently at the present time. In America, as Lichtenberger points out, "there has been, on the whole, a decided tendency towards greater stringency in the regulations as regards marriage and divorce, yet during the same period divorce has gained a threefold velocity."[4]

This only shows that where there is a need of divorce, it cannot be checked by any legislation. Willcox, after an elaborate statistical study of the divorce question, comes to the conclusion that "legal provisions of whatever sort have little direct and permanent influence upon divorce. Restrictions on marriage, restriction on divorce,

[1] Haynes, *Divorce Problems of To-day*, p. 7.
[2] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 460.
[3] Gore, *The Question of Divorce*, p. 7.
[4] Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, p. 105.

and remarriage after divorce, have been tried in various places and at various times and have proved of little effect."[1] It is true that a change towards greater facility of divorce generally leads to an excessive increase in its frequency; this, however, as Lichtenberger has shown, is merely temporary, until the accumulated old cases of marital estrangement are exhausted.[2]

It is argued by the supporters of a strictly hedged-in matrimony that difficult divorce is justified inasmuch as it has the tendency to render choice in marriage more careful. Bad marriages, according to this notion, are the fountain-head of later divorces. There should be some sort of correspondence between the facility of marriage and that of divorce. But this does not justify us in heaping on to the mistake of a hasty marriage the still greater evil of rendering it irremediable, all for the sake of the good of society. "Alike from the standpoint of reason and of humanity the gate that is easy of ingress must be easy of egress; or if the exit is necessarily difficult, then extreme care must be taken in admission."[3] As a matter of fact, it does not follow that, because theoretically difficulty of divorce should go with careful choice in marriage, in practice any such deterrent policy will have the desired effect. If the remedy were really efficacious, it should come out in the differential marriage rate in countries where divorce is difficult. There is no evidence whatever that young people in Catholic countries, where divorce is impossible, show in any way more prudence or foresight as regards matrimony. Nor has the Church exhibited any special tendency towards stringency as regards entry into marriage. Bad marriages, as Lichtenberger points out, are only a part cause of

[1] Willcox, *The Divorce Problem*, p. 72.
[2] Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, p. 221.
[3] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 439.

divorce, and cannot by themselves account for its great increase during modern times. It would rather seem that bad marriages and frequent divorce are both due to one and the same factor, which needs elucidating.[1] In fact, we now approach the crux of the whole problem.

Divorce, as we have said, signifies the failure of marriage and records its final break-up. Why, then, does marriage fail so often nowadays? Is it that wedlock is entered into with more recklessness than hitherto? We have no evidence of this; on the contrary, seeing that the marriage age has steadily risen in all modern countries, we shall be more correct in assuming that choice in marriage has become, if anything, more circumspect. What has happened, however, is that our sensibilities as regards marriage relationship have become more subtle and refined. "The home is more than a place to eat and sleep and work in. It is a school of affection and spiritual discipline."[2] "The more one simplifies love and reduces it simply to a connection between two persons of opposite sex, so much less complicated is the sensuous ceremonial. The more it is surrounded by obscure and undefined ideas, the more full of sensation and tenderness becomes the whole mechanism, but also the more easily broken."[3] There are still some who do not seem to realize that incompatibility of temperament between two people is not a sin, nor even necessarily a fault, but a misfortune. One stands aghast at the crude simplicity of an indictment such as the following, which thoughtlessly casts a cruel aspersion on all those unfortunate beings who are victims of an unhappy alliance. "The incapacity to live with a selected partner," says a eugenic writer, "indicates some serious defects in character, and those divorced as

[1] Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, p. 149. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 198.
[3] Mantegazza, quoted by Colin A. Scott, "Sex and Art," *Journal of Psychology*, vol. vii., p. 188.

a consequence of separation would therefore be likely to be, on the whole, below the average in worth."[1] We merely record this opinion without further comment: it stands self-condemned. The intricacy and complexity of the sex problem has never as much as dawned upon the writer of the paragraph.

It is a common assumption that whatever tends to good motherhood will *eo ipso* lead to good wifehood, the implication being that both are identical. Yet, if we are fully to understand and try to solve the difficulties of marriage relationship, we are bound to separate the two as regards their meaning and aim. It is quite possible for a woman to have all the qualities of an excellent mother and yet fail in her psychological equipment as her husband's mate. On the other hand, there are many charming women who, whilst making good wives, seem to be little inclined for domestic responsibilities. It must not be forgotten that a woman on entering marriage has to fulfil a double rôle, that of wife and mother, the two sides of which are not by any means identical in their purpose. And something similar holds for the man too, though in a less degree, his feeling for children being, on the whole, less strongly marked than in woman.

The marital bond is in every case a double one: the conjugal bond with the partner and the parental bond with the offspring. When it comes to the point of breaking the marriage tie, the forces at work do not necessarily tend in the same direction. The least we can do is to leave it to the good sense of the partners concerned to decide what in a given instance seems to them the best solution. The existence of the children is often quoted as a strong argument against divorce. But, in the first instance, what home have children whose parents are hopelessly divided, reared as they are in an atmosphere of perpetual

[1] *Eugenics Review*, p. 297. January, 1918.

discord and strife ? Can it be seriously maintained that a home held together by the force of law is of any real value to the children, when things have gone so far that the mother is willing to sacrifice her best instincts for the sake of working out her own salvation ?* Surely, to leave the children in the care of one of the parents will lessen rather than aggravate the calamity for the children, great as it must be in any case. It is said that " divorce closes the door to reconciliation and tends to break up the home;" all we have to answer to this is that divorce is generally only thought of when the home has been broken up already in spirit. It is merely the final external act of a catastrophe which has become unavoidable. It certainly implies little trust in the strength of motherly and, indeed, of fatherly affection if it is thought that any external compulsion is needed to hold a home together, or that compulsion can hold it together when in spirit it has already been destroyed. It is putting too little faith in human nature. As Havelock Ellis truly remarks: " Married people do not remain together because of any religious or legal tie; that tie is merely the historical outcome of their natural tendency to remain together, a tendency which is itself far older than history."[1] Rev. H. Northcote, in arguing against divorce, holds that " ideally the incentive to duty from the action of love on the will-power is too strong to be nullified by any of the adverse circumstances of this life."[2] Exactly; but why then the appeal to the superior force of the law to achieve this end ? Let everybody be his own counsellor in this matter !

The increased tendency towards divorce at the present day is due, then, to the finer susceptibilities in modern

* *Cf.* the case of Nora in Ibsen's *Doll's House* with that of Mrs. Alving in the same author's *Ghosts*.

[1] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 483.

[2] Northcote, *Christianit and Sex Problems*, p. 243.

marriage conditions. In so far as they raise the expectation of subtler and more harmonious interrelations in married life, they can only be accredited as so much distinct gain. Increased divorce from this point of view merely registers the failure of a finer mechanism, which has not yet had time to adjust itself to new developments. Among these we must reckon as one of the most potent the bid of the new woman for individuality and freedom. This is, in its tendency, part and parcel of the modern movement towards industrial and social democratization. The growing spirit of liberation has also invaded family life. The old patriarchal type of family is tending to disintegrate; coercion by marital authority finds no place in the new order of things. Lichtenberger, in his extensive study of divorce, following upon that of Willcox, agrees with this author in coming to the conclusion that the modern tendency to divorce is entirely due to the growing emancipation of woman, thus indicating a by no means unfavourable symptom of the increasing progress and growth of civilization. "With the acquisition of new rights and immunities women have chosen to exercise them to obtain relief from abuses to which they were formerly indifferent and from which they could not formerly escape."[1] If woman, and man also, revolt and break off false marriage relationships rather than suffer or inflict spiritual and moral indignities, it is only in conformity with the deeper modern conception of marital life. Nothing would seem more immoral than the continuance of an unreal sex union which has ceased to have spiritual validity. For "where there can be no love on either side, there is no marriage and no sacrament."[2] The old notion used to be that "marriage being a confession of weakness, divorce was a confession of

[1] Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, p. 188.
[2] May Sinclair, *The Helpmate*.

greater weakness."[1] Divorce was looked upon as a disease, "a licence to break a promise." It is time that such ideas were relegated to the limbo of the forgotten past. "Divorce is not a disease, but a remedy for a disease;"[2] it is the result and not the cause of the break-up of the family. These are the conclusions reached dispassionately in an official enquiry (viz., the Majority Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, 1912). Those who feel intensely on this matter and search beyond the record of cold facts will find as the underlying spirit of this movement the conviction that "the soul, not the body, is faithful."[3] To them "*the* state of sin is the continuing to live in defiance of, in contempt of, in violation of, in total degradation of, Nature."[4] "The law is truly broken when keeping it externally would be breaking it in the soul, and so in order to keep it in reality it must be broken."[5]

Reform, then, is not only advisable, but "a necessity in this country."[6] It was merely an accident of historical development that Protestant England, instead of following the reform movement, remained in the thraldom of the Canon Law. The Eastern Church has always recognized divorce as compatible with the scriptural commandment, judicial separation being adopted only in exceptional cases as preliminary to divorce.[7] We have seen that the Reformation in rejecting the idea of the indissolubility of marriage made some little advance, at least on the Continent, by gradually extending the grounds of divorce. It was only with the advent of the French

[1] Kitchen, *History of Divorce*, p. 22.
[2] Report of Divorce Commission, p. 95.
[3] J. Galsworthy, *Beyond*.
[4] G. Meredith, *One of our Conquerors*.
[5] Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *James Hinton*, p. 51.
[6] Report of Divorce Commission, p. 37.
[7] Kitchen, *History of Divorce*, chap. iv.

Revolution that a real breach was made in the Canon Law by the Code Napoléon. Divorce by mutual consent was re-established as a fundamental principle of the Code, which thus after a lapse of centuries once more reverted to the saner practice of the Roman Law.[1] Since then the movement has gathered force and led to a liberal interpretation of the divorce laws in many countries. Divorce by mutual consent, always existent in Switzerland, is recognized in Austria, Belgium, Roumania, Portugal, and Japan, though in Catholic countries this right is only conceded to non-Catholics.[2]

The greatest advance in this direction has been made by the Scandinavian countries. According to the Norwegian Divorce Law (promulgated in 1910), "separation and divorce is granted by the magistrate on mutual consent. If both parties agree to want divorce, the law grants it without asking for the causes. It only demands a security that their demand is seriously considered, and imposes mediation by a clergyman or a conciliation committee, and separation for one year as a time of consideration. If after the end of the year they still want divorce, it is granted by the Ministry of Justice as their legal right. If divorce is claimed by one of the parties only, it may be granted against the protest of the other on grounds of drunkenness or gross neglect of conjugal duty, or on grave discordance—that is, if the relation between husband and wife has grown so unfriendly that the continuance of the married state would be inimical to the welfare of the parents and the children. In these case the law imposes a longer time for the consideration—namely, two years of separation—before divorce is given. Divorce by the Court is also given when demanded for incurable insanity of two years, if the parties have lived apart for three years; for desertion for two

[1] Kitchen, *History of Divorce*, chap. viii. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 258, etc.

years; if one party without the knowledge of the other before marriage had been suffering from venereal disease, not cured, or if he has had criminal punishment with loss of liberty for three years. After a divorce, either party is allowed to marry again. The parents may agree how to arrange about the children, but this contract is to be confirmed by the magistrate. If they do not agree, the Ministry of Justice settles it, having most regard to the welfare of the children. The basis of the law is that marriage ought not to be enforced against the seriously considered will of both parties or of one party."[1] *

Contrast this mode of settling marriage disputes with the English method, as recently described by a writer in one of the leading papers: "It may be said, quite accurately, that in England at present there is no absolute bar to divorce between two people who profoundly dislike one another. There is not. But, to get it, they have to go through a long and degrading course of concerted lying and humbug. The husband has to leave home for a considerable time. The wife has to write an insincere appeal to him to return; the husband has to provide the wife with what passes as legal evidence of adultery on his part; the wife has to bring a suit for divorce, and both have to combine in giving no overt sign of collusion to a judge who is morally sure that it is there, but has nothing definite to go on." No wonder that many people rather than submit to "this repulsive farce to get free, take freedom without authority"*—and, adds the writer of this article: "few would say that the latter are the more deeply dishonoured."[2] Surely reform, so far from being inimical to social morality, is imperatively

[1] *Jus Suffragii*, p. 160, August 1, 1916.

* A similar Bill has recently been laid before the Danish Folketing; see *Manchester Guardian*, May 9, 1919.

[2] *Manchester Guardian*, May 9, 1919.

needed for the sake of the purity and sanctity of family life. This is fully recognized in the Majority Report of the Divorce Commission, which declares that "reform is necessary in the interest of morality as well as in the interest of justice, and in the general interests of society and the State."[1] In fine, the divorce movement, as expressed in certain modern aspects, is merely a "sign of a healthy discontent with present moral conditions and marks the struggle towards a higher ethical consciousness in regard to sexual relations."[2]*

If we ask for a safeguard against divorce, it cannot be made to rest on force. Neither difficult divorce nor difficult entry into marriage will avail against a failure of two people in the art of living together. Marriage, as we have expounded at length in this book, is built upon love. "If we are to counterbalance facility of divorce our only sound course is," as Havelock Ellis so truly says, "to increase the stability of marriage, and that is only possible by cultivating the art of love, the primal foundation of marriage."[3]

[1] Report of Divorce Commission, p. 37.
[2] Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, p. 195.
[3] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 512.

* Whilst this book is going through the press, Lord Buckmaster's Matrimonial Causes Bill has passed its second reading in the House of Lords, embodying a good many recommendations contained in the Majority Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes (Cd. 6478). It allows for divorce on any one or more of the following grounds, without distinction of sex: (1) adultery; (2) desertion for a period of three years; (3) incurable insanity for a period of at least five years; (4) incurable habitual drunkenness, after a period of at least three years' separation by a court; and (5) imprisonment under a commuted death sentence.

An order for a decree of nullity of marriage is allowed in cases of mental unsoundness, becoming definite within six months of marriage; or recurrent fits or epilepsy, existing at the time of marriage; also in cases of venereal disease, existing in a communicable form at the time of marriage, etc.

This Bill goes far to bring English divorce law into line with that of other civilized countries.

CHAPTER III

BIOTIC FACTORS

We have so far dealt with the marital state chiefly from the erotic point of view, trying to establish its ethical laws as a love communion. We now turn to the second aspect of marriage, the one which involves the procreative desire leading to the final issue of progeny. The biotic factors which present themselves here in relation to sexual ethics can be said to resolve themselves in the main into one single question: What is the proper number of offspring to be born and reared in a family? The mere putting of this question raises the controversy whether such a question is legitimate at all, assuming as it does by implication that there exists the physical and moral possibility of regulating the number of offspring. In other words, we have to deal with the problem of birth-control.

The outstanding fact from which all discussions of birth-control take their origin is the universally recognized phenomenon of the declining birthrate. It has been observed ever since the middle seventies of the last century that there has been a steady fall in the number of births in nearly all civilized countries. The movement, which started in France and has attained there its acutest form, seems to be part of a general biotic tendency, and has spread even to the more remote parts of the modern world.[1] Thus the number of births in England and Wales declined in the last thirty years to

[1] A. Newsholme, *The Declining Birth-Rate*, chap. i. London, 1911.—Dr. A. Grotjahn, *Geburten-Rückgang und Geburten-Regelung*, p. 22. Berlin, 1914.

the extent of approximately a third.[1] Now it has been observed, firstly, that the decrease of the birth-rate is greatest in the most populated centres, especially in industrial areas and large towns;[2] * and, secondly, that it varies according to social status, being most pronounced among the well-to-do classes and gradually lessening as we descend the social scale[3]: "the birth-rate falls as the income rises."[4] It has been shown that this decline of the birth-rate is not due to any specific biotic influences, such as a raised marriage age or a relative decrease in the child-bearing female population, or to a decrease in the marriage-rate, but it is the result of an actual reduction in fertility.[5] And this decrease in fertility is not a biological one, but is brought about by purely social causes.[6] What is actually taking place is that married people nowadays deliberately restrict the size of their families for definite prudential reasons. It has been found that in naturally small families as a rule no birth restriction is resorted to. It is not so much the small families that are limited as the families that are getting too large; for the mean size of the limited families is found to be larger than that of the unlimited families.[7] Furthermore, it is a striking fact that the fall of the birth-rate is "exceptionally marked, where there is foresight and thrift."[8]

[1] *The Declining Birth-Rate* (National Birth-Rate Commission), p. 37. London, 1916.

[2] Grotjahn, *loc. cit.*, pp. 24, 25.—National Birth-Rate Commission, p. 33.

* This does not seem to hold good for England and Wales; see S. Webb, *The Decline of the Birth-Rate*, Fabian Tract, No. 131, p. 4.

[3] National Birth-Rate Commission, pp. 9, 353, 354.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[5] A. Newsholme, *The Declining Birth-Rate*, chap. ii.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 33.—Grotjahn, *Geburten-Rückgang*, etc., p. 31.—National Birth-Rate Commission, pp. 21, 371.—S. Webb, *Decline of the Birth-Rate*, p. 8.

[7] C. K. Millard, *Population and Birth-Control*, p. 8. Leicester 1917.

[8] S. Webb, *loc. cit.*, p. 8.

And finally, there is the additional evidence that wherever volitional birth-control is interdicted on religious grounds there we have a relatively high birth-rate, as among Catholics and orthodox Jews.[1] In short, it may be taken as proven that the decline of the birth-rate is principally, if not entirely, the result of deliberate limitation of family.[2]

Taking then the prevalence of birth-control as an established fact, we have now to enquire into its ethical bearing. There is a school of thinkers to whom a decreasing birth-rate appears an unmitigated social evil. We mention as modern examples the Whethams, who see in a diminished birth-rate one of the forms of materialism and unbelief, "at once a symptom and a cause of subsequent decay";[3] not to speak of the religionists, who, adhering to the biblical ordinance "Increase and multiply,"[4] view with abhorrence any check upon the population. Such an attitude simply maintains the old notion of the primitive times when a vast supply of virile youths was essential for the upkeep of the tribe in order to ensure its survival against its ever-ready aggressors. Quantity was the one imperative need, and it was attained by incessant child-bearing of the whole female population from the earliest possible moment.[5] Numbers, and numbers only, was the cry of the people, in order that they might render themselves formidable to their enemies; and it is numbers, and numbers again, to which their would-be successors nowadays look as the salvation of the nation. And their clamour against "race-suicide" would seem justified when judged

[1] National Birth-Rate Commission, p. 65.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 37.
[3] W. C. D. and C. D. Whetham, *Heredity and Society*, p. 54. London, 1912.
[4] Genesis i. 28.
[5] See O. Schreiner, *Woman and Labour*, p. 57. London, 1914.

in the light of a hasty examination of the birth-rate. For there is no denying the fact: the birth-rate is falling egregiously.

But, as Havelock Ellis points out, such superficial methods of dealing with the problem are hardly scientific; nor are they conducive to a real insight into the subject. In the first instance, the figures, as expressed by the crude birth-rate, are not conclusive evidence of a decline of population. They only give the gross number of children born during a given period. This obviously depends on the actual number of child-bearing women. In order, therefore, to get a true picture of the birth-rate, it must be "corrected" with exact reference to the child-producing elements in the population. When this is done, it will be found that a low crude birth-rate does not necessarily always indicate a low corrected birth-rate.[1] Furthermore—and this is the crucial point—the birth-rate by itself can in any case give no adequate idea of the actual state of the population question. For this depends as much upon the prevailing death-rate as upon the birth-rate. In fact, it is the excess of births over deaths that is the true measure of the increase of population; it is this difference, called the "natural increase" of population, that alone gives a true idea of the natural condition of affairs. Applying now this test, we find that in many cases, though the crude birth-rate has fallen, there has been no relative net decline in population, simply because the death-rate has gone down *pari passu* with the birth-rate, leaving a natural increase. Thus, in England, while the birth-rate has fallen from 36 per thousand (in 1876) to 25 per thousand (in 1910), the death-rate fell during the same period to nearly the same extent, so that the population was increasing about as fast as it did before

[1] A. Newsholme, *The Declining Birth-Rate*, chap. ii.

the fall of the birth-rate set in.[1] As a matter of fact, it has been found that there exists a close connection between the birth-rate and the death-rate, so that a high birth-rate is generally associated with a high death-rate, and, reversely, a low birth-rate with a low death-rate.[2] Thus, to take two extreme examples: Russia (Province of Kaluga), which has the exceptionally high birth-rate of 54 per thousand of population, has a death-rate of 42 per thousand,[3] while England with a birth-rate of about 24-25 per thousand has a death-rate of from 14-15 per thousand.[4] The natural increase in population is the same in both instances, though in Russia the result is achieved with a tremendous waste of human life—a host of infants falling victims to death before ever reaching maturity. Russia represents what Grotjahn calls the naive type of increase of population, which is characteristic of low stages of civilization. Here a large birth-rate is compensated by an excessive death-rate, the result being that there is an enormous useless expenditure of human lives without any corresponding gain to the community. With this crude method of procreation he contrasts the rational method prevailing in modern civilized countries, where a natural increase in population is obtained by the combination of a low death-rate with a low birth-rate, achieving the same ultimate net result with a minimum of human waste.[5] Sweden, Norway, Holland, Australasia are typical examples of the latter kind.[6]

[1] C. V. Drysdale, *The Small Family System*, p. 54. London, 1913.

[2] C. V. Drysdale, *The Malthusian Doctrine and its Modern Aspect*, part i., p. 15. Appeared in the *Malthusian*, 1916 and 1917).- H. Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, p. 151. London, 1912.

[3] Grotjahn, *Geburten-Rückgang*, etc., p. 7.

[4] Drysdale, *The Small Family System*, p. 52.

[5] Grotjahn, *Geburten-Rückgang*, etc., Einleitung.

[6] Drysdale, *The Small Family System*, chap. iv.

It will be seen that birth-control is from a biotic point of view by no means fraught with such dire consequences as its opponents would make out. On the contrary, it may be asserted with much more truth that, far from being nocuous, it is, within certain limits, of distinct social advantage. If with Bateson we regard not the maximum number of offspring, but the optimum number, as socially sound,[1] it follows that the limit is reached as soon as the number of children "presses upon the means of subsistence, food, housing, and other necessaries of an efficient family life, including such opportunities of education as conduce to efficient workmanship and citizenship."[2] Obversely, it follows, as J. A. Hobson holds, that given our present economic and social arrangements, "a return to the reckless breeding of former times would cause increased poverty, distress, overcrowding, infant mortality, inefficiency, and demoralization."[3]

Large families, so much advocated on ideal grounds, are by no means always regarded in that light by those who have them. The age of industrial child-slavery in England, not so far distant, showed the crudest and cruellest side of unlimited propagation. At that period "each child was his parents' savings-bank, from which savings could be drawn as soon as the child could go to the mill."[4] If exploitation of children has now ceased, and if parents in their greater wisdom nowadays resort to prudential restraints, this does not necessarily imply a lowering of the standard of family life, but rather foresight and consideration for budding humanity. As Newsholme and Stevenson have pointed out, "the decline of the birth-rate is associated with a general raising of the standard of comfort, and is an expression

[1] W. Bateson, *Biological Fact and the Structure of Society*, p. 21. Oxford, 1912.
[2] National Birth-Rate Commission, p. 41. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 290.
[4] A. Newsholme, *The Declining Birth-Rate*, p. 40.

of the determination of the people to secure this greater comfort."[1] This outlook, as the National Birth-Rate Commission emphasizes, includes the realization of the advantages of proper education. Since a large family lowers the prospects of adequate training, it is inconsistent with high attainment in life and therewith decreases total efficiency.[2]

But the case against free, unchecked proliferation is still stronger. It is a well-known fact that throughout the course of evolution there is a progressive diminution in the quantity of offspring; the higher the species the less the number of offspring, the chances of survival steadily increasing with the advance of organization. The same holds good for the human species also. Here, too, there is a constant elimination of human waste as we ascend the scale of civilization. The number of offspring falls as we rise from primitive culture to modern times; the survival rate increases. Birth-control, from this point of view, is, as Havelock Ellis says, "a continuation of the same evolutionary process become conscious, voluntary, and deliberate."[3]

We have already pointed out that the death-rate rises with the birth-rate. That there is a direct connection between the number of offspring and the survival-rate becomes still more clear when we consider the infantile death-rate in relation to the number of pregnancies. It has been found that there is a steady increase in the mortality of children with each succeeding pregnancy,[4] and that the percentage of deaths decreases as the time

[1] Quoted by H. Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, p. 176.
[2] Nora Milnes, "Some Aspects of the Infant Welfare Question," *Sociological Review*, vol. ix., No. 3, p. 121.
[3] H. Ellis, "Birth-Control and Eugenics," *Eugenics Review*, April, 1917, reprinted in *The Philosophy of Conflict*. London, 1919.
[4] Grotjahn, *Geburten-Rückgang*, p. 158.—National Birth-Rate Commission, p. 96.

between successive pregnancies becomes longer.[1] Miss Nora Milnes draws the important conclusion that it is the rapidly recurring pregnancies themselves that exhaust the strength of the mother and therewith lead to the endangering of the life of the child.[2] *

Not only this: it has been clearly shown by Dr. R. J. Ewart that children born at an interval of less than two years after the birth of the previous child remain, even when they have reached their sixth year, three inches shorter and three pounds lighter than first-born children.[3] There is also, as Havelock Ellis has shown, a tendency towards degeneracy in very large families. "The insane, the idiotic, imbecile, and weak-minded, the criminal, epileptic, hysterical, the neurasthenic, the tubercular—all, it would appear, tend to belong to large families."[4] If genius also is frequently found among the same type of families, it must be pointed out that the child of genius most often occupies the position of the first-born. It has been maintained by Sören Hansen[5] and others that first-born children are of inferior quality, but objection has been taken to this interpretation of the facts observed. The pathological tendency of the first-born has been explained as due to less stringent selection of the earlier children by death.[6] The proper "spacing of babies" by a judicious use of the means of birth-control is then entirely a positive biotic gain, making in the long run for the success of the race.

It hardly needs pointing out that an overburdened,

[1] Nora Milnes, *loc. cit.*, p. 124. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

* As to the drain upon the mothers themselves caused by excessively repeated pregnancies, see *Maternity Letters from Working Women*. London, 1915.

[3] Dr. R. J. Ewart, "The Influence of Parental Age on Offspring," *Eugenic Review*, October, 1911.

[4] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 591.

[5] Sören Hansen, "The Inferior Quality of First-Born Children," *Eugenic Review*, October, 1913.

[6] H. Ellis, *loc. cit.*, p. 591.

harassed mother is much less likely to do the best for her children than one who can give time and consideration to the few she has. The mental influence of the mother upon the child as a factor in health is by no means negligible, and must not be overlooked in connection with this problem. In fine, the tendency of a falling birth-rate must be viewed as a sign of growing social stability, being "of the very essence of civilization."[1] That the problem of birth-control forms an integral part of any eugenic scheme goes without saying. To this point we shall return later.

The practice of birth-control has been attacked on two grounds: its methods have been declared injurious to health, at the same time that they are denounced as immoral. The defenders of the latter attitude are wont to thrust home their arguments by their insistence upon the dangerousness of artificial restriction, thinking thereby to secure its unhesitating ethical condemnation.[2] We must demur to such a confusion of issues: artificial preventive methods may perchance be harmless and yet from a moral point of view reprehensible; while, on the other hand, the harmfulness of the methods does not invalidate the principle of birth-prevention itself. Less nocuous methods should, and most probably could, be found. We shall therefore discuss here the physical and moral problems independently.

The first question, then, to be answered is: Are all methods of artificial birth-restriction harmful, and, if so, how far? We must at the outset distinguish between those methods that aim at prevention of conception (contraceptive methods), and those that aim at destroying the fruit after conception. The latter process, which is

[1] H. Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, p. 186.

[2] See, for instance, H. Everitt, *The Falling Birth-Rate and its Significance*, White Cross League. London, 916.

called artificial abortion, we must rule out here for the present. It is in any case risky and often very dangerous. We shall deal with abortion later on. Here we should like to point out that it is merely prejudicing a clear judgment on the case, if, as at the Lambeth Conference of Bishops in 1908, all artificial restriction of family is summarily condemned as "demoralizing to character and hostile to the national welfare."[1] Contraceptive methods and artificial abortion certainly stand on different planes, as we shall see presently.

As to the harm done by the use of physical contraceptive means, all we can say here is that it is a question for medical experts. So far, there is no positive evidence that contraceptive measures, when of the right kind and properly used, are injurious to health; in any case, if at all, they are so only to an inappreciable extent. Quoting evidence merely on one side, as the antagonists do, helps very little in the argument; authorities at least as sound and weighty could be quoted against them. The fact is that so far no definite medical judgment on the subject is procurable. If it should be the case that the contraceptive methods in vogue are more or less harmful, instead of condemning birth-control as such, it would be the duty of the medical profession to find out more harmless methods, for social and eugenic reasons. Unfortunately, the medical brotherhood has so far given little attention to this subject in particular, shirking it with the rest of the community.

Preventive checks are condemned by orthodox religionists as unnatural and therefore immoral. Their use is held to be an interference with Nature, implying a want of trust in Divine Providence.[2] The Catholic Church especially is most emphatic in its strictness upon this

[1] National Birth-Rate Commission, p. 388.

[2] Rev. W. F. Lofthouse, in National Birth-Rate Commission, p. 374.

point, insisting that "the principal or primary end of marriage is the procreation of children," and that therefore no hindrance must be put to the proper fulfilment of this function and its issuing consequences.[1] Restriction of family, if necessary or desired at all, is to be achieved by moral restraint—*i.e.*, abstinence during wedded life. The only legitimate exception allowed is to limit intercourse to those parts of the month (the intermenstrual period) in which conception is less likely to take place. Though this would seem to imply a distinct breach of the avowed marital theory of the Catholic Church, nevertheless it is tacitly condoned nowadays,[2] for the simple reason that the Catholic population, like the rest of the civilized world, is slowly, but steadily following in the van of the modern birth-control movement. Indeed, Catholicism is no longer an absolute barrier to the decline of the birth-rate.[3]

What is the *fons et origo* of the religionists' opposition to contraceptive methods? There is, according to their representatives themselves, no explicit scriptural injunction against contraceptives except the mention of the case of Onan.[4] And even here it is, to say the least, doubtful whether his act of "spilling the seed" was disapproved of for its own sake or because he refused to "raise up seed to his brother." The only other direct words of the Bible that have been construed as being directed against limitation of family is the well-known command in Genesis: "Be fruitful and multiply." It has been well said that this injunction, good when the earth was still sparsely populated at the very beginning of man's career, can

[1] Right Rev. Mgr. W. F. Brown, quoted *ibid.*, p. 390.
[2] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 590.—National Birth-Rate Commission, p. 393.
[3] Grotjahn, *Geburten-Rückgang*, etc., p. 270.—National Birth-Rate Commission, p. 66.
[4] Genesis xxxviii. 8, 9.

hardly be held to be valid for all times without modification. We cannot build a true theory of population upon such primitive foundations. The truth is, that the feeling against preventive checks, in so far as it is not merely a survival of a tribal glorification of mere numbers, is in reality nothing but the logical expression of the Christian ideal of marriage. Marriage, according to this view, exists for procreation, physical union having validity only in so far as it fulfils this mission. For, according to Christian ethics, "no appetite should be used for self-gratification, but for the furtherance of life."[1] In other words, it is once more Christian asceticism that lies at the bottom of the whole campaign against the so-called immorality of deliberate birth-control. It is the embodiment of the belief that the miseries of this world are compensated by the joys of the next.*

Let us enter somewhat more fully into the spirit of the Christian religionist's proposition and see what it means. In the first instance, it posits the theory that sexual gratification is wrong except in so far as it implicitly involves a volitional act of creation. Secondly, it assumes in consequence that, where deliberate means are taken for preventing propagation, the natural course of events is broken in an 'unnatural' manner. The former idea hardly needs refuting over again after the evidence that has been marshalled against it in this book. To look upon sexual pleasure merely as a means towards an end, as an act of self-gratification which has no intrinsic higher spiritual value apart from procreation, is simply to bring

[1] National Birth-Rate Commission, p. 407.

* See Father Stanislaus St. John's letter to Dr. Marie Stopes, in which he writes: "The Catholic belief is that the loss of health on her part [of a worn-out mother of twelve] for a few years of life and the diminished vitality on the part of her later children would be a very small price indeed to pay for an endless happiness on the part of all." Printed in Dr. Marie Stopes' *Married Love*, p. 14.

down human intercourse to the physical plane. It is a gross misunderstanding, discarding what is finest in human love and putting a low value upon the physico-spiritual union between man and woman. The advocates of marital abstinence—more or less prolonged—little reck of the disastrous consequences of their advice to wedded couples. They do not realize that upon sex is securely reared the superstructure of love, however imposing and dazzling be its own lustre. They have not learnt the A B C of married love. "Restriction, achieved wholly or mainly by moral restraint" must be held "a thoroughly impracticable and futile suggestion."[1]

Yet even our rigorous disciplinarians seem to have some inkling of the true state of affairs. For while artificial restraints are unhesitatingly condemned without reservation, an exception is made in cases "where all other deterrents fail" in favour of limiting intercourse to the intermenstrual period. Evidently it is allowed to circumvent God's purpose, but not to thwart Him. Theory, however sacred, has to give way to stubborn fact. Surely it would be much more logical to give up the defence and cease to distinguish between natural and unnatural interference with Nature. The whole progress of civilization, all elimination of waste, consists in interfering with crude Nature for the benefit of mankind. Birth-control, as has been pointed out before, is merely the conscious continuation of this self-same process. To breed indiscriminately, we have seen, leads to heavy child mortality. Those who "would shrink in horror from such an unnatural crime as limiting the family before birth" evidently see "nothing repugnant to God or man in allowing the excess of children to die after birth." In this they are, as Havelock Ellis remarks, "at one with the Chinese";[2]

[1] J. A. Hobson, in National Birth-Rate Commission, p. 293.
[2] H. Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, p. 145.

though, be it said to the credit of the Chinese, they too are waking up and adopting with the Japanese more modern, Western methods of civilization.[1]

And, after all, what was the result of the old naïve system of peopling the world? We have seen that its first effect was a tremendous waste of human material, the excess of which died off before reaching maturity. The other consequence was that parents did not hesitate to rid themselves of the children that were not wanted. Wherever economic pressure makes the rearing of offspring difficult, there we find in low stages of human society a tendency towards infanticide and fœticide. In fact, both methods of doing away with the fruits of conception are in common practice among peoples of low civilization, being viewed with little or no feeling of horror.[2] Abortion and child-exposure were a recognized procedure among the ancient Greeks and Romans, though only permitted under certain restrictions and qualifications.[3] It was the rise of the Christian Church, with its dogma of the immortality of the soul and its insistence upon baptism, that ultimately led to a complete reversal of the primitive attitude. Its crusade against infanticide as a barbarous custom was entirely successful. The softening influence of civilization, in extending its protection to the weak and helpless, marks a permanent advance of humanity.

It happened otherwise with abortion. Here the interdict of the Church, though carried out at times with rigour, created a new crime for which no adequate conscience seems to have developed in the mind of the people. For, in spite of the severity of the law, abortion is held in little abhorrence by those who ought to be most

[1] H. Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, p. 157.
[2] Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, chap. xvii.
[3] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 604.—Donaldson, *Woman*, etc., p. 189.

concerned about it, the mothers themselves. "The majority of women, not excluding educated and highly moral women, who become pregnant against their wish, contemplate the possibility of procuring abortion without the slightest twinge of conscience, and often are not even aware of the usual professional attitude of the Church, the law, and medicine regarding abortion."[1] Wilful abortion never has ceased to be practised, and it is, according to the unequivocal testimony of all authorities, extremely prevalent at the present day.[2] Indeed, it may be said that wherever the means of birth-prevention are unknown or little practised, there recourse is taken the more readily to artificial abortion. It forms, in the eyes of those who either cannot afford or do not want to have an excessive number of children, the only alternative to contraceptives, and is freely taken advantage of. It were well if those people who preach so vigorously against preventives would ponder this.

The fact is, that strict legislation has availed nothing, or very little, against the prevalence of abortion. Indeed, voices are being heard of late, especially on the woman's side, which, repudiating the Christian notion of the independent life of the foetus *in utero*, hold that the mother ought to have the right over her own body and be allowed to decide (at least during the early months of pregnancy) whether she is willing to give life to an independent human being. For after all, so it is argued, this is woman's business and her concern. There is a good deal to be said in favour of this view on its theoretical side;[3] though in our present state of social opinion it can

[1] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 601.—Grotjahn, *Geburten-Rückgang*, etc., p. 56.

[2] National Birth-Rate Commission, pp. 22, 314.—Grotjahn, *loc. cit.*, p. 52.

[3] See arguments pro and contra given by Havelock Ellis in *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 606.

hardly be said to be a practical proposition. Under certain circumstances, however, the indications of artificial abortion might usefully be extended beyond the customary medical reasons. Thus there cannot be any doubt that artificial abortion should be permissible on eugenic grounds, in cases of insanity, idiocy, etc.; and Forel claims the same right for the unfortunate mother who has been outraged.[1]

Birth-control, then, cannot be disregarded any longer. Instead of being left unchecked in its course, it should rather come under the proper cognizance of the social reformer and be dealt with in a scientific manner. The first person to put forward a definite theory of over-population was Malthus (in his *Essay on Population*, published 1798), who also suggested as a remedy against excessive births "moral and prudential restraint." His modern followers, the Neo-Malthusians, have developed his ideas much further, and openly advocate (in addition to early marriage) the use of contraceptive methods as the most effective means of birth-control.* Whatever danger there may lurk in "race-suicide," it can only be averted by facing the problem of birth-regulation and directing it into the right path of social responsibility. It has been computed that in order to maintain the race with the present death-rate three and a half children for every married couple are necessary to replace the old generation. This implies merely the *status quo ante* without any national increase whatsoever. In order therefore to allow for the natural increase this number would need to be surpassed by the majority

[1] Forel, *Die Sexuelle Frage*, p. 456.

* It must be clearly understood that with Malthus as well as with t e Neo-Malthusians birth-control has a social and political end, viz., the regulation of population within the limits of the food supply. It is a political creed, by which it is hoped to attain social amelioration and stability

of married couples. It is our duty, then, to encourage the production of progeny up to that extent. This cannot be done by a mere sentimental appeal to social duty. It is the very people that are most amenable to this kind of persuasion who feel most deeply that social duty includes the proper rearing of children to true citizenship, which cannot be done without there being adequate means. In other words, "what seems indispensable and urgent is to alter the economic incidence of child-bearing."[1] Until parents of the intelligent, provident type are so situated as to be able to give their children a proper start in life, all Jeremiads about the falling birth-rate will be futile. Apart from a drastic revolution in the distribution of wealth, this can be partially attained by sound legislation in relieving the taxation of parents with children;* in establishing maintenance scholarships, or, better still, in providing cheap or even free education right up the educational ladder;[2] and finally by a proper system of endowment of motherhood.

It must also not be forgotten that there are two sources of serious infantile losses to the State. The first is sterility (including childlessness due to pathological abortion), of which a good deal is preventable. Occupational diseases, such as lead-poisoning, etc., on the one hand, and venereal diseases (gonorrhoea and syphilis), on the other, both together lead to a great national waste by preventing the births of offspring which in better hygienic and social conditions would have been born. Incidentally it may be pointed out that any disabilities put in the way of married women's professions act as an effective bar to child-propagation. It is a perverse

[1] S. Webb, Fabian Tract, No. 131, p. 17.

* This is very inadequately done under the present Income Tax scheme.

[2] See on these points also: Whetham, *Heredity and the Family*, p. 156.

policy to deplore the falling birth-rate, and yet at the same time to close the door to would-be parents, such as women teachers, etc. Furthermore, it must be remembered that infantile mortality, especially in certain industrial districts, is still appallingly high. Instead of clamouring for more and more children and leaving them to their fate amidst squalor and waste, it would be much more humane, and incidentally more advantageous to society, to set to work and prevent this yearly holocaust of innocent children.

At present there is still a natural surplus of population; but we see it seriously threatened in all civilized countries. It is not here the place to enter into a full discussion of the political and international consequences of this phenomenon. In view of the fact that most of the backward countries, such as China, Japan, etc., are quickly following the same trend of civilization, the spectre of "the yellow peril" is most probably nothing more than a war cry used for certain political ends. Indeed, apart from a certain view which looks upon human material as mere capital, it is hard to see how mankind is benefited by mere numbers of an excessive world population. Progress surely depends more on quality than on quantity. The true spiritual import of the population question is not embodied in statistics; it cannot be appreciated when viewed merely in the light of 'rapid multiplication.' This is an outlook which may be safely left "to those ignorant preachers of the gospel of brute force, would-be patriots who desire their own country to increase at the cost of all other countries, not merely in ignorance of the fact that the crude birth-rate is not the index of increase, but reckless of the effect their desire, if fulfilled, would have upon all the higher and finer ends of living."[1]

[1] H. Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, p. 159.

CHAPTER IV

EUGENIC FACTORS

Progress, we have just said, depends more on the quality of the race than on quantity. This is the eugenic outlook, which, instead of viewing the population question merely from the numerical side, rather emphasizes the quality of the nation's children to be born. While social reform aims at improving the environment of man, ameliorating his conditions, eugenists look upon procreation as the most important means for bettering the nature of man by selective breeding. "Not only to propagate, but to propagate upwards"[1] by encouraging the breeding of good stocks and preventing that of the bad; to devise measures for the regulation of marriage with this purpose in view; and to direct selection in marriage towards a nobler and higher end for uplifting the race, physical, mental, and moral—these are the endeavours of the eugenists. We shall deal with their several proposals in so far as they come within the purview of sexual ethics.

1. Marriage Regulation.

Marriage regulation, conceived in the eugenic spirit, has a double purport: it aims at checking and weeding out the socially undesirable types (negative or restrictive eugenics); and, on the other hand, it tries to encourage the mating and propagation of the socially desirable types (positive eugenics). So far, the whole weight of the

[1] Nietzsche, "Thus Spake Zarathustra," *On Child and Marriage*, part i.

eugenic armoury has been thrown on the side of negative eugenics. For it is here that the arguments against existing social evils are most penetrating, and the remedies suggested for abating them most effectual. It is otherwise with the positive proposals. Here little or nothing has been done. Not that recommendations have been wanting; but the searchlight of criticism has shattered most of the suggestions and shown that positive eugenic betterment of the race is, to say the least, premature in its attempts, if not futile and dangerous.

If we intend breeding for the good points in the make-up of man, we must first of all know what are the desirable qualities. This is just what we are ignorant of; nor, if we did know, have we at present the required scientific skill of breeding for them by any direct method. As Dr. A. F. Tredgold so well says: "It is extremely doubtful whether many of the special 'qualities' or 'faculties' which characterize mankind at the present day can, as such, be bred."[1] A more general device of eugenists is to recommend the encouragement of a single social type, that of "social worth." Galton, the founder of Eugenics, advocated, as early as 1883, that "local endowments, and perhaps adoptions, might be made in favour of those of both sexes who showed evidence of high race and of belonging to prolific and thriving families. . . . Better races would be given a better chance of marrying early."[2] But what are the high attainments that are to be the evidence of good races? Galton himself admits that "we cannot forecast their form," showing thereby more wisdom than his successors. The Whethams, for instance, do not hesitate to proclaim that they have found the desirable type in those who have been, accord-

[1] Dr. A. F. Tredgold, "Marriage Regulation and National Family Records," *Eugenic Review*, p. 96. April, 1912.

[2] Francis Galton, *Inquiries into Human Faculty*, second edition, p. 214. London.

ing to their computation, successful in the struggle for existence—namely, the middle and upper classes of society.[1] Their whole argument is based upon this false supposition of "the survival of the fittest," a modern relic of the old misapplication of the Darwinian principle of "natural selection" to human society. The fittest to survive, the fittest that have survived, are by no means always the best, those most worthy of surviving, according to the highest human ideal. On the contrary, as Professor Hobhouse rightly observes: "Upon the whole it is probable that the harder and more self-regarding qualities still play a larger part than the gentler and more social in determining success."[2] It is at least possible that the inventor, the artist and the *littérateur*, not to mention the pure scientist, given to their unremunerative pursuits and failing to gain worldly success in the accepted sense, might be at least as valuable to society as the 'captain of industry,' the high financier, and the millionaire; and, on the other hand, many of the notabilities of high life have nothing to recommend them but their title and their money.

We may then, with Saleeby, reject all positive proposals that aim at "direct legislation for the mating and parenthood of the worthy" as not practicable.[3] The positive direct eugenic method fails us. There remains only the positive indirect method, that of trying to change the environmental factor of man, so that room may be given for the most desirable social types to survive and flourish. Instead of deliberately marking out certain human types for propagation, the indirect method aims at the natural selection of the desirable stocks by creating an appropriate

[1] W. C. D. and C. D. Whetham, *The Family and the Nation*. London, 1909.

[2] L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 47. London, 1911.

[3] C. W. Saleeby, *The Methods of Race-Regeneration*, p. 21. London, 1911.

environment for them.[1] Without perfect equality of opportunity for all classes alike, there is no possibility of determining the actual merit of any one individual. The presumption is strongly in favour of the conclusion that the fit, as well as the unfit, are not confined to any one social class.[2] "Society must be so arranged that the fittest to survive *are* the best of the nation. Success should be attainable according to a real order of merit, instead of being based, as is at present largely the case, on monetary and social influences. The way should be open to all talent without social distinction or material hindrance. The so-called ladder of education for the masses is by no means sufficient to bring out all that the nation is capable of in intellectual effort; while propagation among the intellectual classes is greatly in need of encouragement by economic facilities."[3] The fact is, as Professor Hobhouse puts it: "The broad duty of society is so to arrange its institutions that success is to the socially fit, and this is only possible in proportion as the social order is based on principles of a just and equitable organization."[4]

We are on more practical ground when we come to the field of negative eugenics. Here we are face to face with certain dysgenic elements which can be successfully attacked by direct methods. We are referring to insanity, feeble-mindedness, deaf-mutism, etc., with which must be coupled certain diseases due to racial poisons, such as syphilis, chronic alcoholism, and so forth. All that is necessary in the case of the first-mentioned pathological conditions is to impose legal restrictions upon all those who

[1] See the author's *Eugenics in Relation to Social Reform*, Westminster Review, October, 1913.

[2] See the author's "The Discovery of the Fittest," *Westminster Review*, January, 1911.

[3] *Eugenics in Relation to Social Reform*, *loc. cit.*, p. 385.

[4] L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 55.

are permanently affected. This involves the segregation of the individuals thus afflicted, in order to prevent them from propagating their kind and thus transmitting their own unsound constitution. There cannot be any doubt that insanity should be regarded as a strong bar against marriage. But not only this; if insanity breaks out after marriage has taken place, it should be considered, under certain safeguards, as a sufficient ground for dissolving the marriage.[1]

As regards feeble-mindedness, we hardly need to enter into a discussion of its baneful effect upon society. It is now an admitted commonplace that a large proportion of those addicted to vice and criminality are recruited from the army of half-witted individuals who, on account of their mental condition, are unfit to realize their social responsibility. In so far as prostitution, illegitimacy, and habitual criminality are due to this factor, they could be considerably reduced by eliminating the undesirable feeble-minded elements of society altogether from the process of propagation. A right step in this direction has been made by the passing of the Mental Deficiency Act in 1914, which gave power, under certain conditions, to supervise and, if need be, to detain in proper institutions idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded, and moral imbeciles; though, in order to be truly effective, the powers given for this purpose need considerable strengthening.[2]

Of venereal disease we have little to say here, the subject having been dealt with already under its appropriate heading. Here we are mainly concerned with its dysgenic effect on the population. There can be no doubt that venereal disease, and especially syphilis, being

[1] This is the conclusion reached by the Majority of the Royal Commission on Divorce. See the Report, p. 106.

[2] Evelyn Fox, "The Mental Deficiency Act and its Administration," *Eugenic Review*. April, 1918.

fraught with such dire consequences for the infected individuals and their offspring, should be one of the absolute bars against marriage. There is the more reason for stringency in this matter, since the campaign for combating venereal disease has made it clear to the populace that syphilis, as well as gonorrhœa, is in most cases curable nowadays, so that there can be no further plea of ignorance. Unfortunately, the public conscience in England has not yet awakened sufficiently to view the transmission of venereal disease—even if unwilful—with the severity it deserves. In English law it is still a moot point whether infection of the wife by the husband after marriage—when the disease has been acquired subsequent to the marriage—is a sufficient ground for divorce, a state of affairs which can only be termed—as far as the wife is concerned—"a legal barbarity." The Royal Commission on Venereal Disease did not see its way "to recommend any action on this question by legislation."[1] Yet the same Commissioners propose that "it should be laid down by law that the presence of venereal disease in an infectious state constitutes an incapacity for marriage, whether or not the presence of disease is known,"[2] and agrees with the Royal Commission on Divorce, which recommends that under these circumstances a decree annulling the marriage should be obtainable "provided that the suit is instituted within a year of the celebration of the marriage."[3] It is hard to see why the law should not be made as explicit in the former case as in the latter. Surely, in cases of syphilis acquired after marriage, generally due to adultery, the wife should be entitled to at least the same legal protection as when venereal disease was present at the time of marriage.

[1] Final Report of Royal Commission on Venereal Disease, p. 58. 1916.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 57. [3] Report of Royal Divorce Commission, p. 118.

It is hard to give any explanation of the vagaries of the British conscience.

There is a distinct trend noticeable in most modern countries towards making the communication of venereal disease a punishable offence. In Denmark, as Flexner tells us, "it is made a punishable offence to communicate venereal infection even as between husband and wife; any person who in ignorance of his or her condition infects another is liable for the medical charges and damages."[1] Mark the emphasis of the writer on the 'even' as between husband and wife! What a commentary on our present marriage system! As if a wife were less entitled to consideration than other females. And yet the Royal Commissioners did not see their way to giving English wives this legal protection against the sins of their husbands. It is important, as Havelock Ellis points out, that "in any enactment no stress should be put on the infection being conveyed 'knowingly.'"[2] Such a clause easily leads to evasion of the law by enabling the guilty party to plead ignorance of the fact. "It should be at least necessary [for the infecting parties] to prove that they have been fortified in their ignorance by medical advice."[3]

We have little to say of chronic alcoholism, for this is due to a complexity of individual and social factors with which we have no concern here. In so far as it constitutes a disease—and it must be reckoned as such in all severe cases—it comes under the same rule as chronic insanity; and the same remedies apply.

The eugenic remedy for tuberculosis, so long as this white plague remains endemic amongst us, is to advise strictly against marrying into consumptive families, at least where there is no intention of foregoing the prospect of progeny. But this can only be taken as a temporary

[1] A. Flexner, *Prostitution in Europe*, p. 347.
[2] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 349. [3] *Ibid.*

measure. What is much more important in regard to this disease is not how to eliminate consumptive man, but how to eliminate the bacillus of consumption, which is purely and simply a matter of social hygiene.

We have indicated above that segregation would be a simple and ideal solution of the problem of negative eugenics. It would be the most efficacious means of excluding all undesirable types from propagation, and thus preventing them once for all from handing on their dysgenic qualities to successive generations. But though simple in principle, this method is at the present stage of public enlightenment hardly feasible. Public sentiment is not sufficiently alive yet in these matters to contemplate with favour any permanent segregation of certain dysgenic types. It still looks upon all such measures as an infringement of personal liberty, forgetting that such persons are a danger to society and, in the case of feeble-mindedness, very frequently have little or no realization of their own individuality.

An alternative method has been suggested and has been carried out to some extent in some American States, viz., the sterilization of the socially unfit. It has the advantage of doing away with the necessity of depriving such people of the social amenities of life, which life-long segregation even under the best conditions must entail. It certainly is an effective absolute means of undercutting the proliferation of such undesirable types. The trouble is, it is too absolute. We are still too little informed about the composition of desirable and undesirable stocks to risk the wholesale experiment of sterilizing men and women against their will, an operation which cannot be undone. At best it can only be resorted to in a small minority of cases under quite special conditions.[1]

There remains one other practical proposition—viz.,

[1] See H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 616.

the establishment of marriage certificates for checking the undue proliferation of unhealthy individuals. Medical examination before marriage of all persons entering upon wedlock and the granting of certificates would go a long way towards exerting a legal restraint upon those unfit to marry, and would leave the field of marriage to those who are found to be healthy in body and mind. The idea is very enticing and hygienically sound. The first step in this direction has been made in the State of New York, where it is compulsory for all couples applying for a marriage licence to sign a form of declaration to the effect that they have never had (or, if they have ever had, have been pronounced free from) venereal disease.[1] But while compulsory marriage certificates may be workable with regard to some of the most obvious and easily diagnosed diseases, a wider eugenic application of the same system is by no means so simple. In the first instance, once more, we can by no means be sure whether in trying to weed out certain noxious characteristics from man we do not thereby reject at the same time some advantageous, highly desirable types. No one has yet been able to bring forward a scientific scheme of intellectual, let alone moral, valuation of human beings, excepting the extremes of mental and moral deficiency; nor do we know how physical health is correlated with social qualities. We are far from the state of being able to interfere wisely and efficiently by compulsion in matters eugenic.

Furthermore, as Saleeby points out, it must not be forgotten that marriage is not identical with parenthood.[2] Under a system of marriage certification those who do not come up to the required standard may be prevented from marrying, but they will not thereby be necessarily cut off from propagation. This could only be done by

[1] *Eugenic Review*, p. 200. October, 1917.
[2] C. W. Saleeby, *The Methods of Race-Regeneration*, p. 24.

stringent segregation; otherwise the dysgenic elements will only be driven into irregular sex unions, which no law can prevent. On the other hand, though the State has a right to look to its future citizens, it is hardly entitled —except in extreme cases—to forbid anyone to marry. There are people who, though afflicted with some disease, are fully aware of their social responsibility; having found the right partner, they wish to live a conjoint life, whilst giving up with a heavy heart the prospect of having children. Their very conscience singles them out as good citizens, and to stigmatize them as socially unfit in the face of their resolution would appear sheer cruelty. All that can be done in such cases is to trust to their good sense for avoiding parenthood, which will only bring misery to themselves and their offspring. For this purpose it is necessary that prospective parents be instructed in the right use of contraceptive methods, which thus are seen to form an integral part of any thoroughgoing scheme of eugenics. Matters of love and marriage can only be left to the free choice of the persons concerned. What we have to do is so to educate public feeling as to engender a proper sense of parental and social responsibility, in order that we may be able to rely upon voluntary marriage selection as the final and most effective means of selective breeding.

2. Marriage Selection.

In a previous chapter it was shown that love is due to a process of sexual attraction, mainly physical, but surcharged in human beings with a spiritual content. It is shown that from a fairly low level in the animal series a choice in mating takes place between male and female, to which Darwin gave the name of "sexual selection." Darwin himself attributed this choice to conscious

selection on the part of the females, and did not hesitate to endow even lowly organized animals with æsthetic faculties for this purpose. The theory in its original form has never found much favour among scientists, and has in fact been given up as untenable. But even so, though it has been found that the lower kinds of animal species are incapable of true æsthetic judgment in Darwin's sense, there is no doubt whatsoever that definite choice between male and female does take place during mating. In order to vindicate Darwin's theory, it is only necessary to substitute an unconscious instinctive prompting for the deliberate selection of mates posited by Darwin. All the various contrivances of courtship, the displays and combats of animals, have, according to modern theory, the purpose of bringing about in both mates a state of sexual excitement, a desire for physical mutual contact. It is this stimulation during courtship that, bringing the female into the appropriate sexual state, leads her ultimately to choose the mate most capable of arousing the pairing instinct in her. The female's choice, then, denotes a victory for the most enticing, the most vigorous, and the most enduring rival—in other words, a victory for beauty and strength.[1] It will be seen that selective mating becomes in this way a most powerful factor for race improvement, being in fact only one of the means of natural selection.

Among human beings the same biological considerations still hold good, though they are overlaid and to a large extent distorted by disturbing social factors. It still remains a truth—though not so invariably as one would wish it—that, as Grant Allen once put it, "we *do* fall in love, taking us in the lump, with the young, the strong, and the healthy; we do not fall in love with the aged, the

[1] See H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. III., p. 33; also the author's *Physiology and Psychology of Sex*, p. 88.

ugly, the feeble, and the sickly."[1] Though accepting this statement, we must not forget that it is true only in a general way, in so far as society shows an upward progression, only so long as the natural process of sexual selection is not interfered with. So soon as love, or its equivalent in primitive society, sexual desire, ceases to be the true selective factor in mating, the law of progressive selection in man is abrogated. Now there cannot be any doubt that, while on the whole the children of the people have kept true to the natural law of love,* the over-civilized, spoilt darlings of the upper classes have given up to a large extent following their own bent in love. Class, influence, and money have the deciding voice, where Nature herself should rule—with the result that not beauty and vigour win in the race of the world, but sordid mammon and position. Again, with the development of social hygiene, a good many of those have been saved who, under worse social conditions, would have failed in the struggle for existence. This has led to a lowering of the standard of fitness in the choice of mates. While there is no gainsaying the fact that a vigorous mind may dwell in a feeble body and that robust health may go with a feeble mind, on the whole it is not good that the weakling, either of body or mind, should mate.

It is essential for the good of the race that a true ideal of fitness be inculcated in the young, a fitness valued not according to worldly success, but according to intrinsic merit and moral worth. Natural selection, working blindly, and often undone by human greed and weakness, must be replaced, as D. G. Ritchie so felicitously expressed it, by "rational selection."[2] The first step towards this

[1] Grant Allen, *Falling in Love and other Essays*, p. 4. London, 1889.

* See *ante:* on selection in love among the rural and urban working class population.

[2] D. G. Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, p. 100. London, 1903.

ends, as Saleeby insists, "to widen the field of choice, at present ludicrously restricted by custom, class, religious and economic position."[1] True selection for parenthood, the choosing of the best "co-creator" of the future generation, must be instilled into every youth and girl as a solemn duty, the highest aim in life, the one great act which enfolds the destiny not only of the loving couple itself, but of the whole race. It is for this reason that the voluntary use of medical marriage certificates is of such importance. Though leaving love to the free play of Nature, we are becoming aware that we cannot trust Nature blindly any longer. We must use whatever knowledge science can give us, in order to make sure of the health and happiness of the future progeny. Though deprecating compulsory eugenic legislation, we cannot but see in the effort towards a voluntary system of marriage certification a most welcome move in the right direction. "Such certificate," according to Havelock Ellis, "would imply an enquiry and examination into the ancestry of the candidate as well as into his (or her) constitution, health, intelligence, and character. . . . Its chief distinction would be that its possession would be a kind of patent of natural nobility, the man or woman who held it would be one of Nature's aristocrats, to whom the future of the race might be safely left without further question."[2]

Who, then, are going to be these aristocrats that are to be the trustees of the future? We have said that in a general way the natural law of sexual selection holds good for man and woman as well as for the animal world. We still have to determine what in a given society are the qualities most desired. Havelock Ellis has shown that the average man tends to admire those characteristics which

[1] C. W. Saleeby, *Parenthood and Race-Culture*, p. 197. London, 1909.

[2] H. Ellis, *The Task of Social Hygiene*, p. 202.

embody most completely the type of his own race, individual taste generally varying within the limits of this type.[1] The racial or national types represent the most perfect male and female specimens of a given race, the fundamental difference between man and woman in each case being due to their natural differentiation of function. On the whole, what man admires in woman is beauty expressive of her female function (breasts, hips, etc.);[2] and woman interprets manliness as virile strength.[3] This corresponds with the original division of labour between the two sexes, woman being the bearer of children, man doing his share as supporter and defender of the home. But though there exists thus a thorough-going natural division between man and woman, which can never be violated without vital loss to the race, it would be a great error nevertheless to insist upon the immutability of the natural standard.

Among animals, we know, a constant progressive change takes place, a change which we call evolution. In Man there is superadded to biological evolution, which takes place extremely slowly and in small stages, a social change which, acting more rapidly, is capable of modifying human life most deeply and extensively. Such a sociological change has taken place in Man with his advance from savagery to civilization. The physical difference between man and woman has, if anything, become more accentuated with the progress of civilization (a fact we have referred to previously). There is no doubt, however, that in the mental sphere, where the advance of Man has been most pronounced, the original distinction between the male and female type has become much less definite. Primitive masculinity, wont to rely on brute force and building upon the warlike spirit of a man-made society,

[1] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. IV., pp. 175, 210.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 156. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

has with the progress of centuries given way to a much less aggressive type of manhood. The rise of modern science, arts, and industry has tended to produce, as Rosa Mayreder has shown so well, a more refined, sensitive, and peaceful kind of citizen.[1] "The ethical side of the physical superiority by which man constituted himself the lord and protector of the woman and child has lost its significance under the postulates of modern government. The 'strong hand,' which in other social conditions was indispensable to individual man and was justly the foundation of his predominance, has become altogether superfluous."[2] Man in becoming more humane tends to approximate to the feminine type, without thereby necessarily losing the charm of manliness in the eyes of the female sex. The standard of sexual selection has gradually altered with changed conditions of life.

But, while the changed mentality of man is an accomplished fact, there still exists a good deal of opposition to the new kind of woman that has been evolving during the last half-century. There has arisen an intellectual type of woman that refuses to be pressed into the universal mould of conventional soft femininity. We have already pointed out previously in this book that, whatever fundamental difference there may exist between man and woman, it is not so thorough-going and absolute as to render woman a mere child-bearing, man-serving machine. We have seen that there exist all gradations of sexual types; and they all have to play their rôle in life. We cannot afford to exclude from motherhood the most intelligent and independent types of womanhood. But this is exactly what is happening at the present time. "Women who have mental interests, who care about

[1] Rosa Mayreder, *A Survey of the Woman Problem*, chapter on "Masculinity."
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

art and literature or politics, who desire a career, or who value their liberty, will gradually grow rarer and be replaced by the placid, maternal type which has no interest outside the home and no dislike of the burden of motherhood."[1]

Besides, there exists a type of woman who, whilst making an excellent mother and being willing, nay, eager, to fulfil her natural calling, yet at the same time feels bound to refuse marriage because it degrades her either to a household drudge or an idle society lady. And it is just such women that are the most original, most courageous, and most energetic members of their sex. To relegate them to the limbo of the 'third sex' involves a social calamity. The prejudice against the masculine woman and the feminine man is nothing but the expression of a wholesome biological instinct. Yet we should not forget that mere capacity for child-bearing is not, and cannot be any longer, the be-all and end-all of feminine virtue. Though it remains the *conditio sine qua non* of healthy progeny, "the idea of leaving maternity to a docile and domesticated type of cow-like placidity, while the intellectuals run the world, is curiously non-biological";[2] anti-social, we should rather say, because dysgenic. Nor is man, the fighter, the most attractive or desirable social type in a society to come. In short, masculinity and femininity are toning down, approaching nearer to each other in their psychic bearing, and leading up to a harmony of life hitherto undreamt of. It is for the new generation to act up to these ideals and make them a reality by means of a new canon of marriage selection. In the end, it is by sexual selection that the world is transformed—and we have the means of transforming it.

[1] Bertrand Russell, "Marriage and the Population Question," *International Journal of Ethics*, p. 451. July, 1916 (republished in *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, London, 1916).

[2] J. A. Thomson, *The Position of Woman*, p. 23.

CHAPTER V

ECONOMIC FACTORS

THERE exists a fundamental difference between the parental function of man and that of woman. Man, not being biologically burdened by his parenthood, is able to apply all his energies to his work, giving so much attention to home and family as desire and inclination tempt him to devote to them. It is quite otherwise with woman. Her motherhood involves through the bearing and rearing of children such an expenditure of energy as to create a serious problem when she wishes to employ her capacity in any other direction. So long as woman was content to live "in the moated grange of the home" no such conflict existed. With the advent of the modern woman's movement, however, her view turned outward, beyond the range of the home. It is this double envisagement of life, the combination of professional occupation with motherhood, that has produced the difficult problem of woman's work at the present time.

1. WOMAN'S WORK.

"In early society each sex has its own pursuits. The man is responsible for the protection of the family, and ultimately for its support. His occupations are such as require strength and agility—fighting, hunting, fishing, etc. The woman's principal occupations are of a domestic kind: procuring of wood and water, preparing food, dressing skins, making clothes, the care of children,

etc."[1] In other words, woman is identified with work in and around the home, while man provides for it and defends it. If, as Mason points out,[2] woman has the principal share in the originating and making of primitive culture by her inventions of weaving, spinning, pottery, etc., it has been man's task to organize woman's labour. This division of labour, due, according to Professor Thomas, in the first instance to differences in the organization of man and woman, is so far inherent in primitive society that it is considered an indignity for a man to undertake woman's labour, and vice versa.[3] Right into the Middle Ages and beyond, as long as home handicrafts flourished, woman's work included, besides bearing and rearing the children, the homely tasks of weaving, spinning, bread-making, etc. In the small home industries, before the invention of steam-power, she had to bear her full share of the production. It is modern civilization, says Olive Schreiner, that has tended "to rob women, not merely in part, but almost wholly, of the more valuable of her ancient domains of productive and social labour."[4] For "if machinery and the command of inanimate motor-forces have rendered of comparatively little value the male's mere physical motor-power, the demand upon his intellectual faculties, the call for the expenditure of nervous energy, and the exercise of delicate manipulative skill in the labour of human life, have immeasurably increased."[5] To woman no such compensation in the true sense has been vouchsafed. For in so far as she stays at home, she is condemned to a routine of duties which, compared with other outside activities, seems dull

[1] Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, chap. xxvi.
[2] O. T. Mason, *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture*, London, 1895.
[3] Thomas, *Sex and Society*, p. 140.
[4] Olive Schreiner, *Woman and Labour*, p. 50. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

and wearisome; while, when she attempts an independent career outside the home, other obstacles obtrude themselves, quite apart from the old difficulties of procuring work of intellectual quality to suit her higher needs. It is true, the old bastions against woman's higher vocations have now definitely fallen, and the time is not far when the whole field of labour will be as free to woman as to man; yet the question remains still unanswered how this claim of woman to work is to be reconciled with the call to motherhood. We shall be best able to conduct our enquiry by distinguishing between the industrial occupation of the female worker and the higher professionalism of the middle-class woman; for, as we shall see, these cases present somewhat different aspects.

It hardly needs pointing out that the employment of women in industry on a large scale is an established fact, a phenomenon that is firmly rooted in our present economic system and which shows no tendency of abating. On the contrary, the double pressure of post-war conditions and woman's fight for freedom has, if anything, increased the trend to women's industrial occupation. And the reason is not far to seek. The cause that originally drove women to become wage-earners, the need for supplementing the family budget, still weighs upon the vast majority of the population and will continue to do so, as long as the social distribution of wealth is such as to make the man's income insufficient to support the family in comfort. This economic motive will always force women to seek labour outside the home, in spite of all the warnings of hygienists and social reformers. As a matter of fact, it remains the only solution for all those women who, being left out either temporarily or permanently in the race for marriage, have to provide a livelihood for themselves. It can only be a question of so arranging the conditions of employment for women as to

lessen the strain of work, in order to inflict the least possible injury upon the future mother and her offspring.

In spite of much that has been written on the subject, there is at present very little scientific information with regard to the effect of industrial work on the health of girls. The evidence as to the influence of menstruation on work, and vice versa, is still very conflicting.[1] The question whether work suffers seriously during the menstrual period, and, on the other hand, whether heavy work during menstruation is of serious ulterior consequence to motherhood, still awaits full scientific investigation. One thing can be said: it is still too often the case that woman's work is organized on the masculine level. Such a strain is bound to have harmful consequences on the future generation. Still worse stands the problem with the married woman who has children. Here there cannot be any doubt that employment away from the home under present conditions cannot but be deleterious to the health of the mother and her offspring. It must not be forgotten that the mere bearing and suckling of children is a heavy drain on the mother, and that any energy expended on extraneous work is necessarily withdrawn from its proper function. But here, too, statistical evidence is equivocal. Thus it has been found that industrial employment has a bad influence on infant mortality; yet poverty has a still worse effect.[2] And it is at least possible that it is not the woman's outside work, but rather the general condition of poverty, that is the determining factor.[3] For it has been found that the weight of children (at the age of twelve months) scarcely

[1] See on this point: H. Ellis, *Man and Woman*, p. 349.—H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 71.—D. J. Collier. *The Girl in Industry*, p. 35. London, 1918.—*Disabilities of Women as Workers*. Fabian Society, 1909, p. 5.

[2] City of Birmingham Report on Infant Mortality, 1911.

[3] *Disabilities of Mothers as Workers*. Fabian Soc., 1909, p. 21.

differs between those whose mothers are industrially employed and those whose mothers are not; while, on the contrary, the wage earned by the father makes a most material difference to the babies in this respect.[1] It is acute poverty much more than industrial employment of the mother that seems to be the decisive factor.[2]

It may perhaps be admitted that in general it is not so much the work itself that is harmful, as the conditions under which the work has to be done.[3] In any case, seeing that the tendency for women to work cannot be checked, we have to take measures to minimize the danger to mother and child. It cannot be our business to go into details about such schemes, which have only a palliative value. Pure milk supplies, breast-feeding of infants at the factory, women's insurance during confinement, compulsory rest before and after the birth of the child—they are all useful palliatives, but they cannot solve the intrinsic problem of married women's work. The fact is that, as Helene Lange so truly remarks, modern woman's life belongs to two spheres, to the industrial system and that of the family, each with its own laws; and between these spheres there exists, so far as woman is concerned, a crass dissonance.[4]

In order to cut the Gordian knot, two radical remedies have been suggested. One is, to prohibit married women's work altogether. This, even if it were possible, which it is not, is undesirable. Apart from the material necessity, which under our present system cannot be done away with, there is the insistent call of woman for individual liberty, which can only be attained upon the basis of complete economic independence. To this we shall come

[1] City of Birmingham on Infant Mortality, p. 19.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 20.
[3] *Disabilities of Mothers as Workers*, p. 8.
[4] Helene Lange, *Die Frauenbewegung*, second edition. Leipzig, 1914.

later. The other extreme solution is that advocated by Charlotte Perkins Gilman, who holds that every woman should devote herself to some social task in order to earn her livelihood, while the home, such as it will be according to her conception, should be run on professional lines by experts. What she imagines is a sort of State-nurseries where the children will be taken care of by an experienced staff during the absence of the parents, the mother in common with the father taking as much spiritual interest in the children as leisure and inclination will allow.[1] Her arguments are that not only must women acquire economic independence, though they are mothers—to which we may agree in principle—but also that the mere physical fact of maternity does not necessarily make a woman a naturally good mother; that trained educators, specially fitted for the profession, will do the work so much better than unfit mothers. This also cannot be gainsaid.

But even thus it does not follow that the family home as such must be broken up in order to give way to communal households. This is rather a crude solution—it is like emptying out the child with the bath. It implies a very mechanical, rationalized conception of motherhood, and loses sight entirely of the emotional inward bond between mother and child. Ellen Key, arguing against State crèches, points out that such a plan is invalidated because it depends on three underlying, unprovable assumptions: firstly, "that woman's mental and spiritual work in the home is of no 'productive' value"; secondly, "that parents are incapable of acquiring proficiency as educators, unless they are 'born' educators"; and thirdly, "that Nature amply provides such 'born' educators."[2] Indeed, Ellen Key goes much farther.

[1] Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Woman and Economics*, sixth edition, chaps. xiii. and xiv. London, 1908.

[2] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 231; also *The Renaissance of Motherhood*, p. 131.

Whilst emphasizing the original claim of woman to independence, she deprecates the old tendency of the woman's movement towards the usurpation of man's occupations, and preaches a return to motherhood. To accept the male standard is to her mind "an abuse of true woman's strength," tending to undo all the good for which woman is otherwise destined.[1] With this we cannot but be in full agreement. As Havelock Ellis says: "Each sex must seek to reach the goal by following the laws of its own nature."[2] We may take it that to bear and rear children is woman's special domain; but—and with this we come back to our previous issue—is it her only task in life? Can woman, in fulfilling her social obligation as mother, do so without at the same time sacrificing her own individuality, her soul? So far a real solution of the problem of woman's labour seems under present conditions to be unattainable.

We shall probe somewhat more deeply into the finer issues of the problem by taking into consideration the position of the more educated classes of women, those who aspire to a professional status and are often gifted with great artistic and scientific ability. Here we are not confronted with "the monstrous absurdity," as Wells calls it, "of women discharging their supreme social function, bearing and rearing children, in their spare time as it were, while they 'earn their living' by contributing some half-mechanical element to some trivial industrial product."[3] It is not so much a mere question of wage-earning alone, but often a career is looked upon as one of the essentials of life, giving a full outlet to woman's capacities. It is an attempt to live life in an individual, often highly artistic and spiritual, manner, for

[1] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 212.
[2] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 75.
[3] H. G. Wells, *Socialism and the Family*, p. 59. London, 1907.

which home life rarely offers adequate opportunities. Here the two spheres of woman's life are more evenly balanced, and a choice between their respective merits in each individual case is often extremely difficult. Of course, it goes without saying that for the average woman motherhood will ever be the vital issue, the great recompense of life. Still, as Rosa Mayreder points out, "whoever regards motherhood as the equivalent of intellectual productivity overlooks the fact that a work is the achievement of a personality, but not so a child."[1] And it is in so far as woman strives to develop her inmost self, to recover her soul, that there has arisen the clash between her maternal instinct and her higher intellectual endeavours.

It can now be regarded as fairly proven that mental work has intrinsically no unfavourable ulterior influence upon physical motherhood;[2] college education has been shown not to have any prejudicial effect upon the capacity of women to bear children.[3] In this respect the opposition to the study of women has turned out to be entirely groundless; though, be it said, nowadays the entry of women into the professions is considered in quite a new light and is not viewed any longer as a contest with male competitors, necessary in order to prove woman's intrinsic ability. Woman has proven herself worthy in the field she has chosen as her own.

It is a different question how far, conversely, woman's sex affects her work; how far modifications are necessary in her training and career to meet her special needs. To this we shall return later. Here we are concerned with the difficulty that arises from the fact that mental

[1] Rosa Mayreder, *A Survey of the Woman Problem*, p. 69.

[2] Adele Gerhard and Helene Simon, *Mutterschaft und Geistige Arbeit*, second edition, p. 239. Berlin, 1908.—*Disabilities of Women as Workers*, p. 9.

[3] National Birth-Rate Commission, pp. 19, 323.

work interferes to a large extent with the proper function of motherhood, and vice versa. Even apart from the circumstance that the intellectual drain on the mother is apt to tell upon her during pregnancy and lactation, there is the reciprocal effect of the bearing and upbringing of the children on the mental work of the mother. After an exhaustive survey of the question Adele Gerhard and Helene Simon, in their masterly book on *Motherhood and Mental Work*,[1] come to the conclusion that high intellectual work and motherhood are, generally speaking, incompatible. The one or the other is bound to suffer in the combination. The case differs here from that of the industrial worker. Among the working-class the offspring are liable to suffer through want of material care. In the middle class the mother is generally able to provide an efficient substitute to look after the physical needs of the children; but what she cannot delegate to a stranger is the emotional and spiritual affection which plays so large a part in the life of mother and child. And it is just this relationship that a sensible and keenly alive mother will cherish most. As the two aforesaid writers show, there is a deep cleavage in the inner life of woman as artist and mother; yet—paradoxical as it sounds—they come to the conclusion that psychically woman seems, at her best, capable of fulfilling her true destiny only in the combination of both.[2] Thus, while Nature has imposed a heavy burden on woman as mother, civilization, by developing her personality, has increased it to an unbearable degree.

What, then, is the remedy? Is there a remedy? There can be no idea of going back to primitive conditions, when woman, being the chattel of man, unquestioningly

[1] Adele Gerhard and Helene Simon, *Mutterschaft und Geistige Arbeit.*

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 191, 197.

fulfilled at the same time the double function of rearing the race and toiling at the bidding of man, as hard as her strength would allow her. Such notions may be considered as hopelessly antiquated and finally disposed of. Laura Marholm's bold assertion that "woman is physically and spiritually an empty capsule, awaiting to be filled by man"[1] is merely the belated expression by a talented woman writer of the old school of thought. If anything, the trend has been in the opposite direction of looking upon woman too exclusively as a human being and of ignoring—incidentally—her sex. We must discountenance both these extreme views.

As we have shown in a previous chapter, there is no hard-and-fast line between masculinity and femininity; all sorts and conditions of personalities exist and ought to be recognized and provided for. The "teleological limitations of sex," borne easily by some women, are felt by others as a serious hindrance in the development of their true self. "Such women," says Rosa Mayreder, "are the 'unwomanly ones'—no doubt less useful for men and the elemental sex purpose and yet indispensable factors of the advancing processes of civilization."[2] "Mediocrity of temperament," argues James Hinton, "is the best security for domestic happiness; but domestic happiness may not be the be-all and end-all of the Divine plan for all Nature's children."[3] Indeed, has it ever struck those insistent advocates of the 'stay-at-home' convention that there exist women who are "sexual and philoprogenitive without being sedulously maternal?"[4] Or that there are others to whom love by no means implies surrender of personal liberty? What such women

[1] Laura Marholm, *Das Buch der Frauen*, p. 2. Leipzig, 1895.
[2] Rosa Mayreder, *A Survey of the Woman Problem*, p. 63.
[3] Quoted in Mrs. Havelock Ellis's *Three Modern Seers*, p. 27.
[4] H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*, p. 208.

reject is not marriage, but the hampering conditions of domestic life. Indeed, Edward Carpenter even envisages the evolution of a new sexual type, that of the female neuter "not adapted for child-bearing, but with a marvellous and perfect instinct of social service."[1]

There certainly exists a distinct disinclination on the part of modern women to submit to the monotony of home surroundings. As Havelock Ellis points out, after the bustle and excitement of life in the congenial company of her co-workers it is difficult for the newly married wife to settle down to the placid routine of domestic life.[2] Besides this, there exists what Dr. Phœbe Sheavyn calls the "disengaged class" of women—*i.e.*, those free from the absorbing duties of motherhood, either because they have no children or because their children no longer need maternal care.[3] It must not be forgotten that once the children go to school the mother is freed for a considerable part of the day from looking after her young ones, and that unless she finds some other occupation time is bound to drag heavily with her. And this is still more the case when the children are all grown up. Assuming that a woman marries at the age of twenty (or twenty-five) and has four or five children, she will be engaged for about twenty-five years with the upbringing and the direct supervision of her children; at forty-five (or fifty) she becomes one of the disengaged class. What then? No wonder Olive Schreiner speaks of sex parasitism, of a class of women who find no other occupation than a dreary round of empty social calls, and at best the ever-ready expedient of charitable work.

The fact is that civilization, in emancipating woman from the bondage of her sex, has by this very process

[1] Edward Carpenter, *Love's Coming of Age*, p. 67.
[2] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 21.
[3] Phœbe Sheavyn, in *The Position of Woman*, p. 84.

widened the outlook of womanly obligations. Trying to be above—and, as has been disparagingly said, "beyond—her sex" has at least taught her the spiritual value of her sex. If man used to be "the sole significance of woman," she now aims at belonging to her own self, increasing thereby the good, not only of womankind, but also of man and mankind. Professional work has set woman on a higher plane, has enlarged her horizon, and given her a culture that has enhanced her whole being as wife and mother. Her mental enrichment has reacted on her sexual function. "The present age has discovered that motherhood"—and for that matter, wifehood too—"demands more of woman than home life. It has been learned that true mothering necessitates a knowledge of all outside conditions that influence the home."[1] True individuality of woman is essential to good motherhood and wifehood, and a vocation is the surest means towards this end.

It is for this reason, through the deepening and spiritualization of the modern idea of womanhood, that the conflict has arisen in woman as mother and worker. No longer will the female generation of our own time accept willingly the simultaneous duties of a kept mistress and a household drudge. Companionship and a real grasp of life's purpose is nowadays held to be essential for a true realization of the married state. "The fullest ideal of the woman worker," says Professor Thomson, "is she who works not merely or mainly for man as the help and instrument of their purpose, but who works with man as the instrument, yet material of her purpose."[2] The relationship to the children is affected in a similar way. As Rosa Mayreder points out: "There could be nothing

[1] "National Congress of Mothers," quoted by Gerhard and Simon in *Mutterschaft*, etc., p. 31.

[2] J. A. Thomson, *The Position of Woman*, p. 27.

more dangerous for the freedom of children and their personal development than the tendency of a mother to regard her offspring as her work, and to consider their bringing-up as the one single duty of her life."[1]

On the other hand, whilst realizing to the full the spiritual value of intellectual and social influences, we must not forget that woman is essentially not like man. Her very constitution predestines her for motherhood; and motherhood, we have seen, implies a greater responsibility, albeit also a deeper significance and joy, than fatherhood. If, as Gerhard and Simon rightly assert, the measure of woman's worth lies in the cultural value of her work,[2] it is not less true what Ellen Key says, that "woman's life is lived most intensely by means of her maternal function, uplifting the life of the race as well as her own life."[3] Yet intellectual and artistic achievements, being an asset to civilization, should not easily be sacrificed to motherhood. There must be free choice for those who feel called to that path of life; while, on the other hand, it must not be overlooked that the ultimate vocation of woman is motherhood. In order, therefore, to do justice to the cause of womanhood, both these contingencies have to be provided for.

A girl's education before the advent of the pioneer movement used to be entirely ornamental. Her accomplishments were deemed sufficient if, as one of the characters of Jane Austen has it, she possessed "a thorough knowledge of music, singing, and the modern languages."[4] Since then the tendency has been, if anything, in the opposite direction. As Dr. Phœbe Sheavyn says, "There is, on the whole, very little evidence of any

[1] Rosa Mayreder, *A Survey of the Woman Problem*, p. 70.
[2] Gerhard and Simon, *Mutterschaft*, etc., p. 322.
[3] Ellen Key, *The Woman Movement*, p. 176.
[4] Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*.

deliberate endeavour to bring the education of girls into any deep-seated relation with their own special nature. Concessions have, it is true, been made to physical and mental weakness—but concessions are a very different thing from a thought-out scheme. Concessions have also been made, in the form of classes in cookery and domestic subjects, to a practical public demand—but these are at best attempts of technical training; they are not part of a system of education based upon a study of the fundamental elements of feminine nature."[1] What is needed is a system so adapted as to meet the special physiological and psychological peculiarities of woman, as opposed to those of man. "The real task of the feminist," says the famous Swedish educationist Alsberg, "is so to devise an education for girls that they shall be capable of earning their living and sharing in the world's work, and yet remain fit for future wifehood and motherhood."[2] Whether, as some advocate, there should be distinct courses of study for male and female students taking account of their future vocations, or whether lesser modifications are sufficient to meet the same needs, is not in our province to decide. Women certainly have special aptitudes in certain directions, such as teaching, nursing, medicine, etc., which should be taken advantage of in choosing a career.

Whatever work may be undertaken by women, it certainly should be such as not to interfere with their function of motherhood. This is of special importance in industry. Here the whole system of woman's occupation needs reorganizing on a plan more in accordance with woman's special needs. Seeing that there always exists the prospect of marriage, and that work is often carried on after marriage, there must be facilities for continuing

[1] Phœbe Sheavyn in *The Position of Woman*, p. 86.
[2] Quoted *ibid.*, p. 26.

industrial work side by side with motherhood. Special kinds of work that do not need long preparation and do not suffer by interruption would have to be assigned to women. Further, in a well-ordered system provision would have to be made for half-time shifts for those women who, though mothers, still feel the call for a wider sphere. This applies, for instance, to teachers. There is no reason whatsoever why teachers should not be allowed to marry. Indeed, by some it is claimed as a distinct advantage from the educational point of view. Such a scheme would, of course, have to include a thoroughgoing reform of domestic work. Here the waste implied in the keeping-up of multifarious trivial technicalities of private house-keeping is simply appalling. Centralization by the arrangement of communal households, as advocated by Lily Braun,[1] would tend to do away with a good deal of unnecessary labour and set the overworked mother free for more useful social work. It would be the duty of the State to realize the double utility of woman and make proper plans for it. But, alas! that day is still far ahead, since at present work is still arranged, not according to the needs and worth of the personality, but on the basis of mercenary profit for the employer.

It would be a great mistake to assume that a modern woman's creative desire is fulfilled by either "a work *or* a child." She aspires to both, under certain conditions. What the pioneers of woman's rights originally demanded was free admission to all the avenues of life, the right to work—on man's lines, if necessary. It came to be seen in time that what was needed for woman was not so much the right to live as the right to live in accordance with her own nature. It slowly came to be understood that to emulate man in his achievements and yet ultimately to remain dependent upon him was a false road to liberty. If, as

[1] Lily Braun, *Die Frauenfrage*, p. 196. Leipzig, 1901.

Charlotte Perkins Gilman says, human beings are "the only species in which the female depends on the male for food, the only animal species in which the sex-relation is also an economic relation,"[1] the new woman is determined to make an end to this relationship. What she asks for is "unlimited freedom for individual development"; and she realizes that this can only be achieved by complete economic independence.

It is often argued that woman has nothing to complain of in this matter. If she does not work, she is kept—by some man or other, be he a relation or a husband. This is often quite true, though just as often starvation stares the woman in the face who has not succeeded in becoming dependent upon some man or other. And, in order to escape destitution, many a woman finds herself compelled to sell body and soul in a marriage which cannot be characterized otherwise than as "sex-slavery." Furthermore, this economic dependence of woman creates a state of affairs in marriage, in the case of serious rupture, which must be revolting to the good sense of every sensitive soul. As Wells puts it: "A woman gives herself to a man out of love, and remains clinging parasitically to him out of necessity."[2] No wonder that the law of divorce tells so heavily against woman. Even when ill-used, deceived, and tyrannized over by a wicked husband, she rarely has the courage to sue for freedom, seeing that through the interruption of her career by marriage she will be unable to maintain herself (and her dependents) by work. And this is assuming that she has had some suitable calling before marriage, which is not always the case. Well may we exclaim with Pearson: "A man may be willing enough to give, but the woman cannot morally afford to receive."[3]

[1] Charlotte Perkins Gilman, *Women and Economics*, p. 5.
[2] H. G. Wells, *Marriage*.
[3] Karl Pearson, *Ethic of Freethought*, p. 434.

Now it is self-evident that a woman is really independent only if and as long as she is able to maintain herself economically, working for and earning her own living. But as soon as she enters marriage, she ceases to be "on her own," and henceforth shares the fortune of her husband. Being kept by her husband, she so far loses her independence. For though there is a law of maintenance which forces a husband to maintain his wife, this by itself does not give the wife free choice in her expenditure, nor even in her movements, should the husband choose to restrict her. So long as a married woman is prevented from getting her living in her own way, and is bound to receive from the man she happens to have married, she cannot in any sense be said to be free. For it must not be forgotten that a man may be a tender and even attentive lover, and yet a strict taskmaster. Besides, it is hard to see why a woman's fate should be tied to the vicissitudes of her husband's worldly success or failure. There is only one means of breaking woman's chains in order to achieve true liberty for her—namely, by "the economic appreciation of her domestic work,"[1] by giving it social recognition, and bestowing upon it the full economic status such as is vouchsafed to other professions. In short, motherhood must become a profession.

2. The Endowment of Motherhood.

It is a paradox of our social conscience that, whilst talking so much about the holiness of motherhood, emphasizing its importance and insisting upon it as the true —if not the only—calling for woman, we are so slow in taking adequate steps towards fitting her for her life's task. Perhaps it is the excessive idealization of the mother's function that prevents us from giving attention to her earthly needs. "Women," says Havelock Ellis,

[1] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 382.

"are trained for nearly every avocation under the sun; for the supreme avocation of wifehood and motherhood they are not trained at all."[1] The little that is done in this direction is done sporadically by such agencies as mothers' schools, infant welfare centres, etc. If motherhood is in truth woman's natural vocation, then girls should at least be fitted for their life's work in the same manner as is done in the case of other professions. We have pointed out that in choosing occupational work for girls consideration should be given, in schooling and in the choice of trades, to their prospective motherhood. Here, in pleading for motherhood as a profession, we must take up a much more positive attitude and emphasize the need for a proper course of systematic training in all matters appertaining to the duties of wifehood and motherhood. Ellen Key advocates a special year of service for all girls after leaving public school, in which they would have to go through a course of theoretical and practical instruction on the management of home and child.[2] Such a plan, properly carried out, would at last put motherhood on a proper basis as a calling worthy of the attention and consideration of the not least intelligent section of womanhood. The profession of motherhood, including as it does a variety of experiences, gives an outlet to such a host of activities on the physical, mental, and moral plane, that once appreciated at its full value, it should prove one of the most enticing and gratifying occupations.

The movement towards a proper valuation of motherhood is slow. We have seen that the present régime has forced the mother out of the home to do work, without offering her adequate compensations, and often taking away what chances there may be of fulfilling what—by the

[1] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 520.
[2] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, p. 159.

same régime—is declared to be her highest duty to State and society. Until lately motherhood received scant recognition except empty phrases—and still less material consideration. Society is still far behind in realizing that, if healthy offspring are the result of healthy mothers, it cannot have healthy mothers by sweating them either in workshops or at home; or, worse still, in both places together. The enactments and voluntary aids for the protection of motherhood in most civilized countries are still ridiculously inadequate for providing proper security and material comforts to mother and child. We have spoken of all such efforts as lying-in benefit, maternity insurance, etc., as merely palliative. Whilst intended to lighten the working woman's burden, they are hopelessly insufficient to achieve the desired end. Even when maternity benefit is extended, as it is in some exceptional cases, to eight weeks before and after confinement, it is still far from giving to women any true material independence during the period of active motherhood. Such provisions are based on the assumption that the women thus relieved during certain periods are working outside the home and return to full work as soon as the time of stress after the confinement is over. There is no doubt that too much cannot be done in this direction; indeed, we hold that the provisions so far made are not thorough enough to achieve permanent good for mother and child.

It has been pointed out before that the modern trend is entirely against excluding women from work on account of their motherhood. Whatever is done, therefore, for the working mother must be reckoned as so much social gain. But where this scheme entirely fails is in the underlying principle. It still assumes that a woman either earns her livelihood as an independent worker in the industrial system, or otherwise remains " the unchartered

servant of the future, who receives from her husband, at *his* discretion, a share in *his* wages."[1] In short, all such endeavours towards maternity and child welfare, to be really true to the fundamental idea of motherhood, must be extended to the mother at home, such as she is ideally pictured surrounded by her children.

A step in the right direction has been taken in America with the establishment of mothers' pensions. "Maintenance grants are made, in respect of children under fourteen, to a widow or deserted mother who is a proper guardian, but too poor to feed, clothe, and 'home' her children adequately."[2] The poor mother, instead of being left to the tender mercies of private charity or being thrown in the last resort on to poor relief, is now provided for by the State, receiving a weekly family allowance without any stigma of pauperism. Such a scheme goes a long way towards recognizing the social rights of motherhood, and might be usefully extended to mothers whose family bread-winners have been incapacitated through illness or accident. But even so, as Maude Royden points out, "'maternity benefit' and 'mothers' pensions' schemes are radically different from real 'endowment of motherhood,' in that they are all given only to the poor mother, and therefore are tainted with the idea of charity rather than the recognition for service given."[3]*

Woman's true independence can only be achieved by raising the status of motherhood itself. Motherhood, instead of being built upon "the rotten foundation of a form of indentured unpaid labour," must attain to the

[1] *Equal Pay and the Family: A Proposal for the National Endowment of Motherhood.* London, 1918.

[2] Judge Neil, "Mothers' Pension," *Review of Reviews*, p. 39. July, 1917.

[3] A. Maude Royden, *The Making of Women*, p. 140.

* It is therefore wrong and certainly misleading for Dr. H. D. Harben to entitle his scheme of maternity benefit the "Endowment of Motherhood," see Fabian Tract 149. London, 1910.

full dignity of a paid profession. A system of endowment of motherhood which guarantees mothers their full pay for the work done in their home is the only means of giving woman true economic freedom. Whilst the bearing of children is a biological function and carries as such its own reward, their rearing must be regarded as a State service and be paid accordingly. Various plans have been suggested towards this end. One of the simplest is to give the wife a legal claim to part of the husband's earnings, subject to proper conditions. It would at least establish the right of the wife to be joint-owner of the husband's income. It fails in so far as it does not ensure an income to the wife when the husband fails to earn a living; and what is more, it errs in principle, because it still makes the wife dependent upon her husband's fortunes.

One of the earliest proposals for a proper system of mothers' endowment was championed by the great Swedish woman pioneer, Ellen Key. She suggested that every mother should be maintained by the community at least during the first year of each child's life; that in addition she should receive for every child born (up to a certain number) one half of its maintenance from the State, the other corresponding half being supplied by the father.[1] These ideas of Ellen Key, so fruitful for the progress of the woman's movement, have been the prototype of all later schemes for the endowment of motherhood. We shall merely outline the English scheme as advocated by a number of prominent leaders.[2]

As the basis of their proposals there is taken the separation allowances to soldiers' wives and their children during the war. These allowances were regulated, not

[1] Ellen Key, *Love and Marriage*, pp. 367 to 370.

[2] *Equal Pay and the Family*. London, 1918; also A. Maude Royden, *National Endowment of Motherhood*. London, 1918.

according to the earnings of the husband and father, but according to the needs of the family that he left behind. The rate of endowment suggested for all mothers with children is on the same scale: a certain amount for the mother, and a corresponding allowance for each successive child up to a certain age (at first up to the age of five; to be extended later to school-leaving age).* There will be no maintenance provision for the childless wife, the assumption—still rather problematical—being that she will and can earn her own living. Whether, as some suggest, a eugenic limit should be put to the number of State-maintained children may remain for the present undecided. A flat rate is advocated for all classes alike, no distinction being made between rich and poor.† For only thus can the true principle be vindicated of the right of the mother to the endowment, not as a palliative remedy for social poverty, but as a recompense for services rendered to the State.

It is hardly necessary here to expound the material advantages to mother and child accruing from such a scheme. That the proper care of children is only possible with adequate means is a foregone conclusion, the disadvantages of acute poverty for the population having been amply proven by statistics. From this point of view alone a proper system of endowment of motherhood

* The scale advocated for the present is: Mothers, eight weeks before confinement, and as long as they have one or more children under five years old, 12s. 6d.; children, until they reach the age of five (or fourteen, as it may be), 5s. a week for the first child under five, with 3s. 6d. a week for each child under five beyond the first. See *Equal Pay and the Family*, p. 41. The actual sum granted will, of course, have to vary with the local conditions and the general standard of prices.

† We need not here enter into the details of the scheme, which gives alternatives for bringing the allowance into exact relation to a graduated income tax, from which ultimately every endowment will have to be derived. See on this *Equal Pay and the Family*, Appendix, p. 59.

would fully repay itself for the nation. For, by providing the means of subsistence to every mother and child, it would do away with the terrible waste of life and health that is now engendered through the haphazard competitive system with its attendant periods of slack time.

The question here arises whether the endowment should be extended to mothers with illegitimate offspring. From the standpoint just discussed, there cannot be any doubt that the illegitimate child is as much entitled to life's amenities as the more fortunate legitimate one; perhaps—for the sake of society alone—even more so, since it otherwise tends to become a burden and drag on the community. As to the maintenance of the mother in general, the only condition attached to the payment of the endowment should be the adequate discharge by the mother of her duties to the child. If she fulfils these, she has a claim to her endowment, whether she devotes her whole time to the child herself or delegates her responsibilities, as most mothers of the wealthier classes do, to servants, nurses, kindergartens, or schools. Now, as we have seen in a previous chapter, a good many of the illegitimate unions are more or less permanent, the only difference between them and marriage being the absence of legalization. As the State saw fit to extend the war allowance to all the wives and children of such unions,* there is no reason why endowment of motherhood should not be administered on the same principle.

It stands otherwise with those cases of illegitimacy which are due more to passing fancy and which constitute in reality cases of prostitution. It is only natural that objection should be taken to putting a premium on profligacy and encouraging immorality. But even here it would be obviously wrong to let the innocent child

* Maternity benefit under the Insurance Act is also paid to unmarried mothers.

suffer for the sins of the parents. Once more, it can only be a question whether the mother shows sufficient sense of responsibility for the child to undertake its rearing. If so, it is no concern of the State (apart from eugenic reasons) how the child came to be born. The mere fact that the mother is willing to look after her child should be sufficient reason to entitle her to maintenance. If, however, she shows no such inclination to fulfil her duties as mother, she *eo ipso* forfeits the rights of motherhood also. The child will have to be taken from her and put under the guardianship of the State. Indeed, the very fact that the unmarried mother makes use of the endowment in the proper way will in most cases allow fair discrimination between the worthy mother and the loose woman. It has been found that the very means of keeping her child with her is often the truest way towards the mother's regeneration. Maintenance allowance for the unmarried mother, if administered under the outlined *cautelæ*, will hardly tend to increase illegitimacy, which, in any case, is little influenced by economic factors.[1]

Endowment of motherhood implies a very far-reaching social reform tending to revolutionize the whole fabric of family life; and it has met with a good deal of criticism. It is clear that, if family endowment—apart from its purely material effects—is to be a liberating measure for womanhood, it will fail in this result if it does not give economic independence to women of every class and every age. This difficulty has been construed into an argument against the practical possibility of mothers' endowment itself. But all it proves is that the scheme outlined is not complete, as it hardly can be in its beginnings. It does not achieve the desired end, the emancipation of woman, in two respects. In the first

[1] *Equal Pay and the Family*, Appendix, p. 51.—A. Maude Royden, *National Endowment of Motherhood*, p. 10.

instance, it can hardly be asserted that a flat rate of endowment suggested on a working-class basis allows sufficient maintenance to a middle-class household for securing the mother's economic independence. Yet to give her a larger allowance would involve putting a differential value on the work of motherhood according to class, which would in no sense be just or fair. The fact is, that the distinction in earning capacity in our present-day competitive system is not correlative with the work actually done for society; and the same inequality applies also to woman's work. If and when work is paid for according to its actual value to society, then all mothers' work will be equally remunerated—and 'adequately.'

Secondly, it has been argued that since the endowment of the mother will cease when her children are grown up, and her industrial value will be greatly impaired with the cessation of child-bearing, she will have to be pensioned for life. This has been urged as a very serious objection. If the mother should really be unable to do any work at all, the proposition to pension her off, preposterous as it seems to-day, will not appear so to a future generation. But it is greatly to be doubted whether with proper social arrangements work could not be found for mothers who are still in the prime of life and capable of doing work in many capacities. It is our system that is at fault, that so far has not seen fit to make any provision for special woman's work on feminine lines and on a feminine scale. Besides this, it is to be hoped that with the economic betterment of family life due to this very scheme of endowment, worn-out mothers at forty-five will be the exception. Disablement pensions for mothers should then form only an insignificant item in the financial budget of the State.

One of the most formidable-looking objections against subvention of mothers' work in direct wages is the fear,

conjured up, that the husband in the poorer classes, "emancipated from the duty of providing for wife and children," will henceforth cease to earn more than what is absolutely necessary for his own needs; or worse still, that "he would do nothing, but would proceed to give up work and live on his wife's endowment." In short, so the argument runs, there will be a general slackening of effort on man's part to contribute his due share to society's work. In truth, a doleful outlook; and, incidentally, what a picture of the proud English workingman with tools downed to live royally on his wife's income! As if women had not before been earning money in factories and other places side by side with men, without any such general attempt at shirking by men. No doubt, there always have been and will be some men ready to live on their wives' income; but whether it be the wages of industry, or of vice, or of mothers' toil—or, it should not be forgotten, in the upper classes an inherited fortune—it will make very little difference to such parasitical creatures. They have to be dealt with in the ordinary way as social wasters and wastrels.

Another more pertinent question is the effect of mothers' endowment on wages generally. Here there is a real problem, which will have to be faced economically. To us who look upon the subject only from the ethical point of view, the case appears simple. Assuming that the money for endowment of motherhood is found, it can only come from the country's financial resources. Now it makes ultimately no difference how the allocation of wages takes place in each family, so long as a certain amount goes to those who need it. If the mother and her children are *prima facie* entitled to their share, it will make financially very little difference whether their upkeep comes out of the man's wages or whether it is paid by the State to the mother and results in a corre-

sponding decrease of the man's income. The economic balance remains the same. Even with a reduction of man's wages there would be no real loss on either side. The result would be simply as if the dependents of a man had a direct legal claim on his wages. Indeed, by some this tendency is hailed as the solution for the much-discussed problem of "equal pay for equal work."[1] But what is of vital importance is that there should be established the right to maintenance of every woman worker, including the mother. This is only a matter of elementary justice, which will ultimately redound to the benefit of society itself.

A third objection advanced against endowment of motherhood is its supposed dysgenic effect on the birth-rate. It is feared that the breeding of the worst stock of society will be encouraged by the proffered lure of a family pension. Whether it is reasonable to assume that the present scale of endowment will entice women, otherwise unwilling, to undertake the duties of motherhood, is difficult to judge. If there are women—and there are many, many of them—who have to forgo the pleasure of motherhood on account of economic hardship, so much the better for society if these hardships are removed by a scheme of endowment. As for the lowest classes of society, in so far as they are undesirables, they are already procreating at the highest possible rate. An increase in their material comfort may tend, nay, is very likely, to abolish this improvident class to a great extent, and therewith the habit of indiscriminate proliferation. For the birth-rate falls with a rise of prosperity. A reduction rather than an increase of population of this class may thus be expected; while, on the other hand, the class above the border line will have a better chance of rearing the children born to them. Both factors com-

[1] *Equal Pay and the Family*, p. 24, etc.

bined will thus have a eugenic tendency rather than the reverse.

Even illegitimacy, as we have seen in a previous chapter, has not necessarily a dysgenic influence upon offspring, in spite of all that has been said to the contrary. Though an increase of illegitimate children is undesirable on other grounds, it cannot be adduced as a valid argument against the endowment of motherhood. Whether a limitation of family should be or can be insisted upon under certain conditions is another matter. In so far as the mother is unfit to look after her children, she certainly must be deprived of the guardianship and care of them. The limitation of family, however, is a purely eugenic question, and must be dealt with on eugenic lines. Segregation under certain circumstances would be the only remedy.

There remains the final, and, as it seems to its upholders, the most trenchant objection. To quote once more the Whethams, the champions of the old order: "The one essential service a woman renders to the State can neither be judged nor rewarded adequately."[1] Does it follow that it has to be ill-judged or not rewarded at all? As Miss Royden puts it: "It is said, 'You cannot *pay* mothers for what they do for their children.' Of course you cannot. You cannot buy with all the money in the world love and devotion and the willingness to risk life itself to bring life into the world. The mother is perhaps, in one sense, like the soldier. You cannot *pay* a soldier for what he does. You cannot pay a man to be patriotic; you cannot pay him to die; you cannot pay him to give what no money can ever restore or make good to him. But you do not, therefore, argue that he should have nothing at all. You do not say to him, 'Your service

[1] W. C. D. and C. D. Whetham, *Heredity and Society*, p. 73. London, 1912.

is so sacred and noble that we do not dream of offering you any money. If you should happen to want any, no doubt your commanding officer will give you what he thinks proper.' No; the soldier does not get much, but at least we do not leave him without *anything* in return for all he does for us."[1]

Then again, it is argued in the same strain that endowment of motherhood tends to break up the spiritual relationship between husband and wife, by putting an economic nexus between them in place of one that should be only of love and trust. True, marriage should be based upon love; but unfortunately the cash nexus has not the habit of disappearing in marriage maintained upon the old order of "the sweet dependency of woman." It may even be doubted whether a woman's separate income will not remove a good deal of friction in many matters that so often disturb the peace of the home. Those who strenuously oppose woman's matrimonial independence on sentimental grounds seem to imply that the bond of mutual affection in marriage ceases to hold as soon as there is any idea of the wife's economic independence. Yet there are many such wives in the upper classes; and we still have to learn that any objection has been raised against the system prevailing there.

Furthermore, has it ever struck those who defend female dependence on the plea of the sacredness of love, to reverse the situation and imagine the man dependent on the wife? Impossible, it will be said, a sacrilege against all good feeling! True, dependence destroys all true human relationship between partners as equals; both man and wife are, or should be, joint-partners in marriage. This is the underlying theory of its spiritual content. In practice, these same people who believe that true love is based upon mutuality of sentiment claim the economic subjection of the wife

[1] A. Maude Royden, *National Endowment of Motherhood*, p. 5.

as the best and only means of upholding the true ideal of the home. Surely an outworn ideal that does not fit in any longer with the aspiration and dignity of the modern woman. It is just the abolition of this dependency and the initiation of a true partnership between husband and wife that will be the crowning achievement of the endowment of motherhood.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL FACTORS

The social status of woman is closely correlated with her marital position, her legal political rights being to a large extent dependent upon the prevailing conditions of marriage. Though there are exceptions to the rule, it may be said in general that in primitive society woman is subject to the overlordship of man, being indeed often held as his property like slaves and chattels. Even mother-right, we have seen, by no means implied woman's rule; and the patriarchate certainly asserted the full authority of the male. Woman under this system was, in the eyes of the law, simply a minor, and was treated as such.*

In ancient Rome and Greece she could not fulfil the religious rites, and for this reason was excluded from the direct line of descent, which was reckoned by males only.[1] She could not inherit like the sons;[2] could not appear as witness,[3] nor make a will without supervision.[4] Among the old Teutonic tribes a similar relationship held true. Women, though respected and venerated (according to Tacitus), were under guardianship, the husband generally

* As Professor Hobhouse points out against Dr. Westermarck, even kind treatment, sometimes accorded to woman in primitive society, does not invalidate the principle stated above. "Considerate treatment is a totally different thing from equality of rights." See L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 171, note 2.

[1] Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*, p. 53.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[4] E. A. Hecker, *A Short History of Women's Rights*, p. 1. New York, 1910.

also having the lordship of all her property.[1] A decided preference was given in the inheritance to the sons.[2] We have seen already in a previous chapter how the Roman woman at last, in resorting to the expediency of free marriage, broke her legal bondage also, and became a free woman in every sense of the word. She gradually became independent of her guardian, acquired complete control of her property, succeeded to her full share of the paternal inheritance, assumed charge of her children, could engage in business, and had free access to education—indeed, was to all intents and purposes a free agent like man.[3]

Christianity once more submerged woman in a sea of iniquities, in spite of its religious veneration of certain aspects of womanhood. Obedient submission of woman under the law of man became once more the tenet of the times, aggravated at this juncture by the low opinion in which everything feminine was held on account of its supposed lure to lust.[4] And this patriarchal-Christian attitude towards woman held sway until near modern times; or rather we should say it persisted thus especially with regard to the married woman. For, "while the grosser excesses of marital and paternal power died away during the earlier Middle Ages, the subjection of the wife remained. But of the wife only. From the Conquest onwards, the unmarried English woman on attaining her majority became fully equipped with all legal and civil rights. . . . But the wife was still, if not the husband's slave, at any rate his liege subject. Her personality is merged in his."[5]

[1] Hecker, *History of Women's Rights*, pp. 81 and 84.
[2] Marianne Weber, *Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung*, p. 223.
[3] Hecker, *History of Women's Rights*, chap. i.
[4] *Ibid.*, chap. ii.—Weber, *Ehefrau und Mutter*, etc., p. 184.
[5] L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 219.

Thus, while the unmarried woman and widow was relatively independent, a married woman was "under the rod."[1] The liberty and personality of woman were sacrificed to her wifehood. And the position became still worse when with the abolition of the convents her sole means of attaining higher aims came to an end. "Up to this time a woman might become either a wife or a nun; and as a nun she might be artist, poet, teacher, administrator, or woman of business, and receive all due honour and respect. But now this career was closed to her. She could only be a wife."[2]

And so the law still stands in England in substance, though it has been modified in many particulars in order to redress the wrongs of women. "A woman, when she marries," says Mrs. Swanwick, "enters into a state of 'coverture' . . . 'From the earliest times it has been laid down as a fundamental principle of law, a principle upon which the whole law relating to husband and wife has hitherto depended, that by virtue of the marriage a husband and wife become one person in law,'" and, as she pithily remarks, that "that one is the man."[3]

We can trace this inequitable tendency of the law as regards woman's rights in many details, even though it be mitigated by modern changes. Thus it is the father who has the primary and sole control of the custody, maintenance, education, and religious upbringing of his lawful children during his life-time.[4] According to the old law, he could even exert this control partly after his death, by having the power of appointing a guardian of

[1] A. B. and M. Wallis Chapman, *The Status of Women*, Sections I. and II. London, 1909.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[3] Mrs. H. M. Swanwick, *Some Points of English Law*, etc., pp. 8 and 9. London, 1914.
[4] E. Jenks, *Husband and Wife in the Law*, p. 38. London, 1909.

his own choice over his unmarried children.[1] Though this law has been abolished, and the mother is now able to become the guardian of her own children after the death of her husband,[2] and though a mother may, under certain circumstances, be allowed the custody of or access to her child,[3] still in essence the law has remained unaltered, assigning to the father the 'natural' guardianship of the children.[4] As a consequence a mother, when the guilty party in a divorce suit, may be and has been deprived of access to her own children for her lifetime, a legal atrocity that would seem preposterous were it not true.

Indeed, it is hardly credible that in the face of all biological teachings, in spite of the evident psychological fact that the mother is the true nurse and guardian of the young, modern society still holds to the ancient patriarchal notion of marriage, and persists in allotting this rôle in law to the father. Though, as Dr. McDougall points out, the parental instinct is primarily maternal,[5] we insist on replacing it by the legal responsibility of the father, thus continuing the old idea of proprietary relationship, of patriarchal monogamy, which was designed for the purpose of ensuring inheritance among the legitimate issue.[6] Against this there has set in a strong counter-movement, which would place the responsibility for the children entirely upon the mother, where it rests naturally.[7] Now, while it cannot be denied that the physical and psychic bond is closer between mother and child than between father and child, yet mother-right

[1] E. Jenks, *Husband and Wife in the Law*, p. 39. London, 1909.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[4] Mrs. Swanwick, *Some Points of English Law*, etc., p. 24.
[5] W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, eleventh edition, p. 69. London, 1916.
[6] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 375.
[7] Elsie Clews Parsons, "Feminism and the Family," *International Journal of Ethics*, October, 1917, p. 55.

does not seem to us an equitable modern solution of the question. The father, though not primarily imbued with an intense parental instinct, has acquired a sufficiency thereof[1] to be deserving of being the legal co-partner to his children. True family life is built upon a tri-unity of feeling between father, mother, and child, which to-day is still too little recognized by man.[2]

Indeed, instead of depriving man of his future parental opportunities, it would be more appropriate to foster his parental spirit, not for the benefit of the child only, but of his own spiritual life and that of his female partner. If, on the one hand, woman is developing her intellectual powers, becoming the friend and co-worker of man, it is not less essential that man should realize the full charm of home life and try to become more and more the help of his wife and the playmate of his children. Husband and wife should be equal in authority in the family;* there must be true co-partnership, legal as well as spiritual.

In respect of property, the old common law once more asserted the exclusive right of the husband over the wife's belongings. All her "personal" property passed to him on the marriage, except landed property, of which he was entitled to receive only the rents during marriage. Property expressly given to a woman, however, "for her separate use," was free from the husband's control.[3] Thus whatever the wife earned by her own exertion was delivered over to the will of the husband, who might squander it without the wife's having any redress. This state of affairs was radically altered by the passing of the Married Women's Property Act in 1882. Since then a married woman has a legal right to her own

[1] McDougall, *loc. cit.*, p. 169.

[2] Robert Michels, *Sex Ethics*, p. 280.

* This is the proposal of the latest Danish Marriage Bill; see *Manchester Guardian*, May 9th, 1919.

[3] Jenks, *Husband and Wife in Law*, pp. 41 and 43.

earnings, which cannot be alienated either by her husband or by his creditors.

But though a fundamental step has been taken in the right direction, still the spirit of the old law survives in many of the smaller details of property law. Thus "a man can by will leave everything of which he dies possessed away from his wife, even if she has worked for him in home and business all their married life."[1] Again, while the whole real and personal estate of the wife, if she dies intestate, leaving a widower and no children, goes to the husband, she herself, according to law, only receives part of the deceased husband's estate under precisely similar circumstances.[2]

As regards maintenance allowance, the man's liability can only be enforced indirectly, as by pledging his credit, so long, at least, as the wife lives with her husband. Should he fail in his obligation, she has no direct redress against him, unless she is prepared to leave the home with her children; for she can only get an order against him when she has left him.[3] Surely a ridiculous state of affairs in a society which, whilst upholding the holiness of marriage, is so engrossed with the sacred rights of man that it is unwilling to guarantee to the wife the means wherewith to live, unless she breaks her marriage obligation. Again, the fact that the income of the wife is for the purposes of taxation reckoned a part of the husband's earnings, must be looked upon as a relic of the old conception that the woman's property is not her own.*

It is true that the law, as it stands, also carries certain privileges for married women, of which much has been made by some anti-feminists. Thus the husband is liable

[1] Swanwick, *Some Points of English Law*, etc., p. 21.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 21. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

* It is a bad piece of legislation, anyhow, seeing that it increases the burden of the married man; for a large joint-income is liable to higher taxation than two separate small incomes.

for his wife's debts, the old law logically assuming that the husband, on marrying, took over, not only all his wife's property, but also the entire responsibility for her existing debts. The law has now been modified to this extent, that the husband's credit can now be pledged for "necessaries," if he has actually left her without means of support.[1] Furthermore, according to the old law, a married woman was not a legal personality, and could therefore commit no legal wrong in certain respects. The consequence was that the husband was held responsible for the wife's "torts," such as libel, trespass, misappropriation of money, and so forth. Now, though the law has been altered according to the modern tendency, making a married woman responsible for her own torts, still, the husband also remains liable to the full extent, quite apart from the wife's liability.[2] Since the husband, as a rule, is the more likely person for affording fines, it is he generally who is sued in the place of the wife.

It must be admitted that these privileges of woman must be accounted so many disadvantages of man. But it must be remembered that they are merely incidental, not to say accidental, reliefs for women, otherwise heavily burdened by the iniquity of the law. To cease to be a person on account of marriage is a heavy price, indeed, to pay for the small advantages that a married woman gains by sheltering behind her husband under certain legal conditions. Better to realize the fulness of true individual responsibility and take all the consequences of citizenship.

The modern change in woman's outlook is nothing if not thoroughgoing. It pervades her whole individuality, and shows itself in all manner of ways. There would seem to be little in a name, yet how much it may imply to its bearer! To many it stands as a mark of personality:

[1] Jenks, *Husband and Wife in Law*, pp. 54, 55. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

so at least it appears to some advanced women, who, loth to part with their name at marriage, feel that by doing so they yield part of their personality to their husband. And indeed, the loss of the maiden name is expressive of the old-time subjection of women under male rule. No wonder that here too a change has been attempted towards equalizing rights between man and woman. Many women of repute now adopt after marriage a double-barrelled name, by attaching their own name to that of the husband's. This method of using both names obtains, according to Michels, as a routine custom in many lands —*e.g.*, in Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Brazil.[1]

It may also seem a trivial point that a distinction is made between a spinster and a married woman in the manner of their appellation; the former being called Miss, the latter Mrs. This usage obtains in all civilized European countries. No such distinction is made between a bachelor and a married man. Here again, as Michels points out, "the use of such discriminative terms represents for women as a whole an interference on the part of the man-controlled state, of an extremely offensive and morally impermissible character. A close consideration of the problem leads us to ask ourselves what business it is of the majority whether a woman has or has not entered into sexual relationship with a man, and whether before doing so she has passed through certain legal formalities."[2] A thoroughgoing emancipation of woman will sweep away all such man-made distinctive female badges of servitude. Some of the more courageous women have refused to be marked thus any longer.

It is in accordance with this revolt of women that the marriage service is also being attacked on the same grounds. The injunction to woman at the marriage

[1] R. Michels, *Sexual Ethics*, p. 209. [2] *Ibid.*, 207.

ceremony to "obey" the husband is entirely out of keeping with the spirit of the times. It cannot any longer be said to represent the elevated attitude towards matrimony, as understood nowadays. Voices are being raised demanding the omission from the marriage ceremonial of a phrase that, if not degrading to woman, certainly has become meaningless.

The social emancipation of women, carried to its full logical end, leads to further important consequences. It implies the realization of woman's aspirations to participate fully in the intellectual and political life of the nation. As regards the former, access to higher education has had to be gained step by step in every civilized country. There is no need here to describe the history of the spirited struggle of the early pioneers, who made it their object to make the higher professions accessible to women. In England Queen's College, the earliest of women's colleges, was opened in 1849. Women were admitted to the Cambridge local examinations in 1859. Girton was founded in 1869, and Newnham two years later. In 1878 the University of London obtained a new Charter, enabling it to confer degrees on women.[1] There is the less reason to stress the past, since the victory in this field is so overwhelmingly complete, that there is only ground for rejoicing. Whatever hindrances there have been to the higher careers of women, they are fast giving way before the new spirit of the age. Even the old universities, Oxford and Cambridge, which in their conservatism held out longest against women's rights, are yielding in face of the new legislation passed for the admittance of women to all civil professions and vocations.*

And in the political sphere also justice and common

[1] A. B. and M. Wallis Chapman, *The Status of Women*, p. 41.

* The new Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill, now passed into law, decrees that "a person shall not be disqualified by sex from entering or assuming any civil profession or vocation."

sense have at last prevailed over age-long oppression and prejudice. In most advanced countries women either have the vote or are near getting it. England in her customary manner has as a first instalment effected a compromise, giving the vote, not to all women, but only to a number of them, the woman's vote having been made contingent on certain conditions that do not apply in the case of man.* The vote is still withheld from a vast number of women, in order—as the plea goes—not to jeopardize this best of man-ridden worlds. There is no doubt that woman will enter her kingdom in the fulness of time. Seeing that the public civil and judicial posts are now open to her,[1] that she can and has become a Member of Parliament, the day cannot be far off when all the anti-democratic devices for lessening the direct power of woman will be as an old, old tale of a bygone age. For as Tagore says: " In the future civilization the women, the feebler creatures, who are less muscular, and who have been behind-hand, always left under the shadow of those huge creatures, the men, they will have their place."[2]

We have no intention of going into panegyrics over woman, like Benjamin Kidd, who sees in her " the future centre of Power in civilization."[3] A feminine world may be and is likely to be as one-sided in its emotional softness as a man-made world in its hardness and over-rationalization. We have already pointed out, in our previous chapter on psychology, that man and woman are neither

* Thus a woman's vote is given only to householders or ' wives ' of householders, a condition that does not apply to men. Furthermore, a woman is only considered worthy of using a vote at the respectable age of thirty, while men are supposed to have arrived at the age of political discretion at twenty-one, soldiers at still younger years.

[1] According to the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Bill already mentioned.

[2] Rabindranath Tagore, *Personality*, p. 184. London.

[3] Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, p. 195. London, 1918.

equal nor necessarily antagonistic. As man excels by his power of doing, so woman shines by her gift of loving. Both these qualities are needed in life, never more so than to-day, when all the forces at our disposal have to be mustered in order to create a better and humaner world. We shall only be able to combine them by allowing men and women to meet freely for a common fuller and richer life. It will then be recognized, as Edward Carpenter fondly anticipates, "that the sexes do not or should not normally form two groups hopelessly isolated in habit and feeling from each other, but that they rather represent the two poles of *one* group—which is the human race."[1] This must be our final aim; towards this end we have to direct all our energies.

[1] Edward Carpenter, *The Intermediate Sex*, p. 17.

PART IV

SEX AND EDUCATION

THE new outlook, we have seen, tends to view sex and sexuality in a more rational light, treating them as natural facts to be faced and not to be hidden. This is especially evident in the present-day attitude toward the problem of education in sex. There, if anywhere, it has at last been realized that the old " policy of mystery and silence " is worse than useless. It is being recognized, even if slowly, that holiness and virtue in sex matters are not dependent on secrecy and make-believe, but are consistent with, and actually enhanced by, a wholesome naturalness.

It used to be held that the sex impulse, unfolding itself gradually, would, if under proper restraint, find a healthy natural expression by a sort of instinctive intuition. Such an opinion was ill-grounded. Repression there might be, and a kind of ignorant innocence, shut off from life and love; but wherever the sex impulse, too strong for repression, burst its dam, there it led to disastrous consequences. Civilized conditions of life are too complex, especially in matters of sex, to enable us to lead an entirely natural life; and mere instinctive knowledge does not suffice any longer to lead the young and adolescent through the garden-maze of love. In fact, the principle of sex instruction is nowadays admitted on all sides as an urgent social need: there only remains the question of the details, of the when and how.

CHAPTER I

SEX EDUCATION

EDUCATION, it has been maintained with truth, starts in the cradle; and education in sex, strange as it sounds, makes no exception. As a matter of fact, sex education is given from very early childhood, though not in accordance with the latest science. On the one hand, too much emphasis is laid on the physical distinction between the sexes in too early years, arousing a sort of vague sex consciousness which is by no means wholesome. On the other hand, there exists a tendency to regard the child as sexless, that is, to assume that it has no sexual feeling whatsoever, and to enforce this idea by repressing all childish curiosity in such matters. 'This is rude,' we tell the child when it innocently exhibits its body, unaware as yet of doing anything wrong, thus suggesting shamefulness when the child is still delightfully unconscious of it; while at the same time we ruthlessly thwart it in all its primitive, eager efforts towards finding out something about its own body and the bodies of its human and subhuman housemates. Thus whilst too much is made of the child's sexuality in physical respects, too little heed is taken of its mental attitudes and needs. Yet modern science has clearly shown that the child is by no means so asexual as common observation would have it. Indeed, the findings of psycho-analysis have revealed the fact that the sexual life of children is much richer and more varied than was hitherto believed.[1]

[1] See A. Moll, *The Sexual Life of the Child*, London, 1912; but especially Sigmund Freud, *Three Contributions to Sexual Theory;* also Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, second edition. London, 1918.

This does not mean that the child is sexual in the ordinarily accepted sense; it is unconscious of its promptings,[1] its sexuality being more generalized and multiform than in the adult. It is important to realize this "sexual infantilism"; for only by giving it due recognition shall we avoid the blunder of violently repressing certain questioning tendencies in children, which, if they do not find a legitimate outlet, tend later on to produce serious moral and mental trouble. In short, the child is entitled to have its questions answered, and answered as far as possible truthfully within the limits of its understanding. Children, it has been found, form their own sex and birth theories, which, if not corrected in proper time, are apt to warp their mental and moral outlook. The fact is that, do what we may, complete exclusion of sex knowledge in the education of the child is impossible; and it is better to grapple with the problem in honest daylight than let "the cardinal thing in life sneak in darkly and shamefully like a thief in the night."

And the first thing to be noted and condemned in this respect is the false shame that is afraid of naming sexual things (including the excretory functions) by their appropriate names. Clement of Alexandria already pointed out that "no one ought to be ashamed of naming what God was not ashamed to create."[2] If we want sex to be beautiful, we must not hesitate to make so everything connected with it.* This is not done by over-emphasizing

[1] See Freud, *Three Contributions to Sexual Theory;* also H. Ellis, "Psycho-Analysis in Relation to Sex," *Journal of Mental Science,* October, 1917.

[2] Quoted by Donaldson, *Woman,* etc., p. 152.

* It would seem ridiculous, were it not so tragical, that even Societies that make sex education their object have not the courage to use the term "sex" in their very designation. Thus there is a 'Moral' Education Society which is in truth a Sex Education Society, and an Association for 'Social' Hygiene which has as its aim the promotion of sexual hygiene. Education should surely begin with the educators!

the sexual function in an emotional appeal to children's exclusiveness and mystic sacredness, but by a straightforward naturalness, which, whilst preserving a sense of dignity, treats sex affairs as life's common tasks. It is to our mind the very overstressing of the sexual and excretory functions in a negative sense that, by overweighting their importance, creates in the child's mind the very atmosphere of absorption that it is intended to avoid. It is harmful to make a shibboleth of sex, either positively or negatively.

During the age of childhood, there is no doubt, the best educator is the mother or, if need be, some adult confidant, not excluding the father. No technical instruction is needed, only gentle and tactful guidance in directing impulses and satisfying childish curiosity regarding the primitive facts of life. It must be pointed out here that children are apt to ask questions at a very early age, and that no shirking of issues at whatever stage can possibly do any good. A child cannot be told everything, but a trustful atmosphere once engendered will ease the answer for many an awkward problem, which can be solved to the child's satisfaction in gentle hints without untruths.

Much is made by many writers of the question as to who is to give sex instruction to boys and to girls respectively. To our mind, the very discussion of the problem is irrelevant. No person is fit to undertake the task of sex education of the young at any stage who has not a free and an easy mind on the subject and cannot give the necessary facts without embarrassment; and of all the impediments in this direction a feeling of sex consciousness is the greatest. But this sex consciousness is by no means always absent between persons of the same sex; not even between the mother and her girl-child. Our mothers have, thanks to our perverted notions of purity, still too little naturalness of mind about their own functions to be

entirely at ease with their children. The result is that under the present circumstances it is often better to leave sex enlightenment to someone else who feels less personal in the matter. Otherwise there can be only one rule—namely, that the sex of the instructor is of no account, as long as the subject itself is dealt with in a simple, delicate, and natural manner. For this reason it is most imperative, at the present juncture, to start with the sex instruction of the mothers themselves, of which more anon.

The fact is that, apart from the most elementary information, the mother, and even the father, has generally too little knowledge to be able to give proper sex instruction to young people beyond the early years, say after the age of ten to twelve. There remains the only alternative, if sex teaching is to be given at all, of giving it outside the home. Hence it appears strange that there should still be any doubt as to the propriety of giving sex instruction at school.* The fear that the personal touch of sympathy will be missing, so that sex instruction in school will be of a hazardous nature, is quite baseless. Such an attitude merely betrays the old moralizing tendency that used to pervade all attempts at guiding the young in sex. It creates an atmosphere of unhealthy suggestiveness, if not of impatient repulsion. Sex should be dealt with as a natural phenomenon, and can as such be taught in class. All theoretical objections are as nothing against actual successful experiments, and these have been made in different countries, especially in America.[1]

What is much more important is to decide how to

* At the Eugenic Education Conference held in March, 1913, many speakers expressed the opinion that sex teaching could find no place in the curriculum of an ordinary school; on the whole, more voices were raised against it than in favour of it. See *Eugenics Review*, April, 1913.

[1] *Eugenics Review*, July, 1912, p. 145; April, 1913, pp. 27, 52.

approach the subject of sex in both these stages, that of the very young and that of school children. It has been forcibly argued by many writers that the most appropriate way to introduce the sex factor of life is by illustrations from botany. By this means it is thought to overcome the difficulty of introducing the awkward problem of mating in sex, the botanical facts having a less direct bearing on human physiology. There is no doubt that with the present-day distortion of the sexual sense a certain hesitation seems unavoidable before bringing sex facts to the notice of youngsters who hitherto have heard of them only with bated breath. But to us it would seem that this is the very atmosphere that must be destroyed. This can only be done by courageously facing the problem and letting in the fresh air of truth as the best antidote to the poison of timid suggestion. Furthermore, it must be doubted very much whether the analogy from botanical science is at all suitable in the instruction of children. The process of fertilization in flowers, however beautifully explained, cannot easily be followed by the young, and certainly is not easily understood in its relation to animal mating; the points of comparison are too subtle and unreal for the child's mind. Plants, and especially the flowering parts of the plant stock, are not persons in any sense for the child. The analogy by its very remoteness from the facts of human physiology fails in its purpose. There seems to us no reason whatever why the phenomena of birth, and later on of mating, should not be made clear at the very beginning from animal physiology.

Indeed, the facts of animal life obtrude themselves on every observant child. That the hen lays eggs which are hatched out afterwards as chicks, that the cat has kittens, the dog puppies, belongs to the commonplace experiences of childhood, and is the subject of every-day conversation;

not to mention the much more extended experiences of children in the country. Why wander into far-off fields and give facts that are not directly observable by the child, when our best examples, our animal companions, are so near at hand? The biological approach through animal physiology seems to us the most natural and direct, and certainly not the least feasible line of sex instruction.

The whole process of sex teaching is biased nowadays by the difficulty of starting with a proper atmosphere; the attitude of the pupils is warped by previous unhealthy mental and moral associations with sex. The truth is that there should be no need for special sex education at all; the facts of sex physiology should be taught as part and parcel of general animal physiology. Only thus would sex find its proper place among the other facts of life, and lose that privileged position which, however well camouflaged scientifically, obtrudes itself only too readily upon the mind of the young. Sex would then appear gradually in the course of the training in biology as one of many subjects and thus gain only so much natural attention as it deserves at this stage.

For this reason we agree with Bigelow, who holds that no "sex specialists" are wanted at school.[1] Similarly the great single selected sermon on sex, habitually administered for the moral benefit of young people at the crucial periods of their lives, is entirely reprehensible on the same grounds. In the first place, it generally comes too late, young people generally having acquired some unwholesome sex information long before; and secondly, such a concentrated application of sex wisdom is not and cannot be educative in any sense. It only emphasizes the mysteriousness of sex without relieving it. "The only sure pathway to a healthy attitude in

[1] M. A. Bigelow, *Sex-Education*, p. 115. New York, 1910.

morals is in beginning with young children and instructing them as gradually as the problems of sex come forward."[1] We may assume that boys and girls on reaching puberty will be acquainted with the nature and technical names of the main parts of the sexual and excretory organs; and also, in the case of girls, with the meaning of menstruation.[2] It is no doubt advisable, with the tradition prevailing at the present time, to segregate the sexes when teaching boys and girls the elementary human facts of sex physiology; and any illustrations shown should be diagrammatical and not full-sized pictures.

The problem becomes more difficult when we come to the stage of adolescence. This is reached somewhat earlier in boys on account of their mental precocity in sex matters, and may be put at fourteen or fifteen; in girls a year later. It may be reckoned to last up to eighteen or nineteen, in some girls even up to twenty. The initiation of young people into the fuller meaning of sexual life is by no means an easy task, and it requires great care and skill not to arouse either undue pruriency or excessive curiosity. The facts of intercourse, elementary ideas about the social evils of sex, will have to be brought gradually to the notice of young people. In the case of boys masturbation will have to be mentioned, by no means as a matter of routine, but merely when and if occasion should make it a matter of urgency. Undue insistence on the evils of self-abuse, as we have said in a previous chapter, only tends to create a false sense of excitement, which is anything but wholesome to a lad.

It will also be necessary with advancing years to introduce some elementary knowledge of sex psychology, the aims and purpose of love and marriage, and the social factors

[1] M. A. Bigelow, *Sex-Education*, p. 26. New York, 1910.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 148 and 151; also H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 60.

of sexual ethics. Those who believe that such questions should be left to a still later age forget that most of these things obtrude themselves unavoidably on the young; through picture palaces, the theatre, art and literature young people are bound to come up sooner or later against problems that crave explanation. Pristine ignorance is not held any longer, as it used to be, the wisest safeguard of a virtuous life.

Nor is it the best equipment for marriage itself. We can hardly contemplate with equanimity the fate of two young married lovers who, left to themselves, will have to 'muddle through' somehow. We have learnt too much about the complexities of sex psychology to leave to intuition the difficult task of finding the right adjustment in all the intricacies of married life. Wedlock will be less of a hazard when young people are taught to prepare for it fittingly, as they are now trained and equipped for a profession in life. "Women," says Havelock Ellis, "are trained for nearly every avocation under the sun; for the supreme avocation of wifehood and motherhood they are never trained at all;"[1] and, we must add, neither are men for their task in marriage. In this respect our methods are sadly behind the customs of primitive people, whose initiation rites are nothing if not thorough, including a proper course of instruction in sex matters, lasting for weeks or months, and never identical for both sexes.[2] What is necessary is that men and women should acquire a proper understanding, not only of the physical sex processes, but still more of the psychic elements of sexual life. Only by a thorough comprehension of the spiritual factors, as they bear upon physical sex function, can a full and harmonious union be reached in marriage.

[1] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 520.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 520; also Mrs. S. Herbert, *Sex Lore*, p. 87. London, 1917.

The task of bringing enlightenment to those who need it is rendered extremely difficult, not so much by the nature of the subject-matter alone, delicate as this is, as by the persistent antagonism of those well-meaning but obscurantist people who try to promote morality by denying sex. It is they who raise all sorts of objections to the appropriateness of the means and methods of sex education, doing their utmost to strangle the new movement before it has had a chance of proving its value. The argument used to be that classes and lectures would be impossible on ethical grounds. In spite of all ill forebodings they have been an immense success everywhere, even in England. Another great objection has been made against mixed classes. Here there is no need for quarrelling. There is no imperative necessity to have mixed classes, whether at colleges or among the general public. Still, they are by no means so impossible, even with the present state of affairs, as the obstructionists would have it. If successfully conducted, they engender a feeling of natural sympathy between the sexes, which, to our mind, only a co-educational course can give.*

Lastly, it is said that sex instruction should not be given through books; and, indeed, the issue of such books, until the last few years, has been successfully obstructed.† The truth is, most of the books on sex were "so vague,

* The author has given a two years' course on the Physiology and Psychology of Sex to a mixed popular audience of all ages, from twenty years upwards, with most admirable results. The interest showed itself particularly in the questions and debate after each lecture.

† We should like to remind English readers that the great pioneer work of Havelock Ellis, the *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, could not be printed in England and had to be published in America. It cannot be obtained in the ordinary way through the book trade, and is unobtainable in the libraries. Indeed, all books on sex instruction are still banned from the Public Free Libraries; and for the matter of that, from the private circulating libraries too. And this in face of the great public cry for sex education!

incomplete, old-fashioned, dogmatic, or cranky," that they fulfilled the purpose of the adversaries admirably—they rather obscured than furthered sex knowledge. The opposition to sex books (of the right kind) is based upon the English idea that sexual matters should not be named or, if mentioned at all, only talked about with bated breath in a mysterious, nondescript manner. Nothing, in our opinion, tends more to a false, sophisticated attitude towards sex than this persistent pontifical air about it. "To the pure all things are pure" is a trite saying, but none the less true about sex. Those who wished to cull pruriencies from books did not need to wait for modern textbooks on sex; the Bible and Shakespeare were always handy. It is hardly fair to condemn books because some people may abuse them. Scientific textbooks, with their dry, matter-of-fact style, are, in any case, much less apt to arouse emotional fancies than other more imaginatively written works. We fully realize the danger of over-detailed accounts of sex abnormalities, as given in some of the foreign popular books on sex. They are not meant for the young; though in the later adolescent stage a modicum of such knowledge seems unavoidable. We must always remember that the dark side of life can rarely be hidden completely from the ken of the young enquirer. Sex education by appropriate books is becoming the one great means of bringing proper knowledge to all those—now forming the majority of the population—who cannot be reached by classes or lectures. In addition, books which can be read in the privacy of the home, can be studied and digested, are a necessary adjunct to all educational efforts as in all other branches of knowledge.

Sex instruction has a twofold purpose. It has to give guidance to the individual person for his own life; and it has the wider scope of enlarging the horizon of man and

woman, of giving them a vision of each other that will make for a truer and better understanding between the sexes. For this purpose external facts are not enough; they are, after all, the mere husk of the full inwardness of life itself. The sexes, in order fully to value and appreciate each other's qualities and powers, can only gain this inside knowledge by mingling freely with each other in a natural and unrestrained manner. We have emphasized this necessity on more than one occasion; here we would refer to it once again from the particular view of physical and moral sex education.

It has already been mentioned that conventional sex education fails in its object by hiding blushingly what should obviously be a natural object of beauty for every human being—the human body itself. It tries to create a sense of shame of the bodily functions much too early, and presses it beyond the necessary point. This system merely carries out to its logical conclusion the theory of the sinfulness of the flesh, pushed to such extremes by the Christian Church. As we have seen in a previous chapter, nakedness among primitive people is by no means taboo in the same way as in our present-day over-wrought civilization. Nor can it be maintained that nudity in itself is incompatible with modesty. Such a notion is simply the result of our modern perverted sense of the human body. There exists modesty with nakedness; and, on the other hand, clothes are not only compatible with immodesty, but can be and have been made, as everybody knows, a direct means towards it.[1]

We can even go farther with Havelock Ellis, who says: "There ought to be no question regarding the fact that it is the adorned, the partially concealed body, and not the absolutely naked body, which acts as a sexual exci-

[1] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. I., "The Evolution of Modesty."

tant."[1] Hirschfeld also makes it clear that the genital region in special does by no means exert such a strong visual stimulation as is generally believed.[2] The nude, in ceasing to be regarded as indecent, loses by this very process its opprobriousness, and becomes once more what it always has been—natural.

The best proof that this movement is tending in the right direction can be seen from the latest result of mixed bathing. Who would nowadays still object to mixed bathing? Truly, never was the raven's croak more belied by facts than in this case. Youths and maidens, and incidentally parents with their children of both sexes, can now enjoy their joint water and sun baths without running the risk of going straight down the road to perdition, as was prophesied of them. One only needs to watch the (scantily-clad) bathers, unconcerned as they are about each other's bodies; or, if at all conscious, enthusiastic over the aesthetic beauty of a specially fine type of humanity, in order to realize the refining, educative influence of nakedness. The attitude that man and woman take up to each other depends a good deal upon a true sense of comradeship; and this can best be developed by abolishing all those pruderies that still surround the co-mingling of the sexes.

[1] H. Ellis, *Psychology of Sex*, Vol. VI., p. 97.
[2] M. Hirschfeld, *Die Naturgesetze der Liebe*, p. 110.

CHAPTER II

CO-EDUCATION

If, as has been rightly said, education is a preparation for life, then co-education would seem one of the best means of attaining that end. Yet the opponents of co-education not only fail to see this implication, but are actually endeavouring to find reasons for showing the disadvantages of such a system. To train the sexes apart during school life, and then to fling them together in society on the chance of their realizing harmonious co-operation, is at best a gambler's game. But that is what we are doing at present. In view of the fact that boys and girls pass the greatest part of their day-time at school (and later at college), it would seem imperative to let them enjoy the advantage of their mutual company, so that they should come to know and value each other in work and play. To anybody not biased by an anti-sexual attitude, this would seem common sense, a natural fact, no more, no less. But, as it is, according to Grant and Hodgson, it was the medieval monastic system "which determined the general character of education and produced the stereotyped form from which the English Public School has grown."[1] As these authors so well elucidate, it is to the historical influence of ecclesiasticism and anti-feminism that we must attribute the "dogged persistence of an obsolete tradition."[2]

[1] Cecil Grant and Norman Hodgson, *The Case for Co-education* p. 110. London, 1913.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

The case against co-education is based on two main lines of argument, the objections raised being on grounds either of intellectual or of ethical difficulties. We shall deal with the former first. As regards elementary co-education, it is almost universally admitted both in principle and in practice.[1] The drawbacks, if any, are so slight as never to have presented any real obstacle. In villages and small places it was for economic reasons the only feasible system, and was accepted accordingly. It stands differently with secondary schools and colleges. Here it is maintained that co-education is wrong in principle and bad in practice, because it traverses the natural law of the mental inequality of the sexes.[2] Furthermore, if the school is to give men and women an appropriate vocational training, then, so the argument runs, co-education is impossible, since the two sexes have different objectives in life.

As to the first contention, the mental inequality of men and women, we have already fully dealt with it in the chapter on the psychical differences between the sexes. We have seen there that the differences, in so far as they exist, are not fundamental; they only concern the mode of acquiring knowledge, not the capacity itself. Besides, this cannot affect the problem under discussion, since the professional training of women is now an established fact. Contrary to Stanley Hall's conception, modern society does not focus any longer woman's education exclusively on motherhood and wifehood.[3] This was shown, conclusively, we hope, in our previous chapter on woman's work. The plea that woman's training should mainly fulfil the function of fitting her for these womanly vocations cannot any longer be upheld.

[1] Grant and Hodgson, *The Case for Co-education*, p. 161.
[2] J. L. Tayler, *The Nature of Woman*, p. 132. London, 1912.
[3] Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, vol. ii., chap. xvii.

If we accept these two conclusions, it follows that co-education is not incompatible with the scheme of life for both sexes alike. Far from it; the case against the co-educational school on this ground is not vital at all. For girls' higher education in general, though no longer aping men's ideals, is modified only in certain directions to meet woman's needs, and by no means so greatly as would interfere with co-educational reforms.[1] There is, as Bigelow says, "on the whole really little possibility of sex-differentiated education."[2] And, in so far as it is needed, it is not incompatible with a co-educational scheme.

Professor Welton, in his *Psychology of Education*, expresses the opinion that "really at the bottom of the advocacy of mixed schools lies the idea that true evolution means the gradual elimination of the difference of sex."[3] But, as we have laboured to show right through this book, this is essentially not the standpoint of the modern sex reformer. Co-educationists, far from overlooking or trying to abolish sex differences, which in the nature of the case would be an absurd proceeding, rather emphasize the importance of the co-educational system on account of these very sex distinctions. Co-education does essentially not imply identical treatment of boys and girls;[4] it does not mean, as one of the earlier opponents of co-education states, that "boys and girls are taught the same things at the same time, in the same place, by the same faculty, with the same methods, and under the same régime."[5]

[1] Alice Wood, editor of *Advance in Co-education*, essay ii. London, 1919.

[2] M. A. Bigelow, *Sex-Education*, p. 82.

[3] J. Welton, *The Psychology of Education*, p. 137. London, 1911.

[4] Grant and Hodgson, *The Case for Co-education*, pp. 143, 189, 275.

[5] Mabel Hawtrey, *The Co-education of the Sexes*, p. 13. London, 1896.

On the contrary, the co-educationist sees in the common school life an educational means for accommodating the two sexes to each other for their mutual benefit. "For the claim of one sex to the consideration of the other seems to rest not on the denial but on the affirmation of the sex distinction and the value of each sex to the other."[1] If, as Professor Thomson points out, "the sexes should be taught together *and* taught separately, taught by men *and* by women,"[2] then the co-educational school arranged on the plan of the "elective" system (with subjects separate for boys and girls, whenever needed) should be the ideal means for attaining this end.[3]

Finally, it is argued that the co-educational scheme is bound to fail in so far as it is not fitted for providing adjustment for the differential rate of mental development between boys and girls at different periods. There is no doubt that girls mature more quickly and are intellectually somewhat in advance of boys in earlier years, and that they fall behind during adolescence (between the ages of fifteen to eighteen). But the co-educationists find this by no means such an insuperable difficulty as their opponents make out. It is for them merely a matter of careful grading, which those who have experience do not consider less feasible than in the case of separate schools of backward and advanced scholars.[4] On the contrary, they find that common class-room work of boys and girls supplies a welcome mental stimulus. "The girls have, in the main, more steadiness of effort, work with fewer lapses; but the boys as a rule have greater effectiveness, more quickness in grasping essentials. In competition the boys must gain from the standard of industry set by the girls; the girls must profit by the

[1] Grant and Hodgson, *The Case for Co-education*, p. 133.
[2] *The Position of Woman*, p. 25.
[3] Grant and Hodgson, *loc. cit.*, p. 181. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

vigorous concepts of the boys. This constant interchange of human tendencies, and balancing of human qualities, has great educational value."[1]

We come now to the second set of arguments, the objections based on moral grounds. These appear more formidable from the opponent's point of view than those previously discussed. They are bound to be so to them; for we touch here the crucial issue, that of the sexual problem itself. It is maintained that the intermingling of the sexes at school is objectionable on account of its bad ethical influence on both, boys and girls. Co-education, so it is said, tends to an accentuation of erotism in young people; it not only stresses a false emotionalism, but lessens, as Stanley Hall has it, the motives towards that ideal conduct which, according to the notions of true chivalry, should prevail between the sexes;[2] at its worst it endangers school life by giving facilities for direct sexual immorality.[3]

To the latter point we attach little weight as an argument against co-education. We might on the same ground condemn the whole existing semi-monastic Public School system, because, as is admitted on all sides, if it does not directly foster, it cannot prevent the occurrence of "manly vice." Such arguments are specious and have little intrinsic value. The occurrence of vice does not invalidate the school system in itself, as it is merely an excrescence upon it, which it is the business of good management to overcome.

As to the excessive erotic influence at co-educational schools, the standpoint taken up will depend entirely upon our general attitude to the sex problem. If we believe in the restriction of social intercourse between

[1] Alice Wood, *Advance in Co-education*, p. 40.
[2] Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, vol. ii., p. 621.
[3] Northcote, *Christianity and Sex Problems*, p. 60.

the sexes, holding that they have the best chance of growing up in purity when having little experience of each other, then, of course, the present dual school system is the best to meet that need. Such an outlook in its austerity finds the close intermingling of the sexes in actual life not only unnecessary, but harmful, and leading to an "undignified view" of sex.

Co-education in school and public life is feared as tending to a subversion of sexual morality, in spite of all evidence to the contrary. But, strange to say, even those who are not thorough upholders of co-education have to admit the benefit of some sort of direct influence of the sexes on each other. According to the view of Dr. McDougall, "the normal family, containing several boys and girls and maintaining friendly relations with other families, provides the best environment for the child. . . . The repression and sublimation of the sex impulse during childhood and youth is an essential condition for the development and maintenance in any society of a high level of culture. . . . It is here that the influence of good mothers and pure sisters is of so much importance."[1] Yet the same author takes care to warn us that his argument against too strict a segregation of the sexes "may not be interpreted without reserve as a justification of 'co-education of the sexes.'"[2] It is difficult to see where the distinction lies between moral co-education at home and at school, except in the fact that the mere congregation of boys and girls at school involves an ethical factor that cannot be controlled. Theoretically there might have seemed to be some truth in it; but facts have proved stronger than theory. The evidence of those who have conducted co-educational schools is all on the other side. The co-educational system, far from being an evil influence, is, on the contrary,

[1] McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 418. [2] *Ibid.*

found to be in itself "directly favourable to the growth of purity."[1] Experience has borne out this evidence. It must not be forgotten that co-educational schools exist already in great number. Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark have them; there are some in Germany, and some even in England. As regards America, the majority of schools and colleges there are on the mixed system.

"Boys and girls," so Stanley Hall writes, "need a different discipline and moral regimen and atmosphere."[2] He bases this opinion on the well-known idea that boys, being more boisterous, are inclined to "more vigorous forms of expression"; while girls, with their innate delicacy, are apt to be more dreamy and self-absorbed. This difference, though not wholly extinguished or extinguishable, has become much less accentuated of late with the rigorous intellectual and gymnastic training that girls nowadays have. And even if the distinction remains, co-educationists, anxious not to make their schools sexless, find in this very difference the greatest asset to their system.

It is this very mutual influence of the sexes on each other that is so advantageous to boys and girls alike. The boys' standard of manner and courtesy is raised; the girls gain in independence and directness.[3] Nor does the contention that boys and girls at certain periods are apt to shun each other and to seek rather company of their own in any way offer insuperable difficulties: the co-educational school, as Grant and Hodgson point out, is well able to provide for this contingency also.[4] All co-educationists are agreed on this point, that the atmosphere at mixed schools raises the general standard of moral behaviour of the sexes to each other, without any

[1] Grant and Hodgson, *The Case for Co-education*, p. 221; also Alice Wood, *Advance in Co-education*, chaps. ix. and x.
[2] Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, vol. ii., p. 620.
[3] Grant and Hodgson, *loc. cit.*, pp. 255, 257. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 253.

risk of either sex losing its individuality or charm. "The truth about both boys and girls is this: each sex is most itself in the presence of the other."[1]

It is the unnatural separation of boys and girls that, by concentrating their attention on the object of sex, engenders that unhealthy state of mind which we all find so deplorable. The co-educational method, far from forcing this consciousness, rather has the opposite effect. Even if it is a fact that, as Stanley Hall deplores, " a little charm and bloom is rubbed off by close contact,"[2] we on our part welcome the *camaraderie* between boys and girls as a sign of a healthy sex spirit, which surely ought not to be discouraged. " With the disappearance of the romance which attaches to secrecy and mystery there goes," as Grant and Hodgson explain, " more than half the charm of adventure "[3]—and with it the risk of what the opponents of co-education fear so much, illicit attachments. Indeed, as Westermarck quotes with approval, " between lads and girls who have been educated in the same school there is a remarkable absence of erotic feelings."[4]

No interference would seem so strange, so unreasonable and so harmful as the artificial separation of the sexes. Nature has avenged herself by heaping on society those tremendous sex difficulties with which we are only just learning to cope. If we wish truly to solve the problem of sex, we must begin at the beginning, and realize that the sexes are destined for each other; that, as Grant and Hodgson have it, "a higher evaluation of all social relationships is impossible without the presence of the sex which constitutes one half of society."[5]

[1] Alice Wood, Editor of *Co-education*, p. 85. London, 1903.
[2] Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, vol. ii., p. 621.
[3] Grant and Hodgson, *The Case for Co-education*, p. 240.
[4] Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, vol. ii., p. 375.
[5] Grant and Hodgson, *loc. cit.*, p. 219.

CONCLUSION

We have now run the whole length of our argument. We have tried to envisage a 'sexual renaissance,' a new outlook of love and marriage which, to quote Mrs. Havelock Ellis, will probably "be a blending of healthy, temperate animalism with that rare mating when soul lies by soul."[1] For as Jung declares: "Despite all the indignant assertions to the contrary, the problems and conflicts of love are of fundamental importance to humanity."[2] It is no use trying to blink these facts. "It is both more interesting and more useful to study carefully the basic cases than to chime in with the lamentations of the professional mourners over morals, who prophesy with unction the moral downfall of humanity. The moralizer least of all trusts God, for he thinks that the beautiful tree of humanity can only thrive by dint of being pruned, bound, and trained on a trellis, whereas Father-Sun and Mother-Earth have combined to make it grow joyfully in accordance with its own laws, which are full of the deepest meaning."[3]

The new spirit does not mean riotous indulgence in place of the old notion of asceticism equally ruinous. To quote the apt words of Professor Sorley, used in another connection: "It is the moralization, not the annihilation of ambition and desire that is demanded, the bringing of

[1] Mrs. Havelock Ellis, *The New Horizon*, MS. essays.
[2] C. G. Jung, *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, second edition, p. 366. London, 1917.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 369.

one's sensuous nature into harmony with the realization of a rational personality."[1] For this purpose we must tame and repress the sexual impulse within reasonable limits, so as to bring it into conformity with the law of social ethics. To show how this may be done without doing injustice to either the physical or the moral nature of Man has been our task.

All such efforts at finding a way out from the present sex tangle can only be tentative. We live in a period of transition; great changes are going on around us, and he would be a bold prophet who would venture on prophecy.

To those who would fain cast aspersion on our attempt, claiming righteousness solely on their side, we should like to retort that Morality dwelleth in the house of truth, not of self-righteousness. The world does not stand still —for all their efforts. As Westermarck so well remarks: "Far above the vulgar idea that the right is a settled something to which everybody has to adjust his opinions rises the conviction that it is capable of any expansion, proclaiming its own right to exist, if needs be venturing to make a stand against the whole world."[2] And this applies as much to sex matters as to other facts of social life. "It is," to quote another author, "at least conceivable that our present complacent assurance that every individual must live and act within the arbitrary limits assigned by conventional and purely artificial standards of conduct, or else be segregated from society, may be fallacious and inimical to the best development of the race."[3]

If we want to make sluggish time move on, if we wish to progress, much will have to be attempted, much to be

[1] W. R. Sorley, *The Moral Life*, p. 22. London, 1911.
[2] Westermarck, *Moral Ideas*, Vol. I., p. 20.
[3] B. Hart, *The Psychology of Insanity*, p. 171. Cambridge, 1916.

ventured; experiments, and even failures, are unavoidable here as in every other field. Let us not cavil at these endeavours, heroic though they seem, towards seeking a new world of wonder in love, but cherish the wise words of the seer and sage Hinton: "Nothing degrades save what is in the soul."[1]

[1] Quoted by Mrs. H. Ellis in *Three Seers*, p. 147.

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